

Social Spatial Borders Delimiting Difference in Berlin

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Abstract

This ideational dissertation delves into the philosophy and theory of social space, and arrives at a theoretical vision of social space which can help explain social processes in Berlin. Drawing on Lefebvre, theories of difference and multiplicity are spatialised. Conversely, drawing on theories of difference and multiplicity from transnational urbanism and feminist geography, the limits of Lefebvre's theory of social difference are exposed. While the theories of Lefebvre are heavily based on Marx, the feminist poststructural theories of difference are based in the discourse on infinite flexibility, fragmentation, and radical multiplicity. There is thus a gaping cleft between the two theoretical perspectives. To illustrate the limitations and possibilities of these perspectives, two social phenomena are described. The first involves the post-Wall squatter scene in Berlin. The second involves experiences of newcomers in Berlin. By examining the theory of produced space from Lefebvre, the theories of coeval and flexible multiplicity from Doreen Massey, the theories transnational feminist geographies of Geraldine Pratt, and the imagery of flexible everything from Zygmunt Bauman, some theoretical borders of squatters and newcomers come into focus. The geographies of squatter movements and newcomers' history reveal not only a profound lack of centrality, rather an extensive trans-territorial network. They also show that difference is deeply spatialised and material. A bridge between Lefebvre and poststructuralist difference might be found in the rethinking Lefebvre's necessary centrality of social space, as the economic reductionism his Marxism requires. At the same time, the discourse on difference might benefit from a deeper analysis of the materiality of space. This dissertation is therefore an entry point into the general rethinking of social space.

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Contents

Preface	viii
1.0 Introduction	1
1.1 Objective.....	1
1.2 Methodology and research approach.....	7
2.0 Lefebvre, difference, and theorising social space	12
2.1 The production of social contradictory space from Lefebvre	14
2.1.1 The plan of Lefebvre's 'work'	15
2.1.2 dialectic social space.....	19
2.1.3 Social space has form, structure, and function.....	22
2.1.4 Social space is not neutral.....	22
2.1.5 Social space is inscribed and decodable	23
2.1.6 The architectonics of social space.....	27
2.1.7 Social space is an abstraction of the absolute	30
2.1.8 Social space is contradictory.....	32
2.2 Considering difference and multiplicity.....	35
2.2.1 Bauman on flexible everything.....	39
2.2.2 Massey – multiplicity thrown together	41
2.2.3 Bourdieu – fields of difference	44
2.2.4 Pratt and Smith on transnationalism	48
2.2.5 Fraser and Benhabib – reorganizing democracy with difference.....	50
2.3 The compatibilities of various theories in social space	54
2.3.1 Necessary and real social space	58
2.3.2 Unnatural social space	61

2.3.3 Non-neutral social space	62
2.3.4 Dialectic and dynamic social space	64
3.0 Restricted by the border – two contradictory Berliner stories	67
3.1 A Story of Refusal and Exit	68
3.1.1 House Squats.....	71
3.1.1.1 Köpi	73
3.1.1.2 Rigaer94	74
3.1.1.3 NewYorck59.....	79
3.1.1.4 Brunnenstraße 183	81
3.1.1.5 Tacheles.....	83
3.1.2 Wagendörfer	89
3.1.2.1 Schwarzer Kanal.....	89
3.1.2.2 Lohmühle.....	90
3.2 A Story of Entry – In through the Outdoor?.....	92
3.2.1 Arrival.....	93
3.2.1.1 Statistics and the current situation in Berlin	94
3.2.1.2 Border crossing.....	98
3.2.2 Stay	100
3.2.2.1 Image production and experience	100
3.2.2.2 The school system as regulated exclusion	102
3.2.2.3 Language	104
3.2.2.4 Neutrality versus diversity	107
3.2.2.5 No-go areas?	111
3.2.2.6 Segregation and ghettoization?	114
3.2.3 Departure	117
3.2.3.1 Residency towards citizenship.....	118
3.2.3.2 Removal orders, detentions and deportation.....	119
4.0 Spatialising the Stories	123
4.1 Two theoretical lenses.....	124
4.1.1 The triad.....	124
4.1.2 Poststructural multiplicity	129
4.1.3 Everything social is spatialised	131
4.2 Possibilities in social spatial theory - Lefebvre versus Poststructural difference.....	132
4.2.1 Multiple centres	135
4.2.2 Space not reduced to economic forces	139

4.2.3 Centre and periphery that transcend the urban.....	143
4.3 Grasping social spatial borders	145
4.3.1 Differentiation, hybridisation, and the problem of classification.....	147
4.3.2 Vertical power	152
4.4 Closures and Possibilities.....	156
 References	 163
 Sources.....	 171

List of Figures

Figure 1: Placards and graffiti	71
Figure 2: “Free Space” imagined	75
Figure 3: <i>Tacheles</i> after renovations.	86
Figure 4: Restoring the Brandburger Tor.	93
Figure 5: A governmental postcard “German Turk” (Deutsche Türkin).....	107
Figure 6: Graffiti sticker found in former eastern district of Berlin.....	115
Figure 7: Stamps to pass through the port	118

Preface

This dissertation was submitted towards the completion of my doctorate degree at the Department of Urban and Regional Sociology of the Institute for Social Sciences, Faculty of Philosophy III, at the Humboldt University, in Berlin. This was defended with distinction on June 18th, 2009.

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Objective

Official governmental plans outline and illustrate the goals and objectives to be instituted for a given urban area, and present the future of social space as clear and decided. How these goals and objectives were agreed upon and by whom, however, is left unsaid. By looking at space as socially contested, addressed is the idea that urban spatial transformation is not the result of a step-by-step, straightforward, and linear procedure. The manifested physical environment is a result of complex, chaotic, and lengthy processes of discussions and disagreements, of political movements between coalitions and oppositions, involving or ignoring the outspoken and/or the complacent, and influenced by cultural histories, cultural experience, and capital. In short, contested social space addresses social interactions and their relationship to the space that contextualises and results from it.

The original impetus of this dissertation were the observations of two social phenomena in Berlin: 1) the tendency of squatter movements to refuse the state and to “emigrate” (*Aussteigen*) by creating island communities otherwise known as “Trailer Fortresses” (“*Wagenburgen*”) and/or squats); and 2) the integration of immigrants into German society. They were compelling stories because it was not clear what the entity actually was, to which the former tried to refuse and the latter tried to join. Or in the reverse, it was not clear what it was that the State was protecting in its attempts to integrate and/or exclude. The integration process could not merely be about the crossing of a line on

a map, or the jumping of bureaucratic hurdles through the immigration process, in order to join whatever it was that was inside. Governments retained and presented specific concepts of social space into which newcomers should integrate. Likewise, newcomers had a particular idea of what it was that they were joining. Similar could be said for many squatters, or the “refusers” (*Aussteiger*) of the state. They were not just sources of the hip and trendy waiting to be commodified and mainstreamed. Nor were they degenerates or anti-social. Their *aussteigen* did not mean a particular physical exit either. Instead, they seemed to work with a particular idea of a specific entity – a particular whole – that they rejected, and their struggle was about demanding space for alternative lifestyles amidst, despite, and free of, perceived dominating norms, and with or without the approval of the State.

These two groups were studied because of their similar yet contradictory statuses within Berlin. Neither seemed particularly well represented in the political system. Both seemed to struggle to fit certain norms. There were instances also that both were festivalised, harmonised, or minimalised, and both seemed to struggle against the same *Other* (the State). As a result of these processes, both were restricted from community and discursive identity – something that would allow them to signify themselves, to claim their maximal differences and independent coeval trajectories, and produce space.

These stories of squatters and newcomers posed certain problems for social spatial theory. They seemed to be coherent groups on opposite trajectories. It would seem contradictory that in a city that prides itself in diversity that squatters are in and want out, while newcomers are out and want in. Why wouldn't a politic of integration try to address issues of its own citizens? Why wouldn't an integrations ethos apply to squatters? It would seem that there was an inward (internal squatter relations) and outward (control of international migration) closing and control of borders. These stories, then, posed the theoretical problem of borders.

The border – as a dividing line no matter how thin and as a manifestation of a contested space – necessitates the concept of a whole. The border represents the division, perimeter, or surface area of this whole. The border therefore signifies insiders and

outsiders: on the one side or the other of the contradictory space, those inside or outside of *fields*, those inside or outside discursive arenas, those on one or another social trajectory. In other words, it constructs the *Other*: those that conceive of space and the others that do not; those that experience space and the others that do not; those that participate and the others that do not. A physical border can act as barrier or boundary that frames the whole. It may be a device of protection, exclusion, or control. It may be a point of entrance or of exit. It may be permeable, semi-permeable, or impermeable. Mental borders can discriminate or prejudice, or classify. Social spatial borders include all of the above and are manmade. They are ideological and real. Perceived space is wrought with borders that channel capital into particular flows, define the limits of transportation and communication systems, or fence off land designated towards particular uses. Conceived space pictorialises or charts out particular representations of space to signify particular purposes and rule out others. Or it expresses directives, hierarchies, or imperatives to channel and delineate social action. A contest arises as soon as one attempts to test, cross, redefine, or eliminate the border. Borders are experienced in lived space, and spark desire or complacency, fear or familiarity, artistic expression or formalism and repetition. Borders are seldom without dispute. A problem arises as soon as one tries to test, cross or redefine the border. Borders are not necessarily fixed over time, and it may be that an individual or group want to contest the limit, redefine it, or transverse to the other side. Each time an uncritical abstract subject of social space decides to do things another way, a border is challenged.

Borders are problems of social space. But what is social space? In the 1970s, Lefebvre approached social space with his book *The Production of Space* in which he examined the thesis that, “(social) space is a (social) product,” (1991: 26; parenthesis as in original). In this exploration, social space was a dialectic of mental and physical spaces. In the opening statements of this chapter, for example, it may appear already evident that the negotiation of a resulting spatial texture is, by definition, a process of balancing and weighing off various viewpoints whether they are perspectives of an individual or a larger group. However, in this explanation, we see an illustration of urban social and spatial development, in which people, real body objects, interact, and affect change in the external physical environment. Lefebvre (1991:16) attempted to push the boundaries of this classical sociological paradigm, to include not just the sensual and real, but also the

ephemeral, intellectual, representational, and imaginary. This dissertation also analyses the relationship between people and space, and interprets urban social spatial processes in Berlin. In addition to Lefebvre, Doreen Massey, Zygmunt Bauman, Pierre Bourdieu, Geraldine Pratt, M.P. Smith, Nancy Fraser, and Seyla Benhabib will also be examined.

That space matters is, in my view, best explained in *Production of Space*. Lefebvre's work is valuable because he wrote of space in response to an age-old fundamental philosophical question: what is space? In doing so, he broke the rigid Cartesian lock that academic tradition had divided space into, and bridged the corporeal, physical world with the logico-epistemological. His triad (1991: 38-39) was one such attempt. Lefebvre's (1991: 94) social space was dialectical and had form, structure, and function. It was socially constructed, and therefore neither natural nor neutral. As social space is produced, or abstracted from the absolute, it is also inscribed (1991: 37, 55, 78, 95, 142, 229-291), and according to Lefebvre (1991: 160), this product of inscription can be decoded. Decoding, or reading space, could unveil the social processes overlaying the triad of lived, conceived, and perceived spaces. Finally, social space differentiates itself, and this differentiation process generated incoherencies, or contradictions (1991: 292-351). His response to the problems posed by high modernity and all its contradictions was a Marxist shift, where the production of space is something that each person can assume, and through collective action space, and all its power relations, can change. Lefebvre's (1991: 365) urged his readers to locate contradictions in space as a starting point for social change.

Lefebvre has received much attention over the last few decades (Schmid 2008: 28) – attention that has sparked a “third wave” in Lefebvrology (Kipfer, Goonewardena, Schmid, Milgrom 2008: 13). Some of this third-wave analyses of Lefebvre are helpful in Chapter Four. It was Lefebvre's Marxism, however, that may lead to theoretical problems with difference. Already in the 1970s, feminist writers noticed that, “the categories of Marxism are sex blind.” (Hartmann 1981: 2). Marx and Engels had written (Hartmann 1981: 4) that the incorporation of women into the labour market was key to the emancipation of the proletariat, and that the revolution would bring about equality among the sexes because private property would be abolished, and all persons would be incorporated into the labour market equally. This could not explain, however, why it was

that women took over certain roles and men others, in their service towards capitalism (Hartmann 1981: 5). This mandated an analysis of patriarchy (ibid.). This feminist view caused a problem: sex conflict interfered with class solidarity, and feminists were accused of fragmenting the “left”. Later the categories of sex and gender were abandoned, altogether, with the emergence of poststructural feminism (Weedon 2000: 76). As Lefebvre was loath to fragmentation, and totality was one of his central concepts (Schmuelly 2008: 214), it would seem that there is a gaping cleft between Lefebvre’s emancipatory space and poststructuralist multiplicity.

This fissure is seen in aforementioned social processes in Berlin. For this reason, this dissertation will also draw upon some authors from poststructuralist feminist geography. Massey (2005: 140-142) wrote of a “throwntogetherness” of multiple trajectories throughout social space. Individuals, groups, populations, and even single and groups of inanimate objects travelled around the earth on their own time-space trajectories. Each living and non-living being was on a separate time-space trajectory: trajectories that demarcated or border-lined difference. Massey (ibid.) also argued that borders and boundaries have the potential to inhibit the continual motion of social relations on all levels, and are thus attempts to capture and maintain a particular space-time continuum. Metanarratives are then, by definition, necessarily problematic. To Massey (ibid.), the exploration lay in coeval trajectories and radical multiplicity. Pratt’s project was quite different. She aimed to spatialise feminist theory and get around feminist standoffs such as the materiality of discourse (Pratt 2004: 12). Her work conflated nicely with Massey’s because she sought to expose transnational geographies and histories of her research subjects (Filipino domestic workers), and in doing so she redrew the map of Canada. She showed that trajectories are materially underpinned and are spatialised in Vancouver, and that these local trajectories span across national borders.

Poststructuralism generally focussed on discourse and the logico-epistemological realms (Lefebvre 1991: 3-4, 10-11; Pratt 2004: 12). Pratt and Massey are among the few poststructural theorists who have shown that space matters – although neither referred to Lefebvre’s (1991: 38-39) spatial moments. Smith (2001) was interested in the role of agency and community in the production of space. Like Pratt, he argued (2001: 17, 111,

145) that people take part in creating the urban environment and that their transnationalist ties are woven into the urban fabric at very local levels. Urban life was infused with knowledge and meanings produced in transnational networks. Transnational trajectories needed therefore to be sorted out (ibid: 108-109). Bauman's (2005) liquid modernity was a vision of space in which everything is flexible and in motion. Bourdieu (1984) showed that sociological status, or placement within a trajectory (to use Massey's metaphor) was dependent on history. In deconstructing the universality of Kant's pure aesthetic, Bourdieu (1984: 467) showed that class, economic and educational capital, and place of residence, defined social perceptions and aesthetics. Social background led to varying distributions of symbolic power and capital, and ultimately social spatial differentiation. Although vast in their scope, all of these authors share a fundamental concept of radical multiplicity.

Fraser (1993) and Benhabib (2004) offered insights into how such radical multiplicity and transnationalism could be organised politically. Although it was not her specific focus, Benhabib (2004: 218) showed how non-territorial based polities could be organised. In Fraser's (1993: 13-18) view, diversity expanded democracy. She refuted the notion of a one and unified open public sphere, and argued that differences exist and can be neither neutralised nor negated. Furthermore, modifications to the notion of public must be made in order to accommodate difference. Counter publics could provide just the very space, that counter discourses require in order to form (1993: 14-15).

After outlining my methodology in 1.2, I systematically review in depth the authors mentioned above in Chapter Two. First, Lefebvre and his invaluable contribution to the concept of social space will be reviewed. Second, some theorists of difference will be examined. Afterwards, I cut to Chapter Three and tell the stories of squatters and newcomers in Berlin. In Chapter Four, I focus the theoretical lenses on these stories to expose their theoretical borders and alternate ways of understanding them. At the end, in Chapter Four, the confines and the potentials of the theory are examined. This approach poses an opportunity to rethink these two phenomena regard these social movements in new ways, while at the same time an opportunity to rethink space itself.

1.2 Methodology and research approach

When I came to Germany on my student visa years ago, I was fresh out of graduate school and ready to build on my knowledge base and research abroad. I had witnessed neoliberalisation of social housing policy in, and the amalgamation of local governments of Toronto – all under the name of Toronto, the new global city. From that I wanted to see how globalisation was affecting other cities. I was encouraged to investigate migration issues in Berlin. My original proposal to the Humboldt University read to the effect, that I would, “address the consequences of globalisation on the nature, composition, and socio-spatial patterns of multiculturalism in Berlin [...] employing population analysis, mapping communities, media analysis and interviews.” To be sure, many of these methods were indeed applied, and will appear in this dissertation, particularly in Chapter Three. Yet, when I arrived, I could not read the codes. I couldn’t even read the signs, or most of the newspapers. I arrived blind, illiterate, and – as someone with a past that occurred in another language and that was by in large unknown and irrelevant to most if not all – I also arrived without a history. I just appeared on the scene, so it seemed. Because of this I ran into a problem of voice. Indeed, I could have pretended to be capable of escaping my body, and chosen a purely positivistic and empirical research approach. However, this approach would be problematic and limited (see Beauregard 2003: 183-184). At the same time, I also did not feel capable of a subjective assessment of Berlin, as someone who had never been a subject of Berlin. I therefore felt incapable of telling any story whatsoever. But could it really be that I had no voice at all?

I stove to learn the German language, so that I could understand, pick apart, and even criticize the codes that surrounded me. All the while, I read English literature, made available to me by international online book stores, to keep abreast of debates in the Anglo-Saxon world from where I came. This was partly a survival tactic: should I drown in this foreign land, at least I could float back to my origins. I also married, had two children, and began to attach myself to informal networks of small families and businesses. I consciously refused German citizenship – on the grounds that I would have to relinquish my Canadian and American ones. For better or worse, for wrong, right or left, I settled. “*Ich habe mich sogar verdeutscht*,” (“I even Germanised”) I would tell myself. This was all before I

realised that I myself could be categorised as a transnational economic migrant, and in retrospect it is clear that my research and theoretical approach reflects this transnationality. I realise now, that this was part of the time-consuming process of finding my subjective voice – my subjective voice as a foreigner.

For this ideational dissertation, I walk through the theory in Chapter Two, that one on one hand covers Lefebvre's theory of spatial production, and on the other hand reviews theories of difference. The latter draws upon literature spanning transnational urbanism, poststructural feminism. In Chapter Three, I tell two stories of social phenomenon in Berlin. One might consider these to be "contours" (Pratt 2004: 163 -165) of Berlin that I viewed while finding my voice. These stories pull a thread in the fabric of Berlin that might otherwise be overlooked by pie charts and tables and other Cartesian means of knowing space without being present in it. Epistemologically, I situate my research methods as critically subjective observation, stemming from the premise that complete value-free positivism and objectivity is unattainable, and agreeing with Beauregard's assertion that:

"objectivity and critical distance...are problematic practices,
[and if] they are defined as the absence of subjectivity or as the
search for a single truth, they are impossible to attain,"
(Beauregard 2003: 183)

As I want not and, indeed, cannot escape my body, and am unable to perceive the world without the filter of my comprehension, this dissertation does not uncover a new reality. Rather, this paper is an exploration of the Anglo-Saxon literature on difference in its relationship to Lefebvre's production of space, while using the landscapes of Berlin as well as my own experiential knowledge (as an American-born Canadian landed as an immigrant in Germany) as illustrations.

Before moving on to describe the materials and methods of composing Chapter Three, I want to make a short statement concerning what might be construed as the feminist component of this dissertation. I do not actually consider myself a feminist. If feminism is a project of locating inequalities and power imbalances, I could say that I am a feminist in

the same way that I would expect anyone to be when they discover that they are being discriminated against. I did consider myself a feminist when I was 10. As a child, it really galled me to think that people actually believed that girls were worse at math and science – something I knew was utterly false – and that the only thing they had to aspire to were their bodies. But I halted in this position when my gay father told me that there was more in the world to be angry about, than the easily fought disadvantaged position of women in the 1980s. Since then I never considered myself a feminist. I was raised in a very loving, well balanced family, where my kitchen savvy was taught to me by my father, and that women earning money was a fact of life as ordinary as brushing teeth. Although, women's movements throughout the centuries have worked for and made this equality available to me, I personally, never felt the need to fight. What women had fought for over the decades prior to my birth, was – as a child growing up after the fact – normalcy to me. I would even admit that I belonged to the group of women who considered feminism an F-word. It was therefore odd, even discomfoting, that I should be considered a feminist now, and that my work might be pigeon-holed into the category of women's studies, or feminist studies. As it is, however, this dissertation is mainly about difference, Otherness, and borders, and the literature in feminism has undoubtedly contributed very much to this discourse.

In Chapter Three stories are told. On one hand, they are the stories of squatters and newcomers, told to the best of my abilities. On the other hand, they are my stories. I say this, because as a transnational economic migrant who is at once suspended in the hybrid and blurry personality of migration, and footed in the foreign German educational system (i.e. at Humboldt University as a Canadian), how can one comprehend the complicated mass of Berlin? I am a fragment viewing fragments, so to speak. How then, can one *view*? Lefebvre employed levels (Goonewardena 2008: 126-127). Pratt (2004: 163-164) used contours. I use stories, whose reading is yet another representation of that space. It is my humble postmodern contribution to the multitude of stories that might be told about Berlin, that may stand in contrast to overarching metanarratives, and seeing as deconstructing metanarratives is a project of poststructural feminism, here again, my work might be considered feminist.

There is another element of my research approach that might be classified as feminist. Pratt (2004) discussed this phenomenon in relation to her “melodramatic” (Pratt 2004: 1) presentations of Filipino domestic workers. She commented that at first glance, having work labelled melodramatic, was not a compliment. She was able to harness this quality, however, as a corporeal reaction to the subject matter that binds the ephemeral into a physical understanding, and as a political means of subverting metanarratives. On melodrama, Pratt wrote:

“the carnivalesque juxtaposition of official documents and popular forms, such as gossip and melodrama, is used within this fiction to destabilize official histories because it has the effect of rendering official accounts as fabrications or fabulations. The pastiche of melodrama and documentary evidence thus opens a space to tell other, non-official, counter histories,” (Pratt 2004: 2).

Melodrama, as a means of testing norms and invoking a corporeal reaction, had the capacity to politicise academic discourse by telling an alternative story. It became a *method* of understanding. Pratt wanted the reader to have an emotional reaction to the material. Pratt was not the first feminist thinker to push the limits of rationality. This has been a subject of debate in feminist philosophy for decades¹.

This analysis is relevant to this dissertation because, on a couple of occasions, some of the readers of my work have commented that my style is sometimes “chatty” – a characteristic that is not particularly flattering at first glance. While I have made many attempts to reduce this quality in my work -- because somehow it embarrasses me -- and find the straight and systematic approach that is generally demanded of me, perhaps it is the very abandoning of systematic form that makes this dissertation different, and this dissertation is ultimately about difference. After all, just like Pratt’s (2004) domestic workers, neither the squatters nor many of the newcomers that I have examined in this

¹ See, for example, Sherwin (1988), Morgan (1983), and Lloyd (1979).

dissertation, want to preserve the *status quo*. Furthermore, I have a personal interest in telling an alternative story. I, too, have a bodily reaction to some of the subject matter. As a foreigner in Germany and as someone who supposedly looks politically left, I too have been in situations where I have had to hide my foreign language tongue or be careful of where I walk, out of threat from neo-nazis. These are corporealities that sole empiricism seldom examine. Although further empirical analysis may well contribute to, and support my work, I hold a, “respect for the work that theorists can and have a responsibility to do,” (Pratt 2004: 3).

To create the stories of squatters, I have relied heavily on information available through the internet. Many squats represent themselves at their websites. There are also websites that network them. This has been an invaluable source of data. To tell the stories of newcomers, I have relied on a multitude of traditional secondary sources, including statistics, census tracks, and maps. Where possible, music, newspaper and magazine clippings, and internet sources were also used. In both cases, I have relied on the use of photography to convey messages and provide a visual representation of the arguments composed in this paper. The photos in this paper are presented as visual imagery to compliment the sociological framework that is constructed. They are chosen to illustrate and provoke the reader on levels that may go beyond the limits put forth by the text.

During the process of data collection, I relied heavily on secondary sources. Sometimes my personal experience was drawn upon too. I drew my information from the squat’s self-presentation, as well as from representations of them from the City. Similarly, I drew information from the representations posed by immigration activist groups, as well as those of the City’s. In both cases, I remained at the level of the institution. Indeed, these stories might well be strengthened by interviews with participants. I could, however, at least draw out stories at the group level – I could simply rely on *their* open self-representation – without having to sort out individual perspectives on the issues. At the same time, I could locate possible weaknesses in policy and their implementation. By and large, however, the data sets available were radically different. Except for the *Bethanien*, that houses immigration initiatives, there was almost no overlap.

2.0 Lefebvre, difference, and theorising social space

The relationship between human beings and their environments has been a topic of discussion that dates older than antiquity. Mathematics – that logico-perceptual study of space – dates back nearly six millennia to the earliest known numbering systems and mathematical formulae (for example, the Egyptian decimal system of circa 3500 BC; the Chinese the *Lo Shu* or magic square of circa 2800 BC). Later Greek mathematicians such as Pythagoras (Pythagorean Theorem), Euclid (Euclidean Geometry), and Archimedes (Pi, Archimedes Screw, and Claw of Archimedes) also systematically explored these mathematical endeavours that bridged the mental and the physical — two spheres that were later encapsulated by the idealism-realism arguments of Aristotle and Plato. Almost two thousand years later, Descartes continued where Plato and Aristotle left off, amidst an oppressive church and the parallel beginnings of scientific exploration of the heavens. In 1637, Descartes wrote *cogito ergo sum* and thereby neatly sealed the idealism-realism dualism into the two spheres of the logical subjective reflective mind on the one hand and the physical, corporeal body-object on the other (Lefebvre 1991: 1). The implication on research was that physical corporeal space could be empirically measured or rationally determined. This spun off two major trajectories within science. Empiricism gave way to the positivist sciences, including early sociology, and rationalism provided a structural means to explore deeper into metaphysics as well as the space of the mind.

But what is social space? Although not articulated as such, a social space can be interpreted among the classics spanning Plato to Marx. In writings as early as antiquity, a

social space can be located and interpreted as having dealt with socio-spatial problems. However, it remained an unspecified realm until the 19th century when the specific field of empirical sociology began. Yet for another half century, social processes would remain understood as belonging to either the mental or physical realm. Lefebvre attempted to bridge this Cartesian split and define a social space in which the spaces of the physical, the mental, and the social were interconnected. In his book, originally entitled, *La production de l'espace*, (1974) Lefebvre explored the thesis, “(social) space is a (social) product,”(1991: 26; parenthesis as in original), and in so doing, he exposed the links and overlaps among the three spheres, thereby breaking out of the dualities wrought throughout academia before him. The result was a compelling vision of social space that is socially produced, is wrought with form, structure and function, full of contradictions, and could be perceived, conceived, and lived.

Lefebvre's (1991: 292-351) contradictory space (that will be reviewed in Section 2.1) suggested borders – those that defined the difference among the various sides of a contradiction – those between hegemonic and dominated; heterogeneity and homogeneity; centre and periphery; work and leisure. However, Lefebvre was, as will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Four, resistant to abandoning totality. He was loath to fragmentation (Schmuelly 2008:214). His project, however, was not motivated by a search for a theory of difference. His intentions were to address the problems imposed by modernity (Lefebvre 1991: 24), and to seek ways to address this problem by changing space. Lefebvre was concerned with hegemony and, like Marx, class (Lefebvre 1991: 10, 59, 383).

Marx was also not motivated by ideas of difference, rather explorations of class dynamics. Essential difference as a concept, was, in western literature at least, first addressed by the feminists: Wollstonecraft, Wright, Wheeler, and later de Beauvoir, are considered among the earlier writers. Later in the 1970s, Foucault discussed power. He is widely considered one of the forerunners of poststructuralist feminism (Pratt 2004: 12), which has deconstructed not only the concept of gender but also the concept of sex itself².

² See Butler (2004) and (2006).

Thus, we arrive at many of the authors that will be examined in Section 2.2. Stemming from the literary trajectories of sociology, transnational urbanism, and feminist geography, Massey, Bourdieu, Smith, Pratt, Benhabib, and Fraser all discussed theories of difference. Massey illustrated a vision of social space as a dynamic and unending “throwntogetherness,” (Massey 2005: 140-142) of coeval trajectories. Smith (2001: 93, 107) and Pratt (2004: 133, 143, 144, 145, 163, 188) emphasized the relevance of transnational histories, knowledge and geography. Bourdieu (1987: 5, 6, 41, 42, 486, 487, 499) argued against the Kant’s universal aesthetic, and Fraser (1993: 1-27) rejected Habermas’ (1989, reprinted 2006) one and open public sphere. Benhabib (2004: 218), too, imagined alternative forms of democratic participation. Although these authors stemmed from various academic fields, their conceptions of space are not mutually exclusive. Rather, the space is conceived of as capable of accommodating vast differences.

One of the primary questions that this dissertation attempts to address is whether or not Lefebvre’s (1991) theory of space can be merged with contemporary theories of difference. To begin this exploration, I will first introduce the theories. In Section 2.1, I will examine Lefebvre’s (1991) view of space and its production. In section 2.2, I will review Bauman, Massey, Bourdieu, Smith, Pratt, Fraser, and Benhabib, and show that their views of difference in social space can be conceived as a decentralised network. Of these authors, Fraser (1993) and Benhabib (2004) showed, too, that a political organisation of such a space is also possible. In Section 2.3, I will close the Chapter with a discussion on some compatibilities that the theories have. I will then, in Chapter Three, break to some stories in Berlin, and return again to this discussion of compatibilities and inconsistencies in Chapter Four.

2.1 The production of social contradictory space from Lefebvre

The following eight subsections outline Lefebvre’s (1991) path to social contradictory space. In this section, Lefebvre’s (ibid.) powerful ways of imaging space (and its production, on levels of the real, imaginary, and social) can also be seen. Social space: has form, structure and function (Lefebvre 1991: 149); is not neutral (Lefebvre 1991: 210, 292); is inscribed and decidable (Lefebvre 1991: 17); can be conceptualised

architecturally (Lefebvre 1991: 169-228); is an abstraction of the absolute (Lefebvre 1991: 229-351); and, is contradictory (Lefebvre 1991: 352-400).

2.1.1 The plan of Lefebvre's 'work'

Lefebvre was motivated to write *Production of Space* (1991) because of his observations of academia and wider socio-political and economic processes. Philosophy, in his opinion, lacked a science that could adequately address the issue of space (Lefebvre 1991: 7). Meanwhile, in his view, the capitalism under modernity had reached vast new levels of oppression and dominance (Lefebvre 1991: 10). *Production of Space* was both an analytical and a political project to address these trends (Lefebvre 1991: 11).

Lefebvre (1991: 11, 21) saw a breach in philosophy among three spheres of space: mental, physical, and social. He wanted to bridge this gap (Lefebvre 1991: 11). To Lefebvre, as each science old and new evolved, they developed further and further along their own trajectory, disassociating themselves and their subjects of attention from the other realms of space. Mathematics, he argued for example, had become so abstracted in mental space that it had disconnected itself from the physical and concrete, and even more so from the social (Lefebvre 1991: 2-3). In the earlier half of the 20th century, the dimensions of psychological space had also been so expounded upon in sophistry, linguistics, neo-Hegelianism, and neo-Kantianism, that, in Lefebvre's (1991: 3-7) opinion, it showed no limit, and lacked any clear definition of it. In this process, mental space had all but abandoned the realms of the physical and social. Similar arguments could be made about the physical and social sciences. Lefebvre thought this breach represented the height of Cartesian thought³, and that a blending might be more methodologically useful in interpreting space. Each of the sciences of the mind, which could otherwise be named the epistemological method, could all be reduced to the, "great Cartesian family known as

³ "I think therefore I am," ("*Cogito ergo sum*") was the phrase that Descartes discussed in 'Principles of Philosophy' (Cottingham et. al 1985: 196). Deliberating on the observation that the thoughts of his sleep (dreams) could be of no greater falsehood than the thoughts of his alertness, he concluded (ibid.) that the proof of his being was in the act of thinking itself: the human is a thinking being. The methodological problem that then arose was: how could scientists, who perceive the world through the senses which have been observed to be imperfect, adequately observe, examine, and comprehend external phenomena? Thus, empiricism and cartography in particular was born.

Subjectivity,” (1991: 6; capitalisation as in original). The physical and social sciences could be allocated to the Cartesian objectivity. This division rendered space once again subject to yet another Aristotelian categorisation⁴ (Lefebvre 1991: 1): 1) of thought (*res cogitans*); and 2) of material (*res extensa*). With *Production of Space*, Lefebvre sought to bridge this rift with a dialectical science of space. Lefebvre’s objective was to draft a science of space that bridged the severed spheres of mental space, physical space, and social space: a “unitary theory,” (1991: 11). He wanted to expose the production of space, by examining various kinds of spaces and uniting their various modalities under a single social theory (1991: 16). The thesis that Lefebvre posited, was a Marxist shift⁵ from products to the production process: that, “(social) space is a (social) product,” (1991: 26; parenthesis as in original).

Lefebvre also saw his project as politically relevant. At the time of writing, Lefebvre was witness to a global economic situation of mass consolidation and an oppressive form of high modernity, complemented by a counter force of groups struggling to create their space and articulate their full opposition (Lefebvre 1991: 23). He observed that capitalism influenced space (Lefebvre 1991: 9). He observed that capitalism has a class structure and a hegemony that the ruling class attempts to reinforce (Lefebvre 1991: 10). Lefebvre borrowed the concept of hegemony from Gramsci, and defined it as:

“...an influence, more even than the permanent use of repressive violence [...] that is exercised over society as a whole, culture

⁴ Aristotle implemented two primary methodological avenues: the development of logical reasoning; and the systematic division, categorisation, and objectification of the natural world (see Barnes 1971a/b).

⁵ Marx had argued that his predecessors, the Hegelians and his contemporaries, the Young Hegelians overemphasised the consciousness as motivating force in human interaction, and thus subjectifying the material world to it (see Marx and Engels, F. ‘Critique of Modern German Philosophy According to Its Representatives Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner’ in (1998: 48) ‘The German Ideology’). Marx, then, presented was a paradigm shift within metaphysics away from ideology and back to materialism, empiricism and reality (ibid.). Marx proceeded into four “moments” or “aspects” of what might be interpreted as social space (ibid.): 1) that men must be in a position to be able to produce history; 2) that the satisfaction of the need be able to create history the first need leads to new needs, and this is the first historical act; 3) that men, who remake their lives, reproduce the relations within it; and 4) that the mode of (spatial) production is interwoven with a certain social interaction that is its productive force, and further that the multitude of productive forces determine the nature of society and its resulting history. These moments became central to the arguments of Lefebvre (see Lefebvre 1991: 30-31).

and knowledge parties, as also a good many intellectuals and experts...” (Lefebvre 1991: 10).

Hegemony affected space, said Lefebvre (1991: 10-11). Yet, space was not a mere passive stage on which social relations unfold (1991: 11). Lefebvre asserted, instead, that space is coded and instrumentalised by the hegemonic class. Lefebvre’s aim was to, “detonate this state of affairs,” (1991: 24).

Lefebvre saw that social relations were construed in a Hegelian abstract space, which each society produces for itself. His thesis was a deliberate turn of attention from products to the production process itself (Lefebvre 1991: 26), a redirection away from the static and towards the dialectic (Lefebvre 1991: 85). Lefebvre saw four implications of his thesis (1991: 30-46): 1) that natural space (i.e. the biosphere) is disappearing; 2) that every mode of production produces its own space; 3) that one’s knowledge of space must be able to reproduce and explain the process of production; and 4) that the production of space is historically situated. The first implication referred to the condition of the Hegelian absolute, which according to Lefebvre was the only common underpinning of all societies, the only stage, in all its chaos, on which social relations take place (Lefebvre 1991: 35). The remaining three implications redirected analysis to the production of space, and how it occurs.

Exploring this thesis was a challenge, however. To Lefebvre, semiology offered insights towards the understanding of space. It was a science that was still in need of more defined parameters (1991: 7), yet the concept of codes was a useful starting point. Lefebvre’s trick was not just to decipher codes within a given space and thereby reducing space to a text to be read by an observer (ibid.), but to devise and expose a dialectic of codes, i.e. to study the interaction of subjects and their space, and the coming and going of codes (Lefebvre 1991: 18). To this end, Lefebvre (1991: 33, 38) proposed another dialectic triad: 1) spatial practice or perceived space (that is, the practical basis of perception. i.e. real); 2) representations of space or conceptualised space; and 3) representational spaces or lived space. The triad upset and broke away from the dualisms that constrained critical thought to single axes and polar opposites (Lefebvre 1991: 39). The triad of the perceived,

conceived, and lived, were constructed as spatial moments and presented as a framework in which to interpret the three spheres of space:

“...spatial practice, representations of space and representational spaces contribute in different ways to the production of space according to their qualities and attributes, according to the society or mode of production, and according to the historical period. Relations between the three moments of the perceived, the conceived, and the lived are never either simple or stable, nor are they ‘positive’ in the sense in which this term might be opposed to ‘negative’, to the indecipherable, the unsaid, the prohibited, or the unconscious,” (Lefebvre 1991: 46).

His triad – to be thought of as overlapping and converging and indistinct from one another – called for a radical revision of how various disciplines approach their object of study . This triad demanded interweaving of objectivist and subjectivist approaches, intertwining idealist and realist approaches, and a dialectic analysis of the static and non-static, coding and decoding, and of thought and experienced.

This was Lefebvre’s method of understanding the relationship between capital, hegemonic domination, and space. It was a theory that would contribute to his political project. It provided a means in which oppressed groups could assess their situation and change it. The key was to change space by changing the code. Lefebvre wrote:

“...by seeking to point the way towards a different space, towards the space of a different (social) life and of a different mode of production, this project straddles the breach between science and utopia, reality and ideality, conceived and lived. It aspires to surmount these oppositions by exploring the dialectical relationship between ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’, and this both objectively and subjectively,” (Lefebvre 1991: 60).

By seeing the relationship between the dominator and the dominated as dialectic, and as a project in which both attempt to produce space through the production of codes, one can see that the limitations imposed on any group is their ability to produce their own space. This was Lefebvre's plan.

2.1.2 dialectic social space

Lefebvre first brought the reader's attention to the thesis itself – that (social) space is a (social) product. Here, Lefebvre defined the words carefully that would be used in his dialectics of social space. The words implied in this statement were 'work', 'works', 'products', and 'production' (Lefebvre 1991: 68-70). Lefebvre argued that the meanings of these words – the images that these words represented – also implied that social space is distinct from natural space. Nature does not produce (Lefebvre 1991: 70). It creates (*ibid.*). In contrast, social space was not a 'natural' product, rather a social production (Lefebvre 1991: 71). Because nature does not produce, it therefore does not labour, as do humans. Nature, too, was not staged. What nature creates is not created with intent or with consciousness of itself. Lefebvre concluded, then, that, "the 'beings' [nature] creates are works," (1991: 70). 'Work' and 'produce' were thereby differentiated from the word 'create', and social space was distinguished from natural space.

After showing this initial characteristic of social space (its unnaturalness), Lefebvre used a linguistic analysis to outline the first dialectic of social space. First, both 'work' and 'products' require labour (*ibid.*). Second, the labour process for a 'work', however, is not labourious, whereas the labour process for 'production' is predominant (*ibid.*). Third, 'works' imply diversity, whereas 'products' imply conformity (*ibid.*). Fourth, a 'work' cannot be reproduced, whereas a 'product' can (*ibid.*). Because social space cannot be narrowed down to one of these traits, Lefebvre concluded that, "social practice creates works and produces things," (1991: 71). Furthermore, social space cannot be disassociated from the labour that produces it, nor can it be relegated to the status of a pure object:

“...social space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products: rather it subsumes things produced, and

encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity – their (relative) order and/or (relative) disorder. It is the outcome of a sequence and set of operations, and thus cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple object. At the same time there is nothing imagined, unreal or ‘ideal’ about it as compared, for example, with science, representations, ideas or dreams. Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others. Among these actions, some serve production, others consumption. [...] Social space implies a great diversity of knowledge,” (Lefebvre 1991: 73).

Each work and product takes up space, and at the same time creates and produces that space. Social space is therefore a dialectic of work and production, and of works and products.

The relationship among these poles within the dialectics can be mapped out to be the triad of social space: social practice, representations of space, and representational space. The dialectics of social space can be dissected along the axes defined by the triad, which can be used as tools for social spatial analysis. As an example, Lefebvre (1991: 77) described Tuscany, which emerged out a specific historical transition, embodying town and country. This spatial texture induced a specific spatial praxis, which yielded new representations of space (from local artists and experts), that then spurred yet new lived experiences based on those new orders. A certain dialectical cycle of work and production was set in motion that determined the perceived, conceived, and the lived space. This mapping of the dialectic over the triad can therefore identify the non-linear, and not necessarily predictable nature of social spatial development, as Lefebvre continued:

“social space cannot be adequately accounted for either by nature (climate, site) or by its previous history. Nor does the growth of the forces give rise in any direct causal fashion to a particular space or a particular time. Mediations, and mediators, have to be

taken into consideration ... social space contains a great diversity of objects, both natural and social, including the networks and pathways which facilitate the exchange of material things and information. Such 'objects' are thus not only things but also relations," (Lefebvre 1991: 77).

Production and work set the relationships necessary for works and products, as well as vice versa.

A second social spatial dialectic that Lefebvre (1991: 83- 85) located was that of products and their means of production. A curious paradox then arose with respect to social space: if products conceal and if space is full of products (as well as works), then the *reality* of social space can only be an illusion. Here again, Lefebvre delineated social space from natural space, as nature does not illude, and also that:

"the more a space partakes of nature, the less it enters into the social relations of production," (Lefebvre 1991: 83).

Still, as Lefebvre recalled (*ibid.*), to merely notice the object is to overlook all that the object embodies, and the social relations that formed it. In the same way, Lefebvre argued (1991: 85), social space is neither a collection of objects, nor is it a medium precisely because it is full of objects, nor is it simply a superstructure . Space, Lefebvre wrote:

"...is at once a precondition and a result of social superstructures. [...] networks of exchange and flows of raw materials and energy fashion space and are determined by it. Thus [social space as a] means of production, produced as such, cannot be separated either from the productive forces, including technology and knowledge, or from the social division of labour which shapes it, or from the state and the superstructures of society," (1991: 85).

Thus, Lefebvre arrived at his next observation of social space: that social space is a dialectic of products and their means of production.

Further dialectics were also discussed with respect to the architectonics of space. See below.

2.1.3 Social space has form, structure, and function

All space has a form, structure, and function. This, and the dialectic character of social space, led Lefebvre (1991: 94) to conclude that space is to social morphology as form is to living organism. To Lefebvre (1991: 101), the form of social space was: meeting, gathering, and simultaneity. What structures the forms and what performs the functions are all the objects, natural or social, which fill a space. Here again, social space was differentiated from natural space. To Lefebvre, social spaces imply the actual or potential accumulation around a certain point, whereas natural space simply creates at random. Urban space, for example:

“... gathers crowds, products, in the markets, acts and symbols. It concentrates all these, and accumulates them. To say ‘urban space’ is to say centre and centrality, and it does not matter whether these are actual or merely possible, saturated, broken up or under fire, for we are speaking of a dialectical centrality,” (Lefebvre 1991: 101).

Centre and periphery can therefore be seen as the spatial form in this case. Crowds and structures are the living social praxis that morphs. While nature spontaneously creates, social space develops patterns.

2.1.4 Social space is not neutral

If space is not neutral, the question that follows, then, is: whose ideal is the form? Plato, Kant, and Hegel never addressed this question. It was a moot point, in fact, because

the ideal was metaphysical. To Plato, the author was the sun (in 'The Republic' (Bloom 1991)). To Kant⁶, Descartes⁷ and Hegel⁸, the author was the Christian god. In the vein of Marxist realism, Lefebvre brought social space back to the corporeal. Form, structure, and function were the instruments of corporeal objects (humans) that organise space. However, they were also the instruments that mask. These aspects could be helpful in deciphering the code of space, but they cannot expose the production process. In other words, form, structure, and function could expose the signified but not the signifier. If each social space has a signifier, then no space can be neutral. Lefebvre refuted the notion of neutral space:

“...a space that is apparently ‘neutral’, ‘objective’, fixed transparent, innocent or indifferent implies more than the convenient establishment of an inoperative system of knowledge, more than an error that can be avoided by evoking the ‘environment’, ecology, nature, and anti-nature, culture, and so forth. Rather, it is a whole set of errors, a complex of illusions, which can even cause us to forget completely that there is a total subject which acts continually to maintain and reproduce its own conditions of existence, namely the state...” (Lefebvre 1991: 94).

Further, the relegation of space to the realm of experts reinforces the split between the representations of space and representational space. Here, Lefebvre (1991: 95) argued that experts straddle the ‘commands’ from above, and the ‘demands’ from below. The production of the conceptualised form, structure and function is produced under the guise of professional objectivity, while masking the perceived ideology of the dominant and the lived experience of the dominated.

2.1.5 Social space is inscribed and decodable

⁶ In, 'Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals' (reprinted 2008: 45), Kant wrote of supreme lawgiver or the divine will.

⁷ In 'Principles of Philosophy, Part One, The Principals of Human Knowledge' (Cottingham et. al. 1985: 193-197, paragraph 4) Descartes deliberates on God as the supreme author of our being.

⁸ The subjectivity of the human mind prevented the human individual from perceiving the omnipresent, heavenly ideal (see Hegel's 'The Phenomenology of Mind, Part VII, Religion' (Baillie 2003: 396-462).

Social space might be described as the space that results as nature proceeds to abstraction. The more humans interact and modify their environment the further they distance themselves from nature, and the deeper they delve into abstraction. The production of space is therefore a historical, time-honoured process, and this, says Lefebvre (1991: 142), is inscribed in space. Moreover, this inscription is produced. History, defined by Lefebvre:

“...is to be distinguished from an inventory of things in space ...

It must account for both representational spaces, and representations of space, but above all for their interrelationships and their links with social practice,” (Lefebvre 1991: 116).

The history of a space includes (ibid.): nature; an anthropological analysis (measurements, myths, images, material); a mode of production (industry, or means of reproduction, repetition, and inherent social relationships within it); the apprehension of space; and evolution of space through social practice. In sum, social space reflects the story produced by its inhabitants (ibid.). A couple of issues arise once it is recognised that history is produced and inscribed in space. First, the products produced in space mask their production process. That is, the inscribed history, the product, masks its history (ibid.). Can this be recovered? Second, if time inscribes itself in space, is it a language, and can one read it without reducing space to a text? Lefebvre (1991: 130-140) took the position that indeed a language in space existed. The task was then to determine the language of space – of dialectical social space –, find a means to decipher it, and reveal the hidden production process.

Before venturing to solve the above problems, Lefebvre first examined language and its limitations. He first adopted Nietzsche’s definition of language, as:

“...‘a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and

rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people, '...' (Lefebvre 1991: 138).

He outlined two (in 1970s France) prevalent views of language and space. The first view held that no sign exists in isolation – without a subject signified and an object signifying. Everything, therefore, is language – sounds, visuals, forms, and structures. Space is also therefore epistemological, and reduced to a set of signs. The second view held that language and signs create an abstract realm that nullifies nature's wildness. Space inscribed with language is therefore dominated space. Whichever view one followed, the following conclusion could be reached:

“...once brought back into conjunction with a (spatial and signifying) *social practice*, the concept of space can take on its full meaning. Space thus rejoins material production: the production of goods, things, objects of exchange – clothing, furnishings, houses, or homes – a production which is dedicated by necessity. It also rejoins the productive process considered at a higher level, as the result of accumulated knowledge; at this level labour is penetrated by a materially creative experimental science. Lastly, it rejoins the freest creative process there is – the signifying process, which contains within itself the seeds of the ‘reign of freedom’, and which is destined in principle to deploy its possibilities under that reign as soon as labour dictated by blind and immediate necessity comes to an end,” (Lefebvre 1991: 137-138).

Produced in space are not only things, but also symbols. Buildings and structures have meaning or a code, as do spaces occupied by social groups. In social space, too, the abstraction function of language devices such as metonym, metaphors, and metamorphosis could also be seen. *Meta-*, Lefebvre said (1991: 138), refers to the transcending function, and these were also were produced in social space.

What is the language of social space and how is it produced? Is it merely the marking of space? If so, that is, if it is a container of signs and symbols, can it be read? If so, how? To Lefebvre (1991: 141) marking could not be the sole method of producing language in space, as this reduction of the abstract – the denaturalisation of space – to the simple act of marking, overlooks the vast diversity of abstraction across human culture in its entirety. Nor could space be reduced to the status of a text to be read, although reading is possible – even if the messages in space are not clear or complete. In fact, Lefebvre (1991: 142) argued that reading space is secondary because social space, and its particular order, restricts social activity. Further, the producers of this restrictive function are the occupiers of power (*ibid.*). Space is not created to be read, but to be lived (*ibid.*). Reading is perhaps primary in the search for knowledge, but secondary in the creation of space itself (1991: 143).

The last aspect of social space that Lefebvre (1991: 163) discussed in his chapter on social space was that it could be decoded. How this was possible was one of the questions that Lefebvre posed. Messages were indeed to be uncovered – but how? Semiology, at least in the 1970s, had not refined its techniques sufficiently (*ibid.*). To Lefebvre:

“There is a proper role for the decoding of space: it helps us understand the transition from representational spaces to representations of space, showing up correspondences, analogies and a certain unity in spatial practice and in the theory of space. The limitations of the decoding-operation appear even greater, however, as soon as it is set in motion, for it then immediately becomes apparent just how many spaces exist, each of them susceptible of multiple decodings,” (Lefebvre 1991: 163).

Lefebvre argued (*ibid.*) that simple decoding unveils still more codes. Lefebvre argued that the diversification of codes through its historical processes can be categorised according to its social function, structure, or form. Dominated and appropriated space, for example, could be differentiated to reveal not just a readable but also a socially dynamic code.

2.1.6 The architectonics of social space

Refining the art of interpreting social space was the remaining focus of the rest of the book. Lefebvre (1991: 86) had observed that no finite number of maps – representations of space – could ever capture the depth and breadth of space. Instead, “social spaces interpenetrate one another and/or superimpose themselves upon one another,” (Lefebvre 1991: 86). Social space was akin to a “*mille-feuille* pastry,” Lefebvre said (1991: 86) – although that image too was limited because it implied divisions and barriers that might not be appropriate (ibid.). Lefebvre thus sought after a science of dialectic social space that would enable: 1) space, and the multiplicity of social relationships within it, to be observed at various levels; 2) a different understanding of history; 3) and understanding of how societies generated their representational spaces and their representations of space; and 4) the ideologies that produce and dominate space to be identified and framed – thus bringing the project, as a whole, back to that of a political project. In searching for the code of codes, Lefebvre (1991: 169) proposed an examination of the architectonics of space. These were formulated as categorical supercodes to embrace still general codes, which could be applied as variant forms locally and dialectically.

Beginning with ‘nature’ and ‘natural space’, Lefebvre conceptualised the architecture of social form, structure, and function – the architectonics of which could identify some operative works within, and map out the route from abstract to concrete, social space. Lefebvre’s fundamental basis was that:

“ ... before *producing* effects in the material realm (tools and objects), before *producing itself* by drawing nourishment from that realm, and before *producing itself* by generating other bodies, each living body *is* space and *has* its space: it produces itself in space and it also produces that space,” (Lefebvre 1991: 170; italics as in original).

Bodies are inextricably bound to their spaces, and are not, for example, simple Cartesian objects distributed across a divine space or subjects of a Hegelian divine ideal. Lefebvre,

for example, observed that even simple and wild beings were capable of producing space. A spider can produce a web of astounding intricacy and function:

“... for all its ‘lowliness’, [the spider] is already capable, just like human groups, of demarcating space and orienting itself on the basis of angles. It can create networks and links, symmetries, and asymmetries. It is able to project beyond its own body those *dualities* which help constitute that body as they do the animal’s relationship to itself and its productive and reproductive acts,” (Lefebvre 1991: 173; italics as in original).

‘Marking’ is therefore a basic gesture of simple *beings* as they *become*⁹. Beings – even the simplest of beings – *have* space, are simply *in* space, can orient themselves and navigate around and within it, and can command and produce their inner and outer space. This was evidence, to Lefebvre, that space retained certain geometric and morphological characters, with which beings are in a dialectic relationship.

Symmetries and reflections (Lefebvre 1991: 182), the finite and the infinite (Lefebvre 1991: 181), mirages (Lefebvre 1991: 188-189), the senses (Lefebvre 1991: 198-199), energy, consumption, investment and expenditure (Lefebvre 1991: 176-177), were some of the architectonics acting dialectically in social space, that to Lefebvre, connected the physical to the ephemeral, and could be implemented as a tool of reading space. Many of these dialectic effects were encompassed by the metaphor of the mirror. He wrote:

⁹ Another cardinal departure from Plato upon which Aristotle embarked was the notion of time (see Barnes 1971a/b). In all of Aristotle’s writing, it must be seen that understanding is a process, social development is a process, sensing is a process, and all of these processes require the concept of time. In contrast, it could be argued that Plato retained the notion of a static universal truth (see Bloom 1991). Truth existed, ready and waiting to be intuited. Truth existed as an ideal, ready and waiting to be realised (See Bloom 1991). Aristotle, however, saw truth as real, and as a result of motion or time, and this enabled the notion of change and the distinction between what *is* and what *becomes*, between the actuality of a being and its potentiality to become something else. Aristotle discussed these concepts in his twelve books of ‘Metaphysics’ (Barnes 1971b: 1552-1728), in which he discussed the essence of what *is* (*being qua being*), and the transformation process of what *becomes*. Together, these books illustrated Aristotle’s understanding of nature and beyond (*meta-*) nature.

“If my body may be said to enshrine a generative principle, at once abstract and concrete, the mirror’s surface makes this principle invisible, deciphers it. The mirror discloses the relationship between me and myself, my body and the consciousness of my body – not because the reflection constitutes my unity *qua* subject, as many psychoanalysts and psychologists apparently believe, but because it transforms what I am into the sign of what I am. This ice-smooth barrier, itself merely an inert sheen, reproduces and displays what I am – in a word, signifies what I am – within an imaginary sphere which is yet quite real. A process of abstraction then – but a *fascinating* abstraction. In order to know myself, I ‘separate myself out of myself’. The effect is dizzying. Should the ‘Ego’ fail to reassert hegemony over itself by defying its own image, it must become Narcissus – or Alice,” (Lefebvre 1991: 185; italics as in original).

The object and its subject, the substance and the image, the real and unreal, the tangible and intangible, the finite and the infinite (place another mirror opposite the first), the opening of an idea yet the closing of a barrier, reflection and symmetry, all tangle themselves together within the mirror effect. Lefebvre supposed that these forms and structures might be interpreted from a dialectic analysis of conceived, perceived, and lived space. How, for example, do representations of space (charts, paintings, photos), mirror and distort the space of human practice, and vice versa? What, for example, is symbolised by representational spaces like reflecting ponds, or structural symmetries, and how might this affect social practice? The answers are endless. Similar vertiginous interpretations can be constructed with human forms that structure the functions of social space, such as those also specified by Lefebvre (1991: 202): consciousness, subconsciousness, Ego, and Alter Ego.

These spatial forms, non-human and human, were dialectical processes that stemmed from the corporeal body into space, mark that space, and subsume its further

development. Space thus had a dual nature. On the one hand, space was a container of objects in the Cartesian sense (Lefebvre 1991: 296) – a space in which bodies and objects exist and orient themselves. On the other hand, space offered also a mediating role (Lefebvre 1991: 297) – like the mirror – and offers sequences, a realm where beings can become. Using the metaphor of the looking glass, Lefebvre wrote that this arbitrating character of social space:

“tends to turn [it] into a transparent medium occupied solely by light ...where bodies pass from their natural obscurity into the light,” (Lefebvre 1991: 183).

This meant that social space, as does the mirror, unveiled movements as they come into the light, and activate social reality.

2.1.7 Social space is an abstraction of the absolute

To avert the misconception that social space is merely ‘organic’ – that social realms begin solely with the interaction between the single body and nature, and then later emerge as an aggregate social interactions from a linear development out of nature – Lefebvre (1991: 229-291) launched into a discussion of the absolute and abstract. In essence he borrowed the Hegelian meanings of abstract and absolute, where the absolute refers to the unknowable cosmic cosmos, and the abstract is the human-made construction upon it¹⁰. To Lefebvre, it was necessary to break down the conception of space as natural in order to politicise space. The non-naturalness of space was also a particular point that set Lefebvre apart from the canon of authors that he built upon – with the exception of Marx. To Plato,

¹⁰ Hegel saw the universal ethic and morality as internal to each person, each of whom had, ideally, the capacity to realise or embody this virtue (Baillie 2003). Real life, then, was an external and dependent on the universal ideal. Hence, embodiment itself is abstraction. Hence, religion itself is an abstraction of the absolute, and according to Hegel, the existence of various religions around the planet was proof of the inadequacy of human beings to express the absolute in the abstract, “Absolute appears, is circumscribed in its nature and processes each is per se inadequate to the revelation of complete absolute self-consciousness: hence the variety of religion is necessitated by and is indirectly due to the failure of any one type and the inadequacy of every single type to reveal the Absolute completely,” (Baillie 2003: 397, Part VII, Religion). Thus, with Hegel, we see a return to Platonic view of an unattainable idealistic social and physical sphere, (the absolute) subject to human perception (abstraction).

social space was the imperfect copy of the heavenly ideal¹¹. Similarly, Kant, Hegel, and to some extent Descartes, depicted a social space that was the imperfect copy of the godly ideal¹². Aristotle rejected idealism, but at the same time rendered social space to be the pinnacle of human biological development¹³. These views, rendered social space to some notion of naturalness. Naturalness is socially and politically problematic, however, because it cannot account for differences in social or social spatial development. It cannot account for the differential emergence of matriarchal or patriarchal societies, or of democratic and totalitarian societies, and it cannot explain the differences among similar societies. Why, for example, do women work in some capitalist societies, and in other capitalist societies not? These questions cannot be answered with notions of space rooted in naturalness.

Lefebvre (1991: 183) argued that as soon as humans are situated within a space, absolute space say, they – just like the spider – apprehend that space. Human interaction with other humans, however, sends social development spiralling into abstraction. It is this differential spiralling development that accounts for differential action among and within societies. Lefebvre (1991: 238-239) argued that the ancient Greeks, for example, did not differentiate among form, structure, and function. The Ionic, Dorian, Corinthian architectural orders, for example, delineated all three at once. Agreeing with Hegel, Lefebvre (*ibid.*) supposed that the Greeks were essentially sculptors. The Romans, on the other hand, developed with different concepts of space such as private property, which,

¹¹ To Plato, social space was the imperfect copy of the heavenly ideal (Bloom 1991: 211, Book VII). As told in his Allegory of the Cave in ‘The Republic’ (*ibid.*) all that the human mind can know is limited by his body, while truth, as authored by the sun (Bloom 1991: *ibid.*), existed independently and transcendently of humans. This truth was not attainable by human beings limited by their bodies.

¹² Although Descartes neatly sealed space into two realms (the mental and physical) he was sceptical (in ‘The World’) (Cottingham et al. 1985: 81) that humans could accurately understand the sensual messages that they receive. Furthermore, there is a recurring reverence for God and a heavenly reality throughout his works (Cottingham et al. 1985: 40, 90-96, 99, 102, 117-118, 129-130). Later, in his ‘Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals Part IV’, (Kant reprinted 2008: 45), Kant reasoned that each individual retains good will within him, and this good will is delivered by God. The closer one’s corresponding actions resembled a divine action, the closer the realised action resembles the (heavenly) ideal (*ibid.*) Hegelian godly ideal was represented by his notion of the absolute – an unknowable space only felt and intuited (see ‘The Phenomenology of Mind, Part VII, Religion in’ Baille 2003).

¹³ Aristotle rejected idealism and instead worked from the premise that the world outside was real and knowable. While Plato argued that only the soul could know truth, Aristotle argued (in ‘On Sense and the Sensible’ (Barnes 1971a)) that the soul was the sounding board of the senses, and that it was through the senses that humans could perceive the world (Barnes 1971a). In his discussions on the organization of the state (‘Politics, Book II’) (Barnes 1971b: 1986-2129), Aristotle also makes it clear that each person is, at least in theory, capable of attaining their ideal life (*ibid.*). Under the right circumstances, each individual can achieve their ideal form – the form being the limiting factor (*ibid.*).

Lefebvre (ibid.) argued, sent Rome off into a different social developmental trajectory based not in Logos but in Law (ibid.). Perhaps this particular point about Greece and Italy is debatable, but Lefebvre essentially argued (ibid.) that upon close examination, and preferably implementing the social spatial triad, the abstraction of space was a dialectical process that can explain the differential codes inscribed into various social spaces.

As for absolute space, Lefebvre (1991: 236-238) argued that social space has absorbed the absolute into both its ideological and real worlds. The space of tombs, cemeteries, churches, all reflected a social ideological conception of the absolute that can only be understood through experience. In and of themselves, these physical real structures have no meaning (ibid.). Also, because this conception of the absolute is experienced in the ephemeral, it is also surreal, and perhaps the space of art. Again, social space is severed from the natural. Instead, social space apprehends the natural, incorporates it within it, and society is freed from ideological domination, which was merely the conception of space by selected and privileged few.

One might say that Lefebvre's concept of social space echoes that of Marx, as he breathes new meaning into the concrete abstraction. Lefebvre, as does Marx, politicised social space specifically because it is not the result of divine ideals. Social space, and all its patterns, are a result of human action, human decisions, of human production. Lefebvre departs, however, again with his insistent triads. Marx was preoccupied with the duality of the bourgeoisie and proletariat – class divisions that, to Lefebvre (1991: 324), were too reductionist. Lefebvre's approach breaks out of this dualism, but leaves social space as real, concrete and at the hands of humankind with their perceptions and conceptions.

2.1.8 Social space is contradictory

Another deconstruction is also necessary: the notion that social space, once abstracted from the absolute and matured, is homogeneous, coherent, or consistent. Lefebvre argued just the opposite: that space, and particularly space in 20th century modernity, is full of contradictory cycles, and opposing forces, which act to fragment and

splinter social space. These contradictions were readable by first locating a logic (Lefebvre 1991: 293) in social space:

“Human beings do not stand before, or amidst, social space; they do not relate to the space of society as they might to a picture, a show, or a mirror. They know that they have a space and that they are in this space. They do not merely enjoy a vision, a contemplation, a spectacle – for they act and situate themselves in space as active participants,” (Lefebvre 1991: 294).

This human interaction inside abstract space produced networks and social webs that have structure, form and function. Just as the spiralling social development explained the differential emergence of social spheres, it could explain internal social developments. An examination of these internal social developments exposes non-coherent and perhaps even non-logical social spatial patterns. It reveals differential development of social groups and individuals. To illustrate with an example that might have been relevant to Lefebvre, one might look to the architecture and spatial forms of Corbusier as wrought with opposing messages. On one hand, the tall, flat surfaced, high rises represented emancipation from the earth, and conquest over the skies. The surrounding vast green spaces represented emancipation from the dirt and grime of central city streets. The broad open spaces, simple designs, represented access for everyone and equality. On the other hand, the compartmentalisation of residents into individual apartments might represent the subjugation of the lower classes. The elimination of architectural intricacies and vulgarities of the city street might represent the exclusion of difference and even the confinement of the legitimate. Hence, the contradictions in Corbussian social space are those of appropriation versus domination, exclusion versus confinement, equality versus oppression, liberation and repression.

Lefebvre’s (1991: 292-351) theory of contradiction, is by extension, the general notion that what would appear as a logical and coherent social spatial model, is by another analysis, neither nor. Rather, it is full of dialectical contradictions. This theory of contradictory social space was one of the primary outcomes of Lefebvre’s decoding

project. He argued that social space, is an abstraction of the absolute, and is full of dialectical contradictions: exchange value versus use value, homogeneous versus heterogeneous, work versus leisure, centre versus periphery, quantity versus quality, abundance versus scarcity, global versus fragmented, productive consumption versus non-productive consumption, spatial consistency versus spatial opposition. The list of contradictions that Lefebvre (1991: 292-400) identified is long. Yet it is only limited to the imagination of the theoretician.

Social space was comprised of overlapping or isolated individuals, little groups, big groups, and networks, which are real and concrete, and who had the innate power to produce their surroundings. For uncritical abstract subjects, social space posed no contradictions – not even divisions in the “*mille-feuille* pastry;” (1991: 86). As Lefebvre wrote:

“The person who sees and knows only how to see, the person who draws and knows only how to put marks on a sheet of paper, the person who drives around and knows only how to drive a car – all contribute in their way to the mutilation of a space which is everywhere sliced up. And they all complement one another: the driver is concerned only with steering himself to his destination, and in looking about sees only what he needs to see for that purpose; he thus perceives only his route, which has been materialized, mechanized and technicized, and he sees it from one angle only [...] It is hardly surprising that one soon seems to be contemplating the product of a coherent activity, and, even more important, the point of emergence of a discourse that is persuasive only because it is coherent. Surely this effect of transparency – so pleasing, no doubt, to lovers of the logical – is in fact the perfect booby trap,” (Lefebvre 1991: 313).

The abstract subject will therefore see neither threat nor trouble. An aggregate of abstract subjects will perceive this non-contradictory space as the common denominator, and

conceive it as neutral. Identifying axes of contradiction, however, dispels any illusions of a pure and neutral space, and hence imbalances of the dominating and the dominated. Lefebvre (1991: 365) argued that contradiction was even a strategy of domination. By dividing and fragmenting, excluding difference, homogenising, and cloaking its ideas as knowledge, it manages to silence ‘users’ into subjects, and, “the silence of the ‘users’ is ... the *entire* problem,” Lefebvre said (1991: 365; italics as in original). Critical subjects, those who identify and react on contradictions therefore demarcate moments of possible breach, struggle, differentiation, and consequential social change.

2.2 Considering difference and multiplicity

In the social sciences, theory of difference might be most easily found in the feminist theory literature. Although the Anglo-Saxon feminist literature has a long history, I am going to focus here only on developments since the 1960s – a time when Marxist feminism was the hot topic. This trajectory was largely abandoned with the onset of radical and poststructuralist feminism. It is relevant to remember it, however, because it may hold clues as to how poststructuralist feminism and Lefebvre can meet (which will be discussed in Chapter Four). Kelly summed up the Marxist tradition in feminist thought as follows:

“Feminist thinkers of the Marxist tradition have traced the divided sociosexual order to the organization of capitalist production outside the home. They have shown how the separation of work (production) from leisure (consumption) really exists for men only. As a conception of society, the notion of home as a refuge from the world of work masks a sexual division of labor. It mystifies women’s work in the home, obscuring the fact that this domestic labour helps “reproduce” capitalist and patriarchal society. i.e., procreation and the daily work that goes into consumption (housework) and socialization (childrearing) in the private family sustains the working population: trains people to know and keep their place: and provides for their replacement. At the same time, this unwaged

and unacknowledged work of women in the home keeps women dependent on men and bound to a subordinate, servicing role,” (Kelly 1979: 217).

Anglo-Saxon feminists of the post-war Keynesian era analysed the organization of capitalism and blamed it for the unequal division of labour among the sexes. A Marxist reorganization of production would redistribute this unequal division of power (Hartmann 1981: 3), where men and women would unite, grab control of production, and eradicate gender roles produced under capitalism. Hartmann (1981: 2), however, argued that Marxism was incapable of considering sexual difference. Although, this may level out wage differentials within the family and reconstruct patriarchal relations within the family and society, this analysis, Hartmann (1981: 5) argued, could not explain why it was that women took particular roles while men assumed others. This, she argued (*ibid.*) could only be explained through an analysis of patriarchy.

Radical feminist theory of the 1970s and 1980s was a wide and varied body of literature that is not easily summed up. Kelly (1979: 218) described it, however, as having supplemented the feminist Marxist movement by being more concerned with socialization and sexuality than with labour. They:

“...analysed the psychic, sexual, and ideological structures that differentiated the sexes, setting up an antagonistic relation of dominance and subjection between them [...] With different emphases, one on societal structures, the other on psychic-sexual ones, both the radical and socialist currents of feminist thought thus point to the centrality of reproduction in women’s lives. The defining of women as reproductive beings – as housewives and mothers – is seen as shaping women’s self image and sense of worth. [...] In the Marxist inspired analysis [of radical feminism], women’s work of biological and social reproduction in the home (procreation and domestic labour) is seen as supporting an economic, social, and political order dominated by

men, while at the same time preventing women from participation directly in that order,” (Kelly 1979; 218).

Radical feminist, Firestone (1970, reprinted 2003), was one such writer who bridged Marxism with feminism. Her approach involved reducing the historical materialist view of space to reproduction as opposed to economics as Marx had done. Marx and Engels, she argued (1970: 5) reduced the re-creation of space to economics, and that controlling the means of economic production was their key to controlling the material production of space. Firestone argued (1970: 7) that there were elements of life on this earth, however, that were not reducible to economics, and then delved into the implications of controlling the means of reproduction. She explained as follows:

“...just as the end goal of socialist revolution was not only the elimination of the economic class *privilege* but of the economic class *distinction* itself, so the end goal of feminist revolution must be, unlike that of the first feminist movement, not just the elimination of male *privilege* but of the sex *distinction* itself,” (Firestone 1970, reprinted 2003: 11).

Forty years later, it is arguable whether Firestone’s vision of indifferent sexual reproduction is viable, and there are concerns to be had with the rationalization of child-bearing that her vision necessitates, but the approach was fundamental critique of Marx and Engels: reduce the production of the material world to something other than economics.

The Marxist (and Socialist) tradition of feminist thought was generally abandoned by the late 1980s (Anyon 1994: 117), as feminist thinkers turned towards post-modernity and poststructuralism for answers. This movement was described by Weedon as follows:

“Attempting to go beyond the liberal feminist goal of extending rights to women, postmodern feminists have sought to theorize those areas of women’s experience and oppression that elude liberal theory and politics. [...] In poststructuralist theory,

meaning is not guaranteed by a world external to it. Language neither reflects nor expresses meaning but constructs it through an infinite process of what Derrida calls *différance*, that is, difference and differal. Postmodern theory offers no privileged objective position from which to ground universally valid ideas of truth and morality or the politics that follow from them. Nor does it offer a position from which to write a history that is objectively true. Knowledge and power are integrally related and, as feminist postmodernists argue, they have worked systematically to marginalize women, defining them as “other” to the patriarchal order of meaning,” (Weedon 2000: 75).

Butler (1988: 529), likely one of the most important poststructuralist gender theorist, drew partly on the works of Foucault, and dismissed the concept of gender and sex as core human qualities. She argued that they *both* were social constructions. Neither sex nor gender therefore were universal categories. She wrote:

“...The option I am defending is not to redescribe the world from the point of view of women. I don’t know what that point is, but whatever it is, it is not singular, and not mine to espouse [...] Indeed, it is the presupposition of the category of woman itself that requires a critical genealogy of the complex institutional and discursive means by which it is constituted. Although some feminist literary critics suggest that the presupposition of sexual difference is necessary for all discourse, that position reifies sexual difference as the founding moment of culture and precludes an analysis not only of how sexual difference is constituted to begin with but how it is continuously constituted, both by the masculine tradition that pre-empt the universal point of view, and by those feminist positions that construct the univocal category of ‘women’ in the name of expressing or, indeed, liberating a subjected class. As Foucault claimed about

those humanist efforts to liberate the criminalized subject, the subject that is freed is even more deeply shackled than originally thought,” (Butler 1988: 529).

Here we arrive at the junction of feminist thought and flexibility, and it would seem that the collective action inherent in Marxist analyses is all but abandoned. If this is steadfast, then it would seem that there could be no common ground with Lefebvre either – but this will be discussed later.

In the following subsections, I want to introduce the works of several authors who discuss difference, which might be considered poststructuralist. I begin with a brief look at Bauman’s (2007) *Liquid Times* as a snap shot of the times in which we live, at the beginning of the 21st century. I then move to Massey’s (2005) *For Space*, in which she argued for a radically new vision of space as fundamentally composed of an endless number coeval trajectories. Attaining this vision demanded the conceptualisation of radical multiplicity. Like Bourdieu (1984), whose *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* I consider next, everything is relative and can have neither centre, nor overarching metanarrative. This was not Bourdieu’s (1984: 101, 114, 172, 208) objective in his deconstruction of Kantian transcendental aesthetics, but his conception of *habitus* and *field* could be interpreted as such. Similarly, both Pratt (2004) in *Working Feminism* and Smith (2001) in *Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization* re-charted space by focussing on geographies of history. The maps of space that they arrive at transcended central structures (for example, national borders). The effect, then, is a vision of space, similar to Massey’s, which is wrought with coeval trajectories. Finally, I consider Fraser’s (1993) infamous *Rethinking the Public Sphere: a Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy* and Benhabib’s (2004) *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens*, which consider how decentralization might be, at least in theory, politically organised.

2.2.1 Bauman on flexible everything

In this dissertation, I do not dwell too long on Bauman, but I want to mention him here quickly because he does render a picture of space that is radically flexible, changing,

or to use his metaphor, liquid – and his vision of space as fundamentally flexible can be seen as the height of all literature on post-fordism over the last two decades. *Liquid Times* (2007) was Bauman's rather dire picture of the world - so dire, in fact, and without empirical foundation whatsoever, one might wonder if the book was meant as a cynical comment, a joke of some kind, and/or the paranoid meditations of a batty old man. According to this book, the planet's population, the "redundant... surplus of human, " (Bauman 2007: 32) has reached its limit (Bauman 2007: 29, 34). Humans are living in an age of waste (human waste, toxic waste, waste production, waste disposal, waste recycling (Bauman 2007: 34).

"The volume of humans made redundant by capitalism's global triumph grows unstoppably and comes close now to exceeding the managerial capacity of the planet; there is a plausible prospect of capitalist modernity (or modern capitalism) choking on its own waste products which it can neither reassimilate or annihilate, nor detoxify..." (Bauman 2007: 28-29).

We are in times of fear (Bauman 2007: 5-70), and migration (Bauman 2007: 28-53).

Bauman, however, is worth pause because he also reflected on a world in which everything is fragmented and flexible: that is, liquid. He thus drew a picture of the world that is not merely on the brink of horizontalization, detachment, and fragmentation, but is. This is a move away from literature of the last 20 years that problematised emerging globalisation and deindustrialization and suggested a fight against its onset. Lefebvre and his project against modernity, could be interpreted as a political project of reorganizing vertical structures. In *Production, Work and Territory: The Geographical Anatomy of Industrial Capitalism*, Scott and Storper (1986) problematised the: "disintegration of the production processes of many once vertically integrated industries," (ibid: 11); the "rapid growth of the office-based economy, which is devoted principally to managerial control, business services, and information processing (ibid.: 11); and the increasing output of "versatility and flexibility" (ibid.:11), and called for an examination of the geography of social-spatial produced territory (ibid.: 14). Zukin (1991: 273-275) called attention to "public value" and problematised landscapes and their hidden and sometimes remotely located power

structures of flexible economies. While many have ruminated on post-industrialization, the destruction of vertical forms of production, and their replacement by horizontal modes of production and flexibilisation, Bauman (2007) described a social space that has arrived at the pinnacle of that development. The only project that remains is how we might organise within it.

Bauman's (2007: 47 77, 81, 85) image of a liquid modernity was also relevant when we consider Lefebvre (1991), as we shall see in Chapter Four. How can Lefebvre's production of space be applied to a space where the centre, under flexible and hyperfragmented-everything, has disappeared?

2.2.2 Massey – multiplicity thrown together

Perhaps coincidentally, the cover of Massey's (2005) book, *For Space*, shows a melting glacier. Liquidity comes to mind. To make her point as clear as possible, Massey (2005: 1-7) opened her book with a story of the Aztecs and their first encounters with the Spanish. She compared the information available to each party: calendars and maps, and noted that the information conveyed by the tools of the Aztecs reflected a different set of value, than did those of the Spanish (ibid.: 3, 7). The Spanish maps conveyed land and water surfaced that were crossed (a Cartesian map), and the calendars marked the number of sunrises (Aristotelian time). They were on a mission of discovery, it was the "Year of Our Lord" (ibid.: 3) and they were about to cross into Tenochtitlán – a city that, at the time, was five times larger the city of Madrid (ibid.). The Aztecs, on the other hand, noted that the men were coming from the direction that signified authority, and they were arriving in the year of One Reed – no ordinary year (ibid.: 7). They braced themselves for an important encounter. Massey (2005: 8) called this a clashing of thrown together historical trajectories. A two-year war followed, and the Aztecs were conquered in what is now known as Mexico City (ibid.: 4).

The story is poignant because, seen the way Massey described it, it is clear that the Aztecs were indeed not "discovered" (Massey 2005: 14), nor were they just there in the wrong place at the wrong time and happenstance victims of Spanish exploration. It

illustrated Massey's core argument: that the real issue at stake is space, and that our concepts of space must open up in order to engage in, deal with, and thoroughly understand multiplicity and difference.

“The imagination of space as a surface on which we are placed, the turning of space into time, the sharp separation of local place from the space out there; these are all ways of taming the challenge that the inherent spatiality of the world presents. Most often, they are unthought. Those who argue that Moçambique is just ‘behind’ do not (presumably) do so as a consequence of much deep pondering upon the nature of, and the relationship between, space and time. Their conceptualisation of space, its reduction to a dimension for the display/representation of different moments in time, is one assumes, implicit. [...] None the less, the persistent associations leave a residue of effects. We develop ways of incorporating a spatiality into our ways of being in the world, modes of coping with the challenge that the enormous reality of space throws up. Produced through and embedded in practices, from quotidian negotiations to global strategising, these implicit engagements of space feed back into and sustain wider understandings of the world. The trajectories of others can be immobilised while we proceed with our own; the real challenge of the contemporaneity of others can be deflect by their relegation to a past (Backward, old-fashioned, archaic); the defensive enclosures of an essentialised place seem to enable a wider disengagement, and to provide a secure foundation,” (Massey 2005 : 8).

Massey's vision of space is one in which time and space can neither be conceptualised as separate independent entities, and where everything is in motion. It was an idea that was already developed in an earlier book, *Space, Place, and Gender*:

“[If space is] thought of in the context of space-time and is formed out of social interrelations at all scales, then one view of a place is as a particular articulation of those relations, a particular moment in those networks of social relations and understandings. . . . It includes relations which stretch beyond – the global as part of what constitutes the local, the outside as part of the inside. . . . The identities of place are always unfixed, contested and multiple. And the particularity of any place is, in these terms, constructed not by placing boundaries around it and defining its identity through counter-position to the other which lies beyond, but precisely (in part) through the specificity of the mix of links and interconnections to that "beyond". Places viewed in this way are open and porous. . . . All attempts to institute horizons, to establish boundaries, to secure the identity of places, can in this sense therefore be seen to be attempts to stabilize the meaning of particular envelopes of space-time... such attempts . . . are constantly the site of social contest, battles over the power to label space-time, to impose the meaning to be attributed to a space, for however long or short a span of time...” (Massey 1994: 5).

People move about and engage with other beings in their environment that, in turn, changes the course of their lives. The built environment changes physically and symbolically over time. Nature too is in process (Massey 2005: 130). Plants and animals come and go, the deserts expand and contract, the shorelines recede and advance, even the mountains who have been around since the beginning of memory, are only passing through. Any one snap shot of space frozen in time is, therefore, a magnificent meeting up of life trajectories. Space is therefore a product of interrelations as well as the possibility of multiple relations. It is never complete, and a perfect simultaneity cannot be attained.

Massey argued too, that this vision has social and political implications. It means that recognition of heterogeneity is also a recognition of space (Massey 2005: 11, 105, 174-

175). She showed that metanarratives of time and space are implicated in order that the multiplicity of stories stay masked. Massey (2005: 11) therefore called for a radical opening of space (and thereby future), and recognition of it always being process. Too often, she argued, space is conceived as closed, or as complete systems or structures (ibid.). This negates its inherent multiplicity. One cannot conflate various temporal trajectories into a single chronicle (Massey 2005: 71) – as might be performed by grade-school history books telling of European exploration. Likewise, a single understanding of land cannot explain all territorial disputes. Massey thus called for a big challenge – to change the way we think about space altogether.

2.2.3 Bourdieu – *fields of difference*

In *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (1984) Bourdieu critiqued Kant's *Critique of Judgment* (translated by Bernard 2000) that attempted to establish some underlying principles that dictate the human sense of aesthetic. Kant had supposed that human perceptions of aesthetic could be split into two primary camps: those that please and those that gratify (Bourdieu 1984: 41); or those of reflection and those panning towards an immediate sense; or, those that are difficult (*difficile*) and those that are facile (*vulgar*) (Bourdieu 1984: 486). Bourdieu (1984: 1-7) argued that taste could not be disassociated from the sociological framework that created the object of aesthetic value or non-value. It was a direct deconstruction of Kant's presupposed (*a priori*) that humans, created equal in heaven's view, were capable of ascertaining a pure aesthetic. The closer one leaned towards the pleasing, reflective, and the *difficile*, the closer was their judgement to the pure (and higher, noble, and/or unviolated) aesthetic, while those who entertained immediate and vulgar tastes that merely gratify were socially further removed from this ideal (Bourdieu 1984: 11-17).

Bourdieu argued (1984: 4), however, that the pure gaze was a historical invention and linked to a particular field of artistic production that was capable of imposing its own norms on both the subject and object of consideration. In other words, objects could not be valued or devalued without the capacity to decode the codes that defined and embedded the object. Tastes were a product of history, personal upbringing and education, and above all,

were the markers of social class (Bourdieu 1984: 6, 106-112, 194, 233). He argued that there was no such thing as pure. All gazes were relative. Taste signified the corresponding class condition of the signifier and the classifying practice, which revealed in turn the subjectivity of the classification scheme. Taste was:

“...the source of the system of distinctive features which cannot fail to be perceived as a systematic expression of a particular class of conditions of existence, i.e., as a distinctive life-style, by anyone who possesses practical knowledge of the relationships between distinctive signs and positions in the distributions...”
(Bourdieu 1984: 175).

As class indicators, aesthetics can then reinforce class division, and respective power structures.

Bourdieu (1984) proceeded to deconstruct Kant and argued his opposition with an empirical, rational, *a posteriori*, analysis of surveys. His research method was a compilation of data collected from numerous studies and a study of surveys. He formulated his own ethnographic survey and distributed it among 1000 participants (Bourdieu 1984: 503). In addition, he borrowed data collected from a number of institutes and governmental organizations. In total, over 100,000 individuals were surveyed. The surveys addressed questions concerning the respondents attitudes towards literature, cinema, clothing, politicians, and celebrities, as well as income level, profession, family history, and living conditions (Bourdieu 1984: 526-555). By tabulating the data, and analysing the surveys themselves, clear and significant trends emerged showing that taste was not an *a priori* inclination guided by natural or supernatural phenomena, rather one informed by class, economic and/or educational capital, and place of residence. That is, aesthetic disposition, preferences in art, music and literature were developed *a posteriori* by the *habitus* by which one lives and by the *field* in which one lives.

The gathered data supported his theories of *habitus* and *field*. It became empirically apparent (*a posteriori*) that lifestyles, or the system of distinctive signs (i.e. tastes) were the

systematic result of *habitus* (Bourdieu 1984: 415, 507) -- a, “structured and structuring structure,” (1984: 171) and qualitative formula that is both a product of its respective social condition, and generative of its social condition. *Habitus* was a social dialectic between the production and consumption of lifestyles. Specifically, *habitus* is the force that produces the spaces of social positions and lifestyles. The *habitus* was a:

“...system of dispositions – a present past that tends to perpetuate itself into the future by reactivation in similar structured practices, an internal law through which the law of external necessities, irreducible to immediate constraints, is constantly exerted – is the principle of the continuity and regularity which objectivism sees in social practices without being able to account for it; and also of the regulated transformations that cannot be explained either by the extrinsic, instantaneous determinisms of mechanistic sociology or by the purely internal but equally instantaneous determination of spontaneist subjectivism,” (Bourdieu 1990: 54).

Habitus is a sense that one develops for her surroundings and an understanding of how to act and react within it. This sense and understanding, is a predisposition that is accumulated and learned beginning in childhood and carried throughout one’s life. Neither calculable nor random, it is behaviour that may not surprise the observer, but behaviour that one can definitively predict.

In *Distinction*, Bourdieu (1984: 208, 258) expanded on some of the dynamics of *habitus*. Symbolic power (ibid.) refers to power attained through social status or other forms of social capital, and not necessarily financial or fiscal power. Symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1984: 172, 282) referred to the accumulated prestige, prominence, and influence that one acquires as a result of their relative ability to ‘know’ (*connaissance*) and ‘recognise’ (*reconnaissance*) cultural capital, which was the competencies and cultural know-how that one accumulates as a consequence of her relative education and familial upbringing. Specific forms of *connaissance* and *reconnaissance* permitted an individual to

decode cultural meaning inherent within material culture – a capacity that leads to, reinforces, and recreates, a process and cycle of social stratification (Bourdieu 1984: 247).

Because human behaviour occurred in space, Bourdieu (1984: 94) developed his concept of *Field* (*Champs*). The *field* was the social environment in which an individual is situated. *Fields* can be defined on any level with respect to any theme. Artistic fields, scientific fields, fields of respective social classes, intellectual fields, fields of production, and fields of struggles are a few of the fields that Bourdieu (1984: 152, 228, 431, 469, 511) discussed. By extension, we can formulate political fields, academic fields, economic fields, cultural fields, and also more specifically, fields of production or consumption, field of fashion, and so on and so forth. Individuals could also, for example, occupy certain positions within their respective fields and interact (commensurate or competitive) with others. Social formation could, then, be ascertained and analysed as a series of overlapping, interlocking, and interacting fields.

A change in *field* means a change in space. To play within a given *field*, one must retain the befitting *habitus* (Bourdieu 1984: 114, 223). Educational capital, for example, might be the key that opens the gate to a particular occupational *field*. On the other hand, the devaluation of a certain capital may restrict activity within a certain field. The popularisation of education, for example, created a widely educated population, but at the same time devalued it, thus driving massive social structural changes. Upward social mobility (which Bourdieu (1984: 131) articulated as a misleading concept) or its opposite, down-classing, or lateral switching could be explained by internal operations of a given *field*. Bourdieu (1984: 131-132) named these dynamics as vertical or transverse movements within a *field*.

Fields were also dialectic. Bourdieu (1984: 123), for example, referred to what he called the homology of fields. The dynamics of production and consumption, Bourdieu (1984: 232) argued for example, were not the net result of a mathematical formula of supply and demand but the result of a dialectic of fields – in this case, the fields of production and consumption – that react and feed one another. For another example, the field of directors and playwrights has a corresponding field of actors and stage

performances which has a corresponding field of audience participants. The specific character of these spaces and their corresponding spaces can then be analysed by the *habitus* of the specific participants and their predisposition to particular needs, desires, and tastes.

2.2.4 Pratt and Smith on transnationalism

What Pratt (2004) and Smith (2001) did was drive home the local embeddedness of transnational networks. Their arguments are relevant here because they localised the transnational while at the same time they network localities. Problems of difference rooted in immigration are not merely locally bounded problems, but are part and parcel of wider social processes. Such analyses are then required if these problems are to be effectively solved.

One of Pratt's (2004) primary goal was to spatialise feminist discourse theory. Nussbaum had charged that feminist discourse theory following Butler, had all but abandoned material and spatiality (Pratt 2004: 12). Pratt took on this challenge (albeit without referring to Lefebvre):

“Discourses are materialised in the world and they are spatialised in ways that matter in the world;” (Pratt 2004: 35).

In the process, she traced the lives of Filipino domestic workers in Vancouver (Pratt 2004: 8), who landed in Canada on a visa as a domestic caregiver and then, after the necessary period of two years, applied for citizenship. Here she showed that the resulting classism and racism were inextricably linked to discourses that are materialised and spatialised not only locally in Canada, but also internationally in the Philippines as well.

At first glance, Smith's primary goal in *Transnational Urbanism* seemed to be to utterly deconstruct the theories and approaches of Saskia Sassen (Smith 2001: 8, 10, 12, 49, 50-52, 55-58, 60, 62-63, 72-73, 79, 146) and David Harvey (Smith 2001: 10-12, 23, 25-27, 29-30, 32, 34-35, 37-38, 39-41, 43, 58, 103, 114, 116, 121, 124-126, 146, 164), as the first

half of the book was dedicated to deconstructing their theories. However, the central thesis of his work was an argument for the study of a transnational dimension in sociological urban studies. In his own words, further:

“By deploying the metaphor of transnational urbanism I have tried to capture the notion of the city as a crossroads of social relations constituted by the interactions of local, national, and transnational actors and the networks through which they operate. The optic of transnational urbanism brings into focus historically specific activities and projects instituted, reproduced, or transformed by these social interactions. Viewed in this light, the diversity of place-making practices, the dynamics of political conflict and accommodation, the variety of state policy-making projects, and the agency of social networks come to the forefront of urban analysis,” (Smith 2001:184).

Transnationalism differs from globalization (ibid.) in that the latter subsumes or ignores the role of national, regional and local policies and social processes. In contrast transnationalism theory, Smith (2001: 127) argued, insists that transnational processes are anchored in, and inseparable from, local socio-political constructions of agency:

“From a social constructionist perspective, an intellectual focus on the analysis of discursive practices, on discourse itself as a space of the “self-production of society,” should not simply shift our attention from macro-politics to micro-politics, and then valorize the latter, as if the two were distinct and irreducible binary opposites. Rather, such a focus can be used to shift our attention to the processes whereby *networks of power*, subsisting at every point from the most “local” to the most “global,” are formed, related to each other, and transformed. Since human agency operates at many spatial scales, and is not restricted to “local” territorial or sociocultural formations, the very concept of

the “urban” thus requires reconceptualization as a social space that is a cross-roads or meeting ground for the interplay of diverse localizing practices of national, transnational, and even global-scale actors, as these wider networks of meaning, power, and social practice come into contact with more locally configured networks, practices, and identities.” (Smith 2001: 127, italics as in original).

2.2.5 Fraser and Benhabib – reorganizing democracy with difference

Fraser (1993: 1) directed her focus primarily on Habermas’ (1989, reprinted 2006) *Structural Transformation: an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society* which discussed a normative form of public sphere which was separate from the state, and a forum for discourse, in which all citizens can deliberate on ‘common’ affairs concerning the citizenry (Fraser 1993: 2). As neither the arena of market relations, and neither the state apparatus itself, Habermas’ universal public space was therefore indispensable to critical social theory (Fraser 1993: 2-3). Yet, Habermas failed in, “developing a new, postbourgeoisie model of the public sphere,” (Fraser 1993:3). Fraser argued that a one singular public sphere was not sufficient to forge an egalitarian participatory democracy. Her fundamental arguments are summarised below.

First, Fraser (1993: 10) argued that is not possible for participants within a public sphere to deliberate *as if* they were equals. A simple example of this problem was the well documented and widely experienced phenomenon of individuals in a seminar room (ibid.): men speak more often than women, men are listened to more often than women, and women’s voices are often quicker to be discredited. Fraser argued, that the simple declaration of:

“...a deliberative arena to be a space where extant status distinctions are bracketed and neutralised is not sufficient to make it so,” (Fraser 1993: 7).

Fraser argued further that this assumption of equality among participants furthered the agenda of the dominant group because individuals could not find the arena in which to articulate their opposing views.

Second, the idealisation and supposition of a one public sphere neglects the inevitability of emerging competing and/or counter discursive arenas as places of deliberation. Fraser (1993: 14) recounted previous studies of 20th century women's groups that acted as forums of discursive exchange that eventually led to the articulation of women's issues and the inclusion of women voices into the wider bourgeois public realm. History shows that members of subordinated groups have repeatedly taken advantage of separate discursive forums (Fraser 1993: 14).

Third, the assumption that a multitude of public spheres is a step away from democracy is arguable (Fraser 1993: 9, 18). Fraser alluded to the success of the women's groups was evidence to the necessity of counter publics. In spaces only for women, for example, women could invent a language to describe their social situation (Fraser: 14). "Sexism," and "Sexual harassment", for example were terms invented by women for women and are now in wide spread use (ibid.). Thus, the products of these counter publics are evidence to the idea that a multiplicity of publics does not fragment the great democratic sphere, but rather expands it, if it is recognised as a necessary and equal component of total discursive action.

Fourth, it cannot be assumed that participants will agree on what issues are relevant to be discussed. Fraser (1993: 19) argued that in Habermas's (1989, reprinted 2006) public sphere, deliberators would discuss affairs concerning everyone. If individual points of contestation could not be formed due to lack of opportunity to meet and discuss with like-minded co-deliberators, then issues of common concern would be limited to the lowest common denominator of 'we,' (Fraser 1993: 21). Habermas's public assumes a certain concept of public. Where as, as Fraser (1993: 19) pointed out, the word, "public" can mean: state-related, accessible to everyone, and/or pertaining to a common good. Fraser argued (1993: 20) that it cannot be assumed that the division between public and private is

universal. Fraser (1993: 22) cited the problem of wife battering, for example. Is this “domestic” or “personal” affair a public problem? What is thematized and who decides what is of public concern are questions that are difficult to address in a one and open public sphere (Fraser 1993: 22).

Fifth, if civil society referred to everything non-governmental – as it does Habermas’s (1989, reprinted 2006) definition of the bourgeois public sphere as a forum where private individuals meet (Fraser 1993: 2) – then it may be argued that the distinction is necessary to keep discourses free from state influence. Namely, it is necessary to prevent a conflict of interest among participants who might have a dual interest in the outcome of the discussion. Fraser referred to such public spheres as “weak publics,” (1993: 23-26) – publics that have no jurisdiction in decision-making structures. Autonomy of discussion is perhaps maintained, but influence towards social and political change remains limited. Instead, Fraser argued for the blurring of civil society and the state because in this way the public sphere or spheres become more influential as their power to control decision-making increases. She named these decision-making public spheres, “strong publics” (ibid.). Further analysis, Fraser argued (ibid.), would then look closer at the relationship between strong and weak publics.

Fraser’s (1993: 14) publics are easy to imagine inside local, regional or national spheres. They can be imagined as spheres that enable a variety of, and democratically enriching, discourses to arise. These spheres may be well implemented in such spaces that are imagined to have hegemonic processes. A rigid, centralized, and vertically organized polity might do well with some marginal spheres that can contribute to back to the main discourse in a meaningful way. Fraser’s (1993: 14) counterpublics, however, can also be conceptualised in a much more diffuse and horizontal organization of democratic publics.

In her observations of migrants, Benhabib (2004: 65) noticed a discrepancy between human rights for refugees and national rights to sovereignty. For a number of reasons concerning the plight of illegal migrants, these two perspectives were not compatible with one another, in her view. She saw no new democratic model that could solve the “Gordian knot” (Benhabib 2004: 219). On one hand:

“...democracies enact laws that are supposed to bind those who legitimately authorize them...the scope of legitimacy cannot extend beyond the demos which has circumscribed itself as a people...Democratic laws require closure precisely because democratic representation, must be accountable to a specific people,” (Benhabib 2004: 219).

On the other hand there are 175 million individuals on this planet who are living abroad as migrants (Benhabib 2004: 5): refugees with or without papers, aliens, or transnational migrants. Her concluding proposal was an organization of democracy in which nations retain their sovereignty and rights to control their borders, but remain porous for the international needs of refugees (Benhabib 2004: 3, 39,177). Refugees and asylum seekers should receive a right to first-admittance, in her view (ibid.). Her conclusion entailed, indeed, a closed system, combining a Kantian moral universal with cosmopolitan federalism (Benhabib 2004: 213) -- a proposal that legitimated the needs of, and also legalised, each person on the planet, while retaining the rights of those already participating in closed democratic systems.

“For some, these proposals will go too far in the direction of rootless cosmopolitanism; for others, they will not go far enough,” (Benhabib 2004: 221).

Although she herself did not, in her conclusion, find extreme forms of non-territorially based democracies and disaggregated citizenships plausible or helpful because:

“...we can never eliminate the paradox that those who are excluded will not be among those who decide upon the rules of exclusion and inclusion,” (Benhabib 2004: 177).

Yet, her exploration of democratic forms are useful for the theory here:

“Disaggregated citizenship permits individuals to develop and sustain multiple allegiances and networks across nation-state boundaries, in inter- as well as transnational contexts. Cosmopolitanism...is furthered by such multiple, overlapping allegiances which are sustained across communities of language, ethnicity, religion, and nationality,” (Benhabib 2004: 174-175).

Although she concluded that a territorially based democracy should not be abandoned, she did explore the possibilities of non-territorially based models of representation. She wrote:

“[They] are certainly possible: one can be represented by some individual or a body of individuals by virtue of one’s linguistic identity, ethnic heritage...religious affiliation, professional activities, and affected interests. Representation can run along many lines besides territorial residency,” (Benhabib 2004: 218).

Taken in its extreme, Benhabib illustrated a world full of a variety of political spheres, that theoretically, resembles a world that would be full of nothing but Fraser’s (1993: 14) counter publics. This extreme “rootless cosmopolitanism,” as Benhabib called it, (2004: 221) is a model too that maps coeval democratic organization over Massey’s (2005) multiple trajectories.

2.3 The compatibilities of various theories in social space

Lefebvre (1991) lifted social space out of the dualistic and opposing realms of the mental and physical spheres. His work brought the reader back to the antique question of what space *is* (or is *becoming*). He wrote:

“[social] space qualifies as a ‘thing/not-thing’, for it is neither a substantial reality nor a mental reality, it cannot be resolved into abstractions, and it consists neither in a collection of things in space nor in an aggregate of occupied places. Being neither

space-as-sign nor an ensemble of signs related to space, it has an actuality other than that of the abstract signs and real things which it includes. The initial basis or foundation of social space is nature – natural or physical space. Upon this basis are superimposed – in ways that transform, supplant or even threaten to destroy it – successive stratified and tangled networks which, though always material in form, nevertheless have an existence beyond their materiality: paths, road, railways, telephone links, and so on. Theory has shown that no space disappears completely, or is utterly abolished in the course of the process of social development – not even the natural place where that process began. ‘Something’ always survives or endures – ‘something’ that is not a thing. Each such material underpinning has a form, a function, a structure – properties that are necessary but not sufficient to define it. Indeed, each one institutes its own particular space and has no meaning or aim apart from that space. Each network or sequence of links – and thus each space – serves exchange and use in specific ways. Each is produced – and serves a purpose; and each wears out or is consumed, sometimes unproductively, sometimes productively,” (Lefebvre 1991: 402-3; italics as in original).

Lefebvre’s (1991) closed with a number of openings for further theoretical deliberation, empirical research, and above all a new social project. He called for a project of:

“a different society, a different mode of production, where social practice would be governed by different conceptual determinations,” (Lefebvre 1991: 419).

His work was therefore also political because he urged his corporeal readers to engage in the production of space as a socio-political act, as a means of re-inventing power structures.

He urged researchers to view and redefine beginnings and endings of, “well-defined,” (Lefebvre 1991: 408) periods as transitions. While urging researchers to resist conflating social space with the rigid spaces traditionally conceptualised by spatial experts (ibid.), he also urged that an ideal study of space would transcend representational space and representations of space to illuminate contradictions (ibid.). His work was, however, heavily Marxist in tone, and as such, left itself a commitment to totality that is at odds with literature on poststructural difference. I will return to this aspect in Chapter Four.

From the other authors discussed in Section 2.2, difference could be conceived as a decentralised network. This was probably most obviously seen in Massey’s (2005) and Bauman’s (2007) respective books. In Bauman’s (2007) a liquid modernity, everything was elusive and flexible. Massey’s (2005) social space was a product of multiple coeval trajectories and their interrelationships. She argued against the conflating of time-space metanarratives into a single story, and illustrated social space as a “throwntogetherness” (Massey 2005: 140-142) of coeval trajectories. Each and every object was on its own path. Bourdieu (1984: 493) argued against the Kant’s so called pure aesthetic, and showed that tastes were socially constructed. His theories of *habitus* and *field* also illustrate how people might move along, across or between trajectories (Bourdieu 1984: 131-132). Smith (2001) and Pratt (2004) argued the relevance of transnational histories, knowledge, and geographies. Social processes could only be understood by considering respective histories and geographies that transcended and decentralised the populations living together on one territory. This was a centreless network in much the same way as the:

“...labyrinth of invisible pathways which meander all over Australia and are known to Europeans as ‘dream-tracks,’ or ‘songlines’,” (Chatwin 1988: 2).

Histories denoted a particular path, not an all-encompassing territory that contained just one history. And despite the somewhat chaotic characteristic of a centreless network, Fraser (1993) and Benhabib (2004) could still envision forms of democracy that could, in theory, work in this model. Fraser (1993: 14) assuming that a hegemonic public sphere would exist, proposed alternative counterpublics in which counter discourses could

develop. Theoretically, a centreless network could be composed solely of alternative publics. Benhabib (2004: 218) although unwilling to advocate a dissemination of territorially bounded publics, described a political organization in which individuals or groups aligned themselves according to causes. Again, they were centreless and not territorially bounded.

Lefebvre's (1991) production of space, Bourdieu's (1984: 114, 223) *habitus* and *field*, Bauman's (2007) flexible everything, Massey's (2005) coeval and multiple trajectories, Pratt's (2004) and Smith's (2001) transnationalism, and Fraser (1993) and Benhabib (2004) political organization of space, do share the same paradigmatic basis. The physical natural world is the underpinning of social interaction, but cannot account for social interaction. Social space is a concrete abstraction of nature and the absolute whose reality can be *a posteriori* understood. The interplay among representational space, representations of space, and spatial practice, show that social space cannot be categorised into simple Cartesian classes of mental and physical. Humans produce their perceived space, conceived space, and lived space. The production of space, *fields*, trajectories, and counterspaces, are historically contingent. Social space is therefore a necessarily dynamic model that leans towards Aristotelian metaphysics that inherently reconciles the notions of time and change. It also rejects Platonic, Kantian, or Hegelian notions of a pre-existing universal ideal. Instead, it borrows on Marxist and Aristotelian notions of the real and concrete – although it does not reduce it to these categories, for to do so would undermine the dynamic nature of social interaction. Humans are viewed as corporeal and as capable of manifesting their reality, within the limits of the corresponding power structures. Space is neither neutral, nor are its inequalities a natural outcome of natural or divine processes. The form, structure, and function of social space and its Lefebvrian abstract contradictions are therefore the outcome of social imbalances of power, and a tool for further domination. These authors, differing significantly in their literary trajectories, do attune with one another in some ways. Although there are incongruencies (which will be discussed in Chapter Four after a look to Berlin in Chapter Three), from them, certain threads can be drawn about social space in general. Specifically, there are five sociopolitical implications of social space. All show that space is: 1) necessary and real; 2) not a natural phenomenon;

3) not neutral; 4) and dialectic. In the following subsections, the character of social space and these five implications will be discussed.

2.3.1 Necessary and real social space

Each author showed why space matters in sociology. These authors are certainly not the only ones to refer to space in the context of social theory. Since the 70s in general, space, has enjoyed a renaissance, particularly in the fields of social geography and feminist as well as queer theory. Lefebvre was of particular significance to the former, and hence his renaissance in the 1990s (Schmid 2008: 27). Many of the other authors discussed in this chapter (Massey, Pratt, Fraser, Benhabib), stem from the broad field of feminist theory, and were influenced therefore by a French contemporary of Lefebvre who also referenced space and its relevance to sociology, Foucault (Pratt 2004: 12). Bourdieu (1984), also a French contemporary of both Lefebvre and Foucault, was also preoccupied with space. Lefebvre (1991), however, was the only one to really bring back the age old question of what space is (Schmid 2008: 28). He was not concerned with analysing the placement of any individual or group within space. His inquiry was more cosmic, so to speak. Convinced of the faulty division between *res cognitans* and *res extensa*, Lefebvre, like his philosophical predecessors, (Schmid (2008: 28) observes that the works of Lefebvre are primarily based on Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche), although Lefebvre refers also to a myriad of philosophers going as far back to Plato) wanted to know simply what space is (ibid.). And although this cosmic question was not asked among the feminist/queer theorists, space remained central to their work and is, whether it was deliberate or not, of the same paradigmatic position: space was necessary and real.

To Lefebvre (1991), social relationships required space, and the relationship between space and the relationships that it supports was the crucial question at hand. He argued that the fundamental underpinning of social relations is spatial (Lefebvre 1991: 403) and that for each social case, an analysis of the spatial is in order. He wrote, "...spatial practice regulates life – it does not create it," (Lefebvre 1991: 404).

He also argued that social groups could not:

“...constitute themselves, or recognise one another, as ‘subjects’ unless they generate (or produce) a space. Ideas, representations or values which do not succeed in making their mark on space, and thus generating (or producing) an appropriate morphology, will lose all pith and become mere signs, resolve themselves into abstract descriptions, or mutate into fantasies,” (Lefebvre 1991: 416-417).

Without space, ideas cannot actualise and become anything more than fantasies. Fraser’s (1993) concept of counter publics also require space. She argued that counter spaces are necessary in order that an alternate discourse could arise (Fraser 1993: 9). By extension, restricting this necessary space may therefore be a tool of domination. In a similar vein, it may be interpreted that Bourdieu’s (1984) *fields* were also required for social expression. Either each individual must produce her *field*, thus creating a social spatial manifestation of her intent, or the *field* must already be in existence in order for her to move towards it. The space, the *field* that one inhabited also defined the person. Space was therefore also capable of classifying people. Massey (2005) dared a step further and conflated space and social into one. Space did not underpin the social, space was the social (Massey 2005: 61). Pratt (2004: 12) had not made this step, but spatialising feminist geography was the primary goal for her book. She had done this by tracing the material manifestations of discourse, and the personal geographies of the interviewees. Quite clearly, the study of feminism was not mere logico-epistemological. Smith’s (2001) intent in the first part of his book was to deconstruct the theories of Sassen and Harvey, which he saw as reductionist and overlooking the role of agency in place making. For Smith (2001: 28, 45), the reduction of social processes to economic processes was akin to laying an ideology over actual processes. Thus, Smith (2001: 6-7) demanded examinations of a real social spaces that included embedded and transnational agency.

Each also showed that space is political, and that an analysis of space can reveal sources of domination and repression. This was considered neither among the Ancient

Greeks nor among the classical philosophers until Marx. Earthly space, as *res extensa* or *res cogitans*, was in all cases subject to a supreme force. A person's position in society was shown to be more a result of a fore gone destiny, rather than as a result of specific social or political circumstances. Space was therefore not political. Space – and the social interaction within it – simply was. Lefebvre (1991), like Marx, urged readers to recognise their relationship to space, and the boundaries within it that confine them to their specific mode of production. Bourdieu (1984: 114, 223), less prophetic, saw *habitus* and *field* as theoretical tools to understand one's position within a given social network. Fraser (1993: 27), too, spoke of the space of counterpublics as a means participating in democratic space. For Massey (2005: 189), space was a product of interrelations and to fully understand it, this multitude and the coeval must be addressed.

As already noted, each author also uncovered a form of social space that was fundamentally within the same philosophical paradigm: the real, the sensual, and *a posteriori*¹⁴. Lefebvre addressed fundamental notions of humanity and space. His trinities of social space, of the, “space of people who deal with material things,” (Lefebvre 1991: 4) of the practico-sensory realm, of the real space, of the space of society and social life, were no accident. They were set up to deliberately upset the dualities that had prevailed in social philosophy for centuries (Schmid 2008: 28). These demanded a side step away from polar, black and white, deliberations, and a step towards social space as dialectic. And although, his triads invoked the ephemeral, imaginary, and tried to blur the lines between the mental and physical, the *a priori* and *a posteriori*, his thesis (that social space is a social product) traced neatly Marx's fundamental moments of social reproduction. In this sense, the social space that Lefebvre discussed was, like Marx, a space existing in an Aristotelian sensual, and Cartesian external, reality. None of the other authors elaborated on the age-old philosophical relationship between people and their environment. They simply began with the premise that they and their actions *are* in space. Bourdieu's (1984) stance was a deliberate strategy of deconstructing Kant. He likely chose empirical and *a posteriori* method deliberately, in order to deconstruct the idealism of Kant *a priori* transcendental aesthetic. Bourdieu's social space was therefore also real and concrete. Individuals had

¹⁴ This paradigm sits in opposition to the idealism posited by Plato, Kant, Hegel, and to the religious Descartes.

varying capacities to know or to understand, and this was informed by their physical environment, or *field* that they inhabit. Similarly, neither Fraser (1993), Benhabib (2004), nor Bauman (2007) deliberated philosophically over the relationship between the person and its surroundings, but simply began with the premise that humans are in space.

2.3.2 Unnatural social space

The unnaturalness of social space has political implications towards the development of social space, because notions of tradition, custom, or “the way things are” cannot be reduced to natural development. Again the authors introduced above are not the only ones to assess space as an unnatural event. The primary aim of feminist theorists has been to deconstruct the so called natural order that prevailed throughout academic history. Queer theorists, one of the most prominent would have to be Judith Butler (2006), have deepened feminist thought with the supposition that everything is socially constructed, not just gender, as feminists had previously argued, but also the concept of sex itself.

Again, Lefebvre (1991) differs from the feminist theorists mentioned in this chapter, because his concept of unnatural space is not concluded from an analysis of individuals or individual bodies, but as an extension of the philosophical discussion of the Hegelian and Marxist abstract (Schmid 2008: 28). For Lefebvre (1991), abstract space is also politically loaded space, because it renders space to the will of humans. He deliberately and carefully delineated social space from natural space. Social space was, in fact, defined as an abstraction of nature, or of the absolute (nature in its unknowable totality) (ibid.). Humans were bound to nature, insofar as they *have* physical space (ibid.). Marking space and inscribing history was the physical result (ibid.). The more humans apprehended their environment, the more it was abstracted (ibid.). That humans were capable of producing their space, meant that the social space they manifested was not a result of divine or cosmic intervention of any sort. Humans, real corporeal beings, produced social space.

Concerning the authors introduced in 2.2, Bourdieu and Lefebvre rigorously and explicitly argued that social space was not a natural phenomenon. Bourdieu (1984: 493)

refuted the notion of a natural social space by deconstructing Kant's pure aesthetic – the notion that tastes are based in nature and are a natural phenomenon. Bourdieu had shown that this was not the case. Rather that tastes were a result of specific social conditions, that were based on individual *habitus* and corresponding *fields* (Bourdieu 1984: 131-132). The works of Fraser, Benhabib, Pratt, and Massey, stem from the wide field of feminist theory. As such, their work necessarily challenges norms, which – and especially for those who do not question them (like Lefebvre's (1991: 313) driver) – might be confused with naturalness. Fraser (1993: 1-27) and Benhabib (2004: 218) questioned the normative ideas of publics and democracy, and thereby called into question the idea of a territorially bounded democratic sovereignty. Political realms, forums, spaces, and places could be conceived of as far more nebulous and multi-layered. In effect: the political structures we have are, to a certain extent, chosen. They are a result of social interaction. By expanding the map of Canada into the Philippines, Pratt (2004: 8) questioned the normative idea of national borders. In effect: the borders we defend are chosen. That is, they are a product of social interaction, and they may be revisualized and changed. Massey (2005: 142) questioned the normalizing effect of metanarratives, and opened up space as integral to the social. The conceptions and representations of space that we have are chosen. They, too, are a product of social interaction, and can be changed.

2.3.3 *Non-neutral social space*

The myth of neutral space was also a common observation of social space. Each author deconstructed the idea as a form of repression, where the dominant class, group, or institution maintains the status quo through the illusion of an all inclusive space. Kant constructed an idealistic notion of purity that was a common natural denominator to all human beings¹⁵. This was the fundamental premise that Bourdieu (1984: 493) argued

¹⁵ In introducing his transcendental aesthetics – the science of all principles of *a priori* sensibility – Kant analysed the relationship between human mental and physical understanding and the natural world in which it is situated. Representations of objects existing in space, according to Kant, are transmitted *a priori* (knowledge before experience) to the mind via the senses. It is in the mind, then, that one understands – pure knowledge. Empirical exploration of this understanding might further verify its existence *a posteriori* (knowledge after experience, or empiricism), or it could lead to the creation of yet another representation of the existing object, again, represented anew *a priori* within the mind. Knowing, then, was a process of representation, understanding, experience, and representation again (Smith 2003: 36-41).

against. Fraser (1993: 2) deconstructed Habermas's notion of a one all-inclusive and neutral public sphere. Lefebvre's (1991) theory of contradictory space revealed the otherwise concealed production processes that create the illusion of neutral space.

Bourdieu (1984: 493) argued against the Kantian notion of purity, arguing that the idea of purity itself is relative, and that tastes in general were dependent on social background, and not on an idealistic common-to-all natural state that each individual should possess. Bourdieu's (1984: 131-132) construct of *habitus* and *field* showed that neutral Kantian pure space is *a priori* and mental, and has no real existence except for those who think it up. Further, it showed that space (*fields*) is loaded with rules and prerequisites that either permit or negate an individual's access to it. Space, therefore, could not be seen as culturally neutral, pure, or as offering equal and indiscriminate opportunities of articulation to all forms of cultural expression. Instead, spaces materialised, and existed in and through cultural institutions. This position argued against Kantian and Hegelian concepts of a social space that is abstract, ideal, and universal.

Lefebvre argued that spaces and places are not public, neutral, or common because architects and planners designate them as such (Carr and Allahwala 2003: 65). Instead, it is the socially interacting milieus within a given space that made it so (ibid.). The codes to be read as neutral are read by living that space. Just as a church, in and of itself, is not absolute and carries no meaning until it is experienced (Lefebvre 1991: 236), so is neutral space. Furthermore, Lefebvre (1991: 94, 292) argued that neutrality was a tool of domination, and an illusion designed to hide class struggle. The participants that collectively create the illusion of neutrality in space are those – like the illustrator and the driver (Lefebvre 1991: 313) – that conform to, and do not question, their social modes (ibid.). This tool effectively placed the individual in a space-producing role, a space that both supports and confines them. Neutrality could therefore conceal the fragmentation. This concealment was the same illusion that Marx had observed in the industrial production process: that the product, itself, does not reveal or necessarily even allude to the processes that produced it:

“How is [production] concealed? The answer is: by a double illusion, each side of which refers back to the other, reinforces

the other, and hides behind the other. These two aspects are the illusion of transparency on the one hand and the illusion of opacity, or ‘realistic’ illusion, on the other,” (Lefebvre 1991: 27).

The driver (Lefebvre 1991: 313) who only knows how to drive does not question from where the car came, or how and by whom the streets were made. A neutral space seems neutral precisely because it – the social milieu and interaction – is a product that does not refer to the processes or struggles that created it. His theory of contradictions, then, was a tool that illuminated the fragmentation wrought throughout space, and the processes that produce it.

Lefebvre’s comment that, “for conflicts to be voiced, they must first be perceived, and this without subscribing to representations of space as generally conceived,” (Lefebvre 1991: 365) is reminiscent of Fraser’s counterpublics (1993: 8) – although the social theoretical production of space was not her specific objective, nor was the structure of democracy a project of Lefebvre’s. Fraser (ibid.) argued for a multiplicity of public spaces, and against the unity of a one neutral public space that was proposed by Habermas. She (ibid.) argued against the possibility of a pure neutral space, and that such spaces serve the interests of the dominant class. The creation of counterpublics was her solution to the illusion of neutrality (ibid.) – and by extension, space was a necessary requisite of this social expression. Neither Massey (2005), nor Smith (2001), nor Pratt (2004), nor Bauman (2007) discussed neutrality per se, but trajectories, transnational histories, and liquid and flexible modernity negated the possibility of overarching and neutralising metanarratives. Neutrality can only exist for someone as they travel within their own path – just as neutrality exists for Lefebvre’s (1991: 313) unquestioning driver. Outside of this path, among *Others*, neutrality cannot exist, or is at best relative.

2.3.4 Dialectic and dynamic social space

Schmid (2008: 30) wrote that the deeper meaning of dialectics can only be captured in the German phrase, *das Aufheben des Widerspruchs*, which has two meanings: negation of the contradiction; and/or, preservation and lifting (to a higher level) the contradiction.

Schmid (ibid.) explained that dialectics is a logic that allows for every proposition to be both true and false, in contrast to formal logic that every proposition can be only one or the other. Lefebvre (ibid.) applied these core ideas to create a dialectics of contradictions, in which a sublated contradiction will not reach its resolution, but its transformation. The contradiction is overcome, and at the same time, preserved and further worked (ibid.). Lefebvre's dialectics then are necessarily at the same time negation and resolve, where each resolution carries with it a seed of change (ibid.). Lefebvrian dialectics then is a return to an age-old debate on *becoming*¹⁶ (Schmid 2008: 31).

The central concepts of dialect thinking was key to understanding Lefebvre's specific dialectics of work and product, of work/product and production, but also of his triad of space (Schmid 2008: 39-40). Dialectics, however, were also not discussed among the other authors discussed above. In fact, dialectics is not to be found among prominent feminist and queer theoretical thinkers¹⁷. Can dialectic thinking be applied to *habitus* and *field*, or trajectories, or publics, or liquid modernities? Exploring these questions are indeed dissertations in and of themselves. Yet, it is probably fair to say that Lefebvre would confirm that it is, indeed, possible, and for the purposes of *this* dissertation, it can be said that the authors above illustrated a social world that, was perhaps not dialectic, but was dynamic to say the least. Bourdieu's (1984) theories were relevant to the production of social space. Bourdieu's (ibid.) concepts of *habitus* and *field* imply a dynamic social space, as they generate one another. To own a certain *habitus* is to be permitted to a certain *field*. To occupy a certain *field* is to occupy a certain social condition that generates further the *habitus*. Also *fields* among *fields* were dynamic. The dialectic relationship between the fields of directors, playwrights, actors, and technicians defined, for example, the master

¹⁶ One of Aristotle's cardinal departures from his predecessor, Plato, was his notion of time (see 'Metaphysics' in Barnes (1971b: 1552-1728)). The question of what *is* and what *becomes* has remained a philosophical debate over the millennia. In classical philosophy, feminist philosophy (see Freeland (1998), or Jagger and Young (2005)), and in urban sociology such as Werlen (1993).

¹⁷ In addition to the feminist thinkers already mentioned in this paper, no where in the following books is dialectics discussed: *Oxford Readings in Feminism: Feminism and History of Philosophy* edited by Genevieve Lloyd (2006); *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* edited by Seyla Benhabib (1996); *Re-Reading the Canon: Feminist Interpretations of René Descartes* edited by Susan Bordo (1999); *Re-Reading the Canon: Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant* edited by Robin May Schott (1997); *On Female Body Experience: "Throwing like a girl" and Other Essays* by I.M. Young (2005); *Undoing Gender* by Judith Butler (2004); *Space, Place, and Gender* by Doreen Massey (1994); *Re-Reading the Canon: Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle* edited by Cynthia A. Freeland (1998); *A Companion to Feminist Philosophy* edited by A.M. Jagger and I.M. Young (2000).

production. The theoretical counterpublic (Fraser 1993: 8) also implied a dynamic model of social space. The multitude of public spheres – as spaces (or *fields*, perhaps) – was a step towards democracy insofar that it would promote and further diverse discursive arenas. Massey's (2005), Pratt's (2004) and Smith's (2001) trajectories were constantly in motion and ever changing. Bauman's (2007) world, too, was in constant transformation.

3.0 Restricted by the border – two contradictory Berliner stories

If there was a European city that would know what it means to live with borders, it would be Berlin. For nearly three decades, residents of the divided city were segregated by a guarded wall that was erected by external forces, and exchange between the parts was all but obsolete. Even if the story of the Wall was an example of conflating a variety of temporal trajectories into one spatial metanarrative, and a rude awakening to the capacity of vertical structures to apply power and violent oppression, it remains an ode to the problems of barriers that thwart horizontal pathways. Now¹⁸, it is nearing on two decades since Berlin reunified, a process that hoped to amalgamate (and create) a new city of the formerly segregated eastern and western parts. However, this process simply generated new contexts to frame new forms of fragmentation and new rules of segregation. There are now a new set of stakeholders, occupiers of capital power, holders of citizenship and status, which reinforce the social patterns that create and sustain new forms of repression. The question remains (and therefore, the outstanding political project) whether or not a critical discourse is possible that can transform social space – one that critically challenges existing structures, and emancipates disadvantaged or marginalised groups that counteract, counterpose, and counterbalance the dominant.

This chapter will describe two phenomena in Berlin: 1) the story of Berlin's "exit scene" ("*Aussteigerszene*") of the squatter movement; and 2) the experience and position of

¹⁸ "Now," refers to the date of the defense of this dissertation on June 18, 2009.

newcomers (*Einwanderer*) in Germany. Exit and entry: at first glance it appears that these two social movements (in so far that they can be categorised as unified movements) are on opposite trajectories. Moreover, it would appear that the city is a kind of container in which some insiders attempt to refuse it, while others attempt to enter. I will return to the question of whether or not this is so in Chapter Four, but for now I will let this contradiction stand. This apparent contradiction was, after all, one of the reasons that I chose these two topics in the first place. They were also chosen because they are prominent and current social struggles in Berlin, in which respective participants struggle for place to produce space.

3.1 A Story of Refusal and Exit

“Das ist unser Haus, schmeißt doch endlich Schmidt und Press und Mosch aus Kreuzberg raus!,” (Ton Steine Scherben 1972).

So sang the beloved punk-folk band, in resistance to the developers that posed a constant threat to the squatters, who during the 1970s, lived in the district of *Kreuzberg*. It translates – unfortunately not so rhythmically – to, “That is our house, throw *Schmidt* and *Press* and *Mosch* out of *Kreuzberg*, once and for all!” *Ton Steine Scherben* (1972) sang this in the 1970s, but these sentiments still characterise the spirit of many protests that carry on today in Berlin as squatters continue to resist City revitalisation programs, developers rebuilding infrastructure, and private institutions staking out and cultivating capital investments.

After the German Democratic Republic (GDR) collapsed, and the border that divided Berlin opened, Berlin’s housing market went through a period of pandemonium, and so too the dialectic of protesting and singing versus ignoring and developing. Suddenly, properties that formerly lay on the eastern fringe of East Berlin were, in the re-unified Berlin, centrally located and available at (by western standards) rock bottom prices (Strom 1996: 7). For many, it was a real estate “gold rush,” (Strom 1996: *ibid.*). Among the myriad of speculators and investors hunting the sites, were young people searching for cheaper rents (Berg 1998: 85). Some simply squatted empty buildings – of which there were plenty – and thus began a new era in Berlin’s squatter history. Most found opportunities in the abandoned tenement housing stock of the former eastern fringe districts

of *Mitte*, *Prenzlauer Berg*, and *Friedrichshain*. In this time over 30 squatter communities were established (squat!net 2006).

The former GDR tenement housing stock provided ample space to build counter culture and housing communities. It might be noted here, that squats in Berlin differ from squats in North America in that they do not signify a larger problem of housing shortage. Inhabitants are not victims of a lack of affordable housing (Berg 1998: 8). Rather, inhabitants value co-operation, self-determinism, solidarity, and environmental consciousness, and reject commercialism, top-down state or institutional hierarchical structures (Berg 1998: *ibid.*; Grell, Sembale and Veith 1998: 209). Squatting is seen as a possibility to realise this utopia, and is therefore a consciously chosen lifestyle (Berg 1998: *ibid.*).

Of the initial squats, some are now legal (squat!net 2006), having achieved some sort of rental agreement with the property owner. Some have been “cleaned away” (“*geräumt*”) (*ibid.*). A few remain illegal. “Trailer villages” (“*Wagendörfer*”) or “trailer fortresses” (“*Wagenburgen*”) are similar, in so far that they (a) grew out of the house squatting scene and their social milieus overlap; and (b) occupy a territory in non-traditional forms. In wagon villages, inhabitants live in mobile wagons, and lack the infrastructure that buildings may offer.

The fate of many squats lay in the development of the reunified Berlin. As squatters were moving in, politicians, planners, and investors were also writing up their designs for the former GDR districts¹⁹. In 1999, *Planwerk* was voted in by the Berliner Senate. This

¹⁹ Frick (1991) discussed some of the planning challenges that Berliner planners faced immediately after the fall of the wall: 1) how to deal with development inside the inner city (Frick 1991: 39) (the territory within the “Subway Ring” (“*S-Bahn Ring*”)); 2) how to development the different city centres (Frick 1991: 45); and 3) how to deal with expansion into Brandenburg. Concerning the area inside the “Subway Ring” – which covers an area comparable to the size of Paris (~100 km²), houses 1.29 million people, contained the old city centres, city park, and old working class districts (Frick 1991: 39). Frick described some of the polar opinions concerning how this area should be re-developed. On one hand, some wanted to encourage the growth of a vital inner city. However, on an opposing hand, others argued that this land would be the only attractive territory to investors interested in a service economy and market-oriented development. These arguments were only the background to the series of physical amendments that had to be made to the area to reconnect the eastern part with the western (*ibid.*). Concerning the various city centres, Frick (1991: 45) predicted the further independent and careful development of the two city centres *Kurfürstendamm/Zoologischer Garten*,

was the development plan that would define areas of emphasis within the reunified Berlin to be redeveloped (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2008). Many squats lay within these areas, and were in the way of such projects as the *MediaSpree*, *Johannisviertel*, *Spandauer Vorstadt*, and *Rosenthaler Vorstadt*.

In this section, I will describe various house squats and trailer villages that are still, as of October 2008, located in Berlin. I will explain their history, outline their social objectives, and expose some of their various claims to difference. It is seen that over the last 15 years, the squatter movement has diversified. Some squats are not as radical as they once were. Some were, indeed, fully commercialised and state sponsored. Others continue to fight the city and private developers, resist forced eviction attempts, and continue to network in political activities. The trajectories of exit and refusal are not as unified throughout the squatter scene as they once might have been. Whether integrated or not, however, these stories expose social movements that are producing their space on independent and horizontal (see 4.3.2) trajectories. In addition to descriptions of the squats, I have also inserted images throughout that illustrate some of the contradictory dynamics at work. All of these trends and their significance for theories of social space will be discussed in Chapter Four, where I will interpret them through social spatial theory.

and *Mitte* – two centres that existed before the division of the city as a result of the founding of *Charlottenburg* in 1705. Regarding the surrounding State of Brandenburg, Frick (1991: 46-47) discussed the concept of a “star-shaped” development pattern that would extend Berlin into the surrounding Brandenburg -- a pattern that would trace the old railways that were built in the 1920s and 30s. The star’s axes, which reach out to neighbouring towns of *Oranienburg*, *Bernau*, *Strausberg*, *Königs Wusterhausen*, *Zossen Wünsdorf*, *Michendorf*, and *Neuen*, would be reserved for housing and built up areas, while the areas in between the axes would be reserved for open space. The main problem with this plan, according to Frick (1991: *ibid.*), was its realization, as there existed complex bureaucratic planning barriers between the City-State of Berlin and the State of Brandenburg. More on this can also be found in a later article from Frick (1995) written four years later.

Plans were also being set in motion to move the capital city of the republic from Bonn to Berlin, as Berlin was (Häußermann and Strom 1994: 336): 1) a capital city as a symbolic place; 2) a capital city as a political setting; and 3) a capital city as a catalyst of regional development.

3.1.1 House Squats



Figure 1: (1) Placards of meetings and demonstrations posted on abandoned houses of the Rigaer street (*Rigaerstraße*) (top); (2) Graffiti legitimated by a frame and hung for display in a subway station (bottom).

The first photograph in Figure 1 shows placard posted on a not yet renovated building on Rigaer Street (*Rigaerstrasse*) in the neighbourhood of *Friedrichshain*. One placard advertises a solidarity party with the *Antifa* (anti-fascists). Another advertises a demonstration against deportations, and another advertises a festival for women. The second photo shows one of a series of framed paintings of spray can graffiti that hung in a

subway station in the neighbourhood of *Mitte*. Both photos were taken in the same month by me as a passive and spontaneous bystander. Both the set of placards and the framed graffiti are materialised representations of space that signify, respectively, various counter movements, while the latter also represents an ambiguous form of packaged modern art.

Shown side by side another level of interpretation is exposed: that of the signifier versus the signified. The placards are a call for solidarity, and as such they represent alternative spaces for alternative discourse. They signify a centre – a meeting place – of these counter movements. With these placards, the signifier signifies itself. Graffiti has indeed become a spatial product capable of being commodified, and spraying is one of the many branches of late-twentieth century modern art. However, the social practice of graffiti has its roots in rebelliousness. It arises as a rebellious act (Chalfant and Prigoff 1987: 10) where spraying on private property, spraying at night time, and spraying where it is not legal to do so were part of the thrill and soul of the art. Spray-can graffiti – and particularly subway spray-can graffiti – originated in New York by underground movements (ibid.: 10). The signifiers (the sprayers) signified themselves. Although some artists used underground spraycan art as a method of becoming known in the art world, the practice of graffiti as modern art can be viewed as a paradox. Once sold in a gallery, it is no longer rebellious and no longer illegal, but merely sprayer art. Still the modern art that hung in the subway station, at once signifies the practice of graffiti, the practice of underground movements, and perhaps even, their real existence, while its framed and paid-for presentation signifies its paradoxical legitimisation. The signifier, perhaps the German Rail (*Deutsche Bahn*), perhaps the City of Berlin, perhaps a private merchant, is signifying something or someone else – perhaps the practice of underground social movements, perhaps the practice of modern art. The real and concrete representations of space in Figure 1, then, reveal a split in the levels of power. The placards reveal the empowerment of counter groups to regroup, meet, self-organise, and act. The subway station art reveals a hierarchy, whereby the rebellious act of graffiti is subservient to the capitalist power of the buyer.

3.1.1.1 Köpi

One of the first buildings to be squatted in 1990 was the *Köpi*. The squat is completed with a bar, video archive, cinema, and studio workroom (*Köpi* 2007). Events include queer cabarets, community kitchens (*Volksküche*), concerts, film showings, and solidarity parties (*Soliparties*). Themes include anti-state, anti-capitalism, anti-fascism, anti-racism, and anti-social stratification. The property and social events are co-operatively managed and financed by the 60 or so residents (*ibid.*). Roof and water systems, for example, were replaced on their own expense (*ibid.*). Outside funding would be rejected, as do-it-yourself ideology is preferred (*ibid.*).

The previous owner, *Petersen & Partner KG*, had made various attempts to evict the squatters. However, all attempts had failed (*ibid.*). Later the owner filed for bankruptcy, and the city made various failed attempts to auction the property off (*ibid.*). As of summer 2006, there were no immediate eviction threats. However the members of the *Köpi* situate themselves against the *MediaSpree* Project that plans to revitalise 180 hectares of land along the riverside between the *Jannovitz* and *Elsen* bridges (*ibid.*). It is planned as a corridor connecting eastern Berlin to the city centre along the *Spree River* (that before 1989 acted as an East-West border), and as common connecting ground between the formerly severed districts of *Kreuzberg* and *Friedrichshain* (*ibid.*). New bridges are in the planning stages, with *Ostbahnhof* in the area, it is a 15-minute subway ride away from the *Schönefeld Airport* (*ibid.*). A host of new media technology businesses as well as recreation and services are expected. *Ver.di*, *Universal Music*, *East Side Gallery*, the *Atrium on the Spree*, the *O2 Arena* (for large sports and concert events), the *East Side Hotel*, *MTV*, the 185 meter high Ferris wheel, and thousands upon thousands of office lofts are either scheduled to move in or are already present (*ibid.*). The *Köpi* inhabitants plan to refuse this movement. If they lose the resistance, it would mean to them the submission to the capitalist commercial logic that they fundamentally reject (*ibid.*).

The members of the *Köpi* represent themselves at their website as a separate social movement, with a separate agenda for the built environment than that of the *MediaSpree* project (*ibid.*). Their self-presentation explicitly signifies a commitment to their community

and their space – values that they view as in conflict with the plans of the *MediaSpree*. The *Köpi*, itself, is very explicitly a meeting-point, a central place for the reproduction of these values.

3.1.1.2 Rigaer⁹⁴

“Free Space” (*Freiraum*) is ideological. The photograph on the left in Figure 2 shows the City of Berlin’s idea and realization of free space. Indeed, it is a space of pleasure. That it is full of young people not particularly radically dressed may be a fluke, but the photo does show a relaxing space that is indeed open, airy, bright, and open to anyone who likes to sit in the sun (everyone?). The uniformity of the furniture, the calculated placement of each tree, can signify on one hand simplicity and openness. It can also represent lowest common denominator conformity and assimilation. At the website for Berlin City Development, the creation of free space is celebrated as follows:

“Berlin creates free spaces. The public space – a place for everyone. The public space is, as a place of communication, individual consumption and social interaction, a steadfast part of the all-day culture Its redesigning creates the condition that everyone can find a place, in which their needs and can be met. In the simultaneity of the diverse forms of appropriation, public space becomes socially integrative and supports urbanity,”²⁰ (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2007a).

²⁰ My translation of, “*Berlin schafft Freiräume. Der öffentliche Raum – ein Ort für alle. Der öffentliche Raum ist als Ort der Kommunikation, individueller Aneignung und sozialer Interaktion fester Bestandteil der Alltagskultur [...] Seine Neugestaltung schafft die Voraussetzungen, dass alle den Platz finden, der ihren Nutzungsanforderungen entspricht. In dieser Gleichzeitigkeit der unterschiedlichsten Aneignungsformen wirkt der öffentliche Raum sozial integrativ und fördert die Urbanität,*” (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2007a).



Figure 2: “Free Space” (“*Freiräum*”) imagined and realised by the City of Berlin (top), and “free space” of the Rigaer squat (bottom).

The city's concept of free space endorses a space in which everyone can (at least in theory) enjoy and participate. The photo on the right of Figure 2, however, shows another vision of free-space that is bubbling up in another corner of Berlin, and manifesting itself in the form of another squatter derelict building in eastern district of *Friedrichshain*. Behind the mysterious facade of this building, the outside passive observer cannot immediately assess what takes place inside. To a non-member, this free-space might appear closed. The building is dilapidated, and the unknown inhabitants hang banners outside their windows. Little else can be assessed of this lived space. To access this space, one has to either have the right contacts, or research savvy.

The contrast between these two representations of "Free Space" are reminiscent of discourse on modernity and all that modernity was to free us from. On modernity, Harvey wrote:

"The idea was to use the accumulation of knowledge generated by many individuals working freely and creatively for the pursuit of human emancipation and the enrichment of daily life. The scientific domination of nature promised freedom from scarcity, want, and the arbitrariness of natural calamity. The development of rational forms of social organization and rational modes of thought promised liberation from the irrationalities of myth, religion, superstition, release from the arbitrary use of power as well as from the dark side of our own human natures," (Harvey 1990: 12).

The City of Berlin's representation of free space is rational, orderly and (supposedly) open. It is reminiscent of Lefebvre's (1991: 160) observations of high modernity in which there is also an unknown signifier, and the possibility that this signifier might be one of power renders this kind of space, then, contradictory. The producers are hidden. This space was produced by someone for someone else. Someone worked and drew up the plans, worked and planted the trees, worked and manufactured the chairs, worked and cut the grass. It is unlikely, that those workers were the same individuals that are represented here sleeping

and sunning themselves. This production process of this “free space” was one of a split in the means of production – a split between thinkers and do-ers, high-paid and low-paid labour. It also represents a split between the producers and the consumers.

The contrasting and opposing representation of the squatter’s free space – as seen from the outside – is mysterious, dark and closed. These are the qualities that modernity was supposed to save us from (Harvey 1990: 12). The modernist duality has surfaced in feminist critiques of rationality and modernity (see Lloyd 2005: 165-168; Gatens 2005: 21-29; Felski 1995: 1-247), where it is debated whether or not modern rationalist thought is a masculine project or not. Here, it is not my goal to place judgement on the gender of this representation of free space, but it may suffice to say that the difference in representations of free space is curious and stark to say the least. Furthermore, it might be reasonable to conclude that for those on the inside, the squatter’s idea of free space is not so mysterious and closed, nor does it require rationalisation. And indeed, this is the case. At the *Rigaer94* website, the following can be read:

“Free Space is Fought For Not Granted,” (Rigaer94 2006).

The *Rigaer94* is a house squat that arose after the Post-Wall west to east migration (*Rigaer94* 2006). The residents understand their project as a political housing project, and the building provides living space, as well as space for concerts, parties, community kitchens (*Volksküche*), and political meetings (ibid.). The house is equipped with an unregistered bar with unregistered workers, *die Kadterschmiede*. At their website one can also read:

“We want a space that opposes norms and where the alternative is possible. The Kadterschmiede, as a left cultural project, consciously opposes the commercial entertainment paradise, and

is a meeting point for people, who search, and want to work in, the alternative,” (Kadterschmiede 2006).²¹

It can be seen that the *Rigaer94* is explicitly perceived as a “free space” (“*Freiraum*”), a space that offers the possibility of alternative counter public discourses, and as stated above and on their website, it is also a space that has to be fought for.

The *Rigaer94* is located just outside the boundaries of the *MediaSpree* redevelopment project. The squat would be indirectly affected by the developments on the *Spree River* (*Rigaer94* 2006), and directly affected by revitalisation projects by private developers in *Friedrichshain*. During the 1990s, the squatters had negotiated a rental contract with the local city housing administration (*ibid.*), after which the house went through the hands of several new owners, with each of whom the residents have been in a struggle to keep the building (*ibid.*). These struggles have involved physical resistance to police raids (*ibid.*). The residents view themselves, however, not just in a fight over a single property but in resistance to a general trend in Berliner city development (*ibid.*). At the *Rigaer94* website, one could read:

“... these modernization plans, just like in the *Kastanie 86*, or in the *Brunnenstr. 183*, are classified within the general restructuring plans of *Friedrichshain* and all of Berlin, as for example *MediaSpree*. Expensive and renovated apartments will be built, which the former renters cannot afford. The socially disadvantaged are systematically forced to the marginal districts, in order that space can be created for those who retain the necessary buying power, and want to spend their money in the

²¹ My translation of, “*Das Recht auf selbstbestimmtes Leben, und zwar für alle! Denn dieser Normalität versuchen wir ein Ort entgegenzusetzen, an dem Alternativen möglich sind. Die Kadterschmiede als ein linkes Kulturprojekt steht in einer bewußten Opposition zum kommerziellen Erlebnisparadies und ist ein Treffpunkt für Leute, die nach Alternativen suchen und daran arbeiten,*” (Kadterschmiede 2006).

consumption of a pseudo-alternative lifestyle,” (*Rigaer94* 2006).²²

The *Kadterschmiede* – a bar located on the premises – supported the view further:

“... it is a political conflict. Private profit seekers stand on the one side, and on the other side stand those who support the right to self-determination...” (*Kadterschmiede* 2006).²³

This resistance furthers their view that the *Rigaer94* is an alternative political project. Not only is the squat a meeting point for alternative discourses, but also their very presence is a statement of refusal of wider socio-economic trends.

Like the *Köpi*, the *Rigaer94* is explicitly separate social phenomenon, with a separate agenda for the built environment from that of the City of Berlin. Their self-presentation explicitly signifies a commitment to their community and their space. Their space is also explicitly a meeting-point or centre for (their idea) of free space. It was also seen how collisions of these trajectories unfold: that of police force. Of course the police are not representatives of just any social movement, but that of the law and government. The readiness of the squatters to engage in conflicts with the law, might be seen as a readiness for refusal (*Ausstieg*) of the community of the German State.

3.1.1.3 NewYorck59

In the 1980s, *Kreuzberg* squats were located at the western periphery of West Berlin, and *Kreuzberg* was famous for its squats. After the Wall fell, however, many squats

²² My translation of, “*Auch reiht sich dieses Modernisierungsvorhaben, genauso wie in der Kastanienallee 86, oder in der Brunnenstr. 183, in die allgemeinen Umstrukturierungspläne in Friedrichshain bzw. ganz Berlin, wie z.B. MediaSpree, ein. Dabei sollen hier teure und sanierte Wohnungen entstehen, welche von den ehemaligen MieterInnen nicht mehr bezahlt werden können. Sozial schwache Menschen werden systematisch in Randgebiete verdrängt, um hier Platz zu schaffen für Leute, die die nötige Kaufkraft mitbringen und mit ihrem Geld einen pseudo-alternativen Lebensstil konsumieren wollen,*” (*Rigaer94* 2006).

²³ My translation of, “*Nichtsdestotrotz ist es ein politischer Konflikt. Auf der einen Seite stehen private Profitinteressen, auf der anderen - das Recht auf selbstbestimmtes Leben,*” (*Kadterschmiede* 2006).

found themselves sitting on prime central Berlin territories. Accordingly, development pressure in this district increased. Fifteen years after reunification, the *Yorck59* squat was one of the few remaining. From 1988 to 2005 the *Yorck59* was home to 60 adults and 11 children (yorck59 2008). It also housed meetings, exhibitions, children's theatre, a bar, and a community kitchen (ibid.). In 2003 a series of court battles with the property owner began, that ended in forceful police eviction in 2005 (ibid.). At 4:30 am on a June morning, police arrived and encountered a human shield of approximately 200 members (ibid.). Throughout the day, participants were dragged away by police (ibid.). Unable to re-squat, as the building was immediately scheduled for renovations and put for sale as condominium lofts, the residents moved to a new building, called the *NewYorck59*, in *Bethanien Mariannenplatz* (ibid.). The *Bethanien* building provides housing for 70 people (ibid.). It also houses political and artist initiatives such as the Documentations Group for Anti-racist Initiatives, the Angolan Anti-militaristic Human Rights Initiative, The Initiative for the Future of *Bethanien*, the Collective for Art and Culture, and Libertad!.²⁴ Campaigning, education and awareness, help-hotlines, theatre groups, solidarity parties, concerts are regular events. Equipped with a bar and café, the residents see *Bethanien* as an open neighbourhood meeting point providing affordable space for housing, grassroots initiatives and cultural events. According to their website, the City of Berlin has stated that they will be tolerated (*geduldet*) until November of 2006, at which point they would have to evacuate the premises. 14,000 signatures were collected to petition the eviction (Yorck59 2008).

In the process of its fight to maintain the premises, the lifestyle of the participants is also publicly branded. At the official website of the Christian Democratic Party (the party that Chancellor Angela Merkel represents), the CDU-delegate for the district of *Kreuzberg*, Kurt Wansner, was quite vocal about his views:

“The squatters at *Bethanien* are the same people who squatted the Yorckstrasse 59. Should the spectre now continue at

²⁴ The names of these initiatives are my translations of the following original German names: *Dokumentationsgruppe der Antirassistischen Initiative (ARI)*, *Angolanische Antimilitaristische Menschenrechtsinitiative (IAADH)*, *Initiative Zukunft Bethanien (IZB)*, *Kollektiv für Kunst Kultur und Kommunikation*, and *Libertad!*.

Bethanien? Democracy shames itself and lacks credibility if revolutionary powers siege vagabond houses and are allowed to destroy the property of others,”²⁵ (CDU-Fraktion des Abgeordnetenhauses von Berlin 2007).

As of February 2008, the *Bethanien* still stood (*Bethanien* 2008).

The *Bethanien* is yet again, another centre of alternative activity. Like the *Köpi* and the *Rigaer94*, it houses community kitchens, solidarity parties, and events and exhibitions. Like the *Rigaer94*, the inhabitants, too, have faced forced eviction and confrontation with the police. In this section, we also witness the comments of Christian Democratic member of Berliner Parliament and his views on “spectre ...[and]...revolutionaries,” (ibid.). Also, the activities of the squatters, presumably inclusive of their social activism, are presented as destructive.

3.1.1.4 Brunnenstraße 183

The *Brunnenstraße 183* is a post-Wall squat, and one of the last remaining in the central district of *Mitte* (Brunnen183 2007). The building has provided housing for up to 30 people of all ages since the mid 1990s (ibid.). Outfitted with a café, galleries, and music rooms, the residents understand their co-operatively run squat as an alternative housing project (ibid.). The residents place special emphasis on an anti-capitalist accumulation logic. On the ground floor, one can find the “Costs Nothing Store” (“*Umsonstladen*”) (ibid.). Here one can sift through various goods, and simply take them home. The visitor only needs to ask herself if she genuinely needs the object (ibid.). Goods are also not to be sold to a third party (ibid.). In the event that such an incident should occur, the visitor is barred from the premises (ibid.). Similarly, the visitor can bring and leave behind goods that she does not need anymore (ibid.). The primary stipulation here is that the goods must

²⁵ My translation of, “*Die Hausbesetzer im Bethanien sind dieselben Personen, die bis vor einigen Wochen über mehr als ein Jahrzehnt das Haus in der Yorckstraße 59 in Kreuzberg besetzt hielten. Soll der Spuk jetzt etwa im Bethanien fort dauern? Die Demokratie nimmt Schaden und macht sich unglaublich, wenn revolutionäre Kräfte vagabundierend Häuser belagern und das Eigentum anderer stören und zerstören dürfen,*” (CDU-Fraktion des Abgeordnetenhauses von Berlin 2007).

be in functioning order (ibid.). The shop runs on the basis of needs, and not on the basis of desire or capital power.

Like other squats, the *Brunnenstraße 183* has also stood under threat of eviction (ibid.). To settle the uncertainty, the residents decided to respond to the City's plan to auction the building off. A "Foundation for Free Space" ("*Stiftung Freiraum*") was set up to administer donations towards its purchase (ibid.). Auction participants were required to come up with the minimum market value of the building. The squatters had achieved this sum of upwards of 250 thousand Euros (ibid.). However, at the last moment the auction was cancelled and the building was sold to a private investor, with whom they have since had a disputed rental agreement (ibid.). The landlord has since made various unsuccessful attempts to bar the residents from the property (ibid.). As of September 2006, the residents and shop remained under urgent threat of eviction, as the new owner plans to renovate the building and locate his practitioner's office there (ibid.).

The *Brunnenstraße 183* is located within the *Rosenthaler Vorstadt*, a restoration district within *Mitte*, which was one of the first publicly subsidised zones in the eastern district to undergo upgrading. In 1993, along with *Spandauer Vorstadt*, *Kollwitzplatz*, *Helmholzplatz*, *Samariterstrasse*, and *Pfarrstrasse/Kaskelstrasse*, the tenement buildings of the *Rosenthaler Vorstadt* that were destroyed in the second world war and left largely unattended by the GDR were to be brought up to modern living standards – central heating, revitalised facades. According to *Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung* (2007b) the district contains 4777 tenement apartments, which required renovations after reunification. By 2003, two-thirds were completed (ibid.). Redevelopment of the *Rosenthaler Vorstadt* is intended to revitalise the neighbourhood and make it more attractive (ibid.). The *Brunnenstraße 183* itself is planned for mixed commercial and residential use. The residents of the *Brunnenstraße 183*, however, refuse a market-based negotiation. They write, "through commercial investors, the political and social character of the project would be destroyed," (Brunnen183 2006).²⁶

²⁶ My translation of, "*durch kommerzielle Investoren würde der politische und soziale Charakter des Projektes zerstört*," (Brunnen183 2006).

The *Brunnenstraße 183* is another centre. Radical images of clashes with the police are lacking, and the *Brunnenstraße 183* does not present itself as a meeting point for the soli-parties or big events either. The *Brunnenstraße 183* does, however, emphasize co-operation in terms of the organization of its housing, and a commitment to build spaces that refute capitalist accumulation. The “Costs Nothing Store” would be the materialization of this ideal. They also publicly resist the restoration plans of the local area, and view their building as a place for “free space”.

3.1.1.5 *Tacheles*

Standing at the heart of the district of *Mitte* is the famous *Tacheles*. Once an abandoned and severely damaged building during GDR rule, then a squatter’s settlement during the 1990s, it has now, after years of negotiation,²⁷ integrated into its surroundings as a centre for the arts – or as cynics say a, “commercial senate sponsored, cultural Tra-la-la,” (Squat!net 2006).²⁸

The *Tacheles* (Figure 3) was built at the end of the 19th century by architect Alfred Messel, and remains a significant architectural and historical monument in Berlin (Museum *Mitte* von Berlin 2003). It is said that the architectural form that the *Tacheles* was built as a “Cathedral of Commerce” intended to set *le beau idéal* for shopping centres to follow (ibid.). A decade later, architect Franz Ahrens built the *Friedrichstraßenpassage* in attempts to integrate the principles of shopping centres with pedestrian oriented avenues (ibid.). This became seen as (next to *Unter den Linden*) one of Berlin’s most important city centres, and the passage itself was one the largest in Europe (ibid.). Built in monumental grandiose dimensions, this spectacular glass roofed department store complex, built primarily from steel reinforced concrete, housed a series of small businesses (ibid.). Later, in 1927, the electric concern AEG moved in and occupied the 10,500 m² retail space with its exhibition pieces. During the Second World War, the *Tacheles* suffered severe damage

²⁷ This process of negotiation was well documented by local newspapers: ‘Berliner Morgenpost’ (1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1997d, 2001a, 2001b), *Berliner Zeitung* (1994; 1995a; 1995; 1996a; 1996b; 1996c), ‘Der Zitty’ (1997), ‘Die Welt’ (1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2000c).

²⁸ My translation of, “kommerzielles Kultur-tralala, sponsert by Senat,” (squat.net! 2006; errors as in original).

(ibid.). As a result, large parts of the ruins were torn down during the post-war rebuilding of Berlin. However, during GDR rule, the building remained largely unused, as were many buildings in this district (ibid.).

In 1990, a group of artists recognised the building's historic significance and occupied the premises to prevent it from being fully demolished (*Tacheles* 2008). What remained was the section that stands directly along the Oranienburger street (*Oranienburgerstrasse*), and it is this (now historic) ruin that became, once again, famous after German re-unification in 1989. Receiving tourists that numbered in the tens of thousands each year, the *Tacheles* became known because of its staggering (ruined) architecture, and as a centre for the outrageous arts and political action carried out by the resident squatters. Visual and performing arts were so off-ball that one day when a woman committed suicide by jumping of the 6th story, onlookers passing by dismissed her body as just another work of art (Hasselmann 2002).

As with other eastern squats, the residents occupied the building after the fall of the wall. 1997 was a pivotal year for the squatters of the *Tacheles*. After years of negotiation among the artists, the city, architects, and the general public, the building was finally sold to the *Fundus Group* (Tacheles 2008) – a group that specialises in the creation of vacation villas and luxury hotels, such as the luxurious *Adlon Hotel* in Berlin (Die Fundus Gruppe 2008). The architectural competition to redevelop the master plans for the site and surrounding neighbourhood (the *Johannisviertel*) was won by a Floridian architectural firm, Duany Plater-Zyberk (Duany Plater-Zyberk 2006). The negotiations between the new owners and the squatters achieved a one hundred year lease at rents that the artists could accept.

The *Tacheles*, now an official tourist attraction endorsed by the city, sits as an arts and entertainment centre in the heart of the *Johannisviertel*, a neighbourhood in the district *Mitte*. Artists from around the world utilise the premises further for the production of arts and entertainment as well as the delivery of gastronomic services, while the City states that:

“...the planned revitalisation of the property should take the alternative character into account,” (BerlinOnline Stadtportal GmbH & Co. KG 2006)²⁹

What was, during the 1990s, a fight of ideologies resolved into a co-operation between the state and the counter culture – although some argue that it is not so counter anymore (Squat!Net 2006).

Though not abandoned by all artists, one of the main reasons for the exodus of many squatters was the oncoming of exactly what it was that they initially refused: commercialization and state authority. Nowadays, the *Tacheles* is among the several New Modernist projects listed at the website of Duany Plater-Zyberk (2006). Figure 3 shows the *Tacheles* upon completion. The right-hand photo zeroes in on the new windows. After the inset of the windowpanes, the concrete structures around the window were sanded and moulded into a better-polished representation of the rough and gritty, bombed out look that it had before. At the same time, adjacent buildings will be refurbished or built to recreate the style ideal of the master planners (Duany Plater-Zyberk 2006).

²⁹ My translation of, “*Heute steht das Tacheles unter Denkmalschutz. Eine geplante Neubebauung auf dem Gelände soll Rücksicht auf den alternativen Charakter nehmen,*” (BerlinOnline Stadtportal GmbH & Co. KG 2006).



Figure 3: The *Tacheles* after renovations (top). The photograph on the left shows the building from the south side after new windows were inserted. The photograph on the right shows the windows close up (bottom). The ledges, once crumbling, were polished, but the ruined look was preserved.

It is said that the *Johannisviertel* – the block that houses the *Tacheles* – will retain its artistic character (ibid.). However, complete with a wellness, pool, and gourmet restaurant, TsAO & McKown are planning the *Johannisviertel Hotel* that:

“... is being designed as a four star hotel and will be operated by a world renowned boutique hotelier. It is located in the Berlin *Mitte* district and is the centrepiece of a 6 acre (2.4 hectare) development. The development will occupy one of the last remaining fully open sites in central Berlin in a vital and growing area often compared to New York’s SoHo, with many art galleries, shops and restaurants. The Hotel will be located on the northern end of Friedrichstrasse, Berlin’s Fifth Avenue, and will facilitate a link between the high-end atmosphere of central Friedrichstrasse and the more artistically inclined *Mitte* area,” (Tsao and Mckown 2006).

Also, hired architects Robert A.M. Stern Architects, who designed the neighbouring building followed the ideals of:

“...a luxury apartment house in the spirit of the Beresford Apartments on Central Park West occupies its own block with a garden court at the centre. An office building recalling the Flatiron Building is set on a triangular block between a shopping square and the Oranienburgerstrasse,” (Stern 2003: 506).

The plans reveal a city block that will be redone to parallel New York City. Duany Plater-Zyberk (ibid.) state that after long negotiations, the *Tacheles* has or will become fully integrated into the surrounding neighbourhood (ibid.). Pausing for a moment to consider the real 5th Avenue in New York City: there one finds luxury shopping with Bergdorf Goodman, Bergdorf Men's, Brooks Brothers, Bulgari, Cartier, Disney Store, Fendi, Ferragamo Women's, Fortunoff, Gucci, H. Stern, Harry Winston, Henri Bendel, Kenneth Cole, Louis Vuitton, NBA Store, Prada, Saks Fifth Avenue, Sephora, Takashimaya, Tiffany & Co., Trump Tower, Van Cleef & Arpels, and Versace. If the *Johannisviertel* is to parallel this district, the neighbourhood is set for expensive shopping and luxury tourism.

The story of the *Tacheles* has much to tell us from the standpoint of Lefebvrian social space and the trajectories of otherness. Upon inception, the *Tacheles* was conceived as a monument to the architectural triumphs of the early 20th century, and as a prototype shopping mall that others would surely follow (Museum Mitte von Berlin 2003). It was perceived as a Cathedral of Commerce (ibid.), or as shopping for the sensation of it. As a space of representation, its massive size and ornate gardens were marketed as a meeting place for well-dressed, entertainment oriented consumers. The brightly lit AEG with its exhibitions of modern technology (ibid.) rendered the *Tacheles*, too, as a space of high-end consume. During the building's Post-War II years, it sat derelict among the numerous square kilometres of destroyed tenements of the former Socialist Berlin (ibid.), perceived by the Socialist regime as unfit for modern use, and as government capital. After the wall fell, artists and political activists squatted the building under the perception of historical preservation (Tacheles 2008), and as a space for the realization of their interests. During these years, as the former eastern districts now rendered central and opened up to speculation, the squatters encountered conflicts over the right to remain on the premises. The colliding of trajectories, that parallel the *Köpi*, *Rigaer94*, *Brunnenstraße 183*, and the *Bethanien*, emerged: squatter versus City.

This City versus the squatter duality fragmented still further after the sale of the *Tacheles*. First, there was a fragmentation within the squatter movement itself. Some holding true to their ideals of anti-capitalism and self-help organization, left the *Tacheles*, refusing the new rules. Second, the arrival of private capital to the site, revealed a fragmentation on the side of the City. City officials were not merely addressing concerns of resident German citizens, but of the interests of private capital and international planning designs. In order to fully understand the transformation at the *Tacheles*, the histories of these new actors must also be investigated: that of Duany Plater-Zyberk, and that of the Fundus Group. Furthermore, the marriage or hybrid of this trajectory with that of the City reveals a new form of governance in this former eastern district of Berlin. What was previously publicly own property, is now a city-sponsored cultural centre, represented as a tourist attraction, and as an icon of the neighbourhood. One might venture, that the *Tacheles* had come full circle to its own pre-war roots as a cathedral of commerce and monument of architectural trend. As for the remaining squatters, one sees the subservience

of rebelliousness to power from above. The radical activities of the agreeable inhabitants are legitimated and further represented by officials from outside.

By the production of new trajectories, representations have shifted. The facade of the *Tacheles* is no longer a mysterious free-space, as one might still interpret of the *Rigaer*⁹⁴. The *Tacheles*, a now somewhat naturalised space, is visited daily by hundreds of tourists, who come to consume its art and culture. Anyone may walk in and about it. Regarding this transformation, one might argue that the City and the Fundus Group were ambassadors of a helpful moral authority, in the sense that these actors apparently tried to integrate difference. On the other hand, one might also argue that like graffiti, counter-culture is no longer counter once it is integrated. It is rendered instead to the realm of modernity and becomes a paradox. The art that is produced at the *Tacheles* – that was once alternative and radical – has been transformed into a representation of Berlin's modern capital power.

3.1.2 *Wagendörfer*

3.1.2.1 *Schwarzer Kanal*

At the website of the *Schwarzer Kanal*, a trailer-village for women, lesbians, and transgendered, one could learn that at 15 years of age, it is one of Berlin's oldest remaining wagon squats (*Schwarzerkanal* 2007). It is one of the few remaining illegal wagon squats. The 20 or so residents live in a small community of mobile homes (*ibid.*). Generally, the residents understand their village as a housing and cultural project (*ibid.*). Decisions concerning common issues are determined through consensus decision-making processes (*ibid.*). Environmental projects (rain water systems and solar power) also provide for electrical and water usage needs (*ibid.*). These measures are understood not only as practical (as infrastructures associated with housing are absent), but also as a wider environmental political project of green living (*ibid.*). The residents have occupied their current position on the *Spree River* since 2002 (*ibid.*). The current property was provided as a substitute for their former one (a few meters to the east across from the *Köpi* squat) from which they were evicted in order that *Ver.di* could build its central headquarters (*ibid.*). The

community understands itself as a meeting point for cultural, social and political activities (ibid.). Events include queer cabarets, community kitchens (*Volksküche*), concerts, Open Air cinema, and solidarity parties (*Soliparties*) (ibid.). All events are free, and all performances and events are organised voluntarily (ibid.).

Most activities in 2006 circled around their fight to remain where they are, and the residents feel that it is not only their location of residence that is threatened but also their lifestyle. The trailer-village sits in opposition to two movements (ibid.). The first is a complaint that was filed by their new neighbours (an architectural firm and real estate agency) that the wagon village's presence presented a devaluation of their own properties, and at the end of 2005, the *Schwarzer Kanal* was ordered to leave (ibid.). Refusing the order, the members took the case to a higher court (ibid.). In addition to this court complaint, the *Schwarzer Kanal* was also threatened by the *MediaSpree Project* that feared to increase developing pressure in their area (ibid.).

Like the *Köpi* and the *Rigaer94*, this trailer-village is presented as a separate social movement, with a separate agenda for the built environment than that of the City of Berlin. Their self-presentation explicitly signifies a commitment to their community, the environment, and to the politics of gender and body. Their space is also explicitly a meeting-point. The relocation of the squat reveals a shift, too, in their territorial boundaries that are rendered meek in the face of capital power. The relocation also reveals the mobility of the territorial boundaries. The boundaries did not disappear, they simply arose elsewhere. Because its prior position was in closer proximity to the *Köpi*, its relocation probably also signifies a fragmentation in the community.

3.1.2.2 Lohmühle

The *Lohmühle* trailer village was founded in 1991 by former members of the *Schwarzer Kanal* (Lohmühle 2008). The 21 members and their guests understand themselves as part of a mobile housing project that seeks a living style that is socially and ecologically sustainable. The wagon village was to integrate art, culture and ecology into a single urban community (ibid.).

The *Lohmühle* was founded on a deserted property located along the east bank of the *Spree River* in the district of *Treptow*, where until 1989, the Berlin Wall stood (*Todestreifen*) (ibid.). For 15 years, the community was under threat of eviction, as all property in Berlin is privately owned – even the land upon which the Wall stood. However, in the summer of 2006 a land use agreement was reached, allowing the residents to remain on the property for another five years. The *Lohmühle*, therefore, began to enjoy tenure free of eviction pressure. Their current struggles are of an internal nature and a side-effect of the process towards realisation of their idealised utopia.

An immediate goal is to find ways to live longer-term in *Gemeinschaft* despite seemingly irreconcilable differences. The residents, themselves, are of diverse education, professions, and income level (Lohmühle 2008). High value was therefore placed on peaceful communication and egalitarian and hierarchy free decision-making (ibid.). The residents also place emphasis on the village as possibility to live free of the relatively anonymous rental housing market, and the larger capitalist system (ibid.). Outside of this system, the residents enjoy a sense of freedom and self-determination (ibid.). The *Lohmühle* is also host to a number of cultural events that support *avant garde* art as well as social political awareness (ibid.). The *Lohmühle* is also home to the *Kulturbanausen e.V.* -- an association that supports the realization of creative ideas. Towards this purpose one would also find a stage, a gallery, and studio workshops on site (ibid.).

Another emphasis is on ecological sustainability (ibid.). Towards this goal, a myriad of systems have been built. Energy is provided by solar and wind power. The village is also complete with natural water purification systems, an underground electricity-free cool room, and integrated composting system. While the *Lohmühle* is located along the *Todestreifen*, where all greenery had been cleared away for the Wall, the residents also took the initiative to plant a number of trees, bushes and wild flowers, and renaturalise the riverbank (ibid.). Lastly, because value is placed on organic fresh food, residents use their land for subsistence gardening (ibid.).

Like the *Schwarzer Kanal*, the *Lohmühle* was wrapped up in legal conflicts over the right to remain in place. The *Lohmühle* reached an agreement that included their right to stay for 5 years. This is not very long in comparison to the 100-year lease offered to the artists at the *Tacheles*, but it is long enough to develop some sense of steadiness. Neither a tourist destination, nor a neighbourhood icon, nor supported by city funds, the *Lohmühle* has retained some of its autonomous character. One might observe that their struggles have now shifted towards being able to actually establish a longer-term community – something that was, until 2006, forbidden. The residents are preoccupied with projects to organise the community and its infrastructure.

3.2 A Story of Entry – In through the Outdoor?

I have constructed this section in such a way that can illuminate immigrant movements as a pathway. On one hand, it exposes migration movements as horizontal (see 4.3.2). On the other hand, it also exposes a political problem: at what point are newcomers allowed to stay? Must they pass through after a certain term has expired (such as permits granted to students, workers or asylum seekers)? Or are they allowed to arrive, and make a home? If yes, how many hoops must they jump through to earn this privilege? Hoffman, Fainstein, and Judd's (2004: 3), proposed regulation theory as a theoretical framework to understand tourism and its impacts on cities. They defined tourism in accordance with that of the World Tourist Organization as, "any person who stays away from home overnight for a limited time," (Hoffman et. al. 2004: 3). In this section, I extrapolate on this argument so that anyone who is not granted citizenship is a visitor. As such, temporary residents, seasonal workers, refugees, and permanent landed immigrants could be regarded as staying away from home for a limited time. This situation would apply to most newcomers in Germany. The parallel can be used to tell a story of how longer term residence is also a process wrought with entrances and exits oriented around a border, as each country has its own myriad of social and institutional structures that regulate and control a visitor's arrival, stay and departure. In this section, I will illustrate the borders that structure Berliner visitors. However short or long-term, I will tell a story in which visitors might encounter measures where they are managed, controlled, and channelled through various institutional structures that are governed at various levels of jurisdiction that are confined and secured

by entrenched and rigid social-cultural norms. The result is a pathway wrought with obstacles, and one might wonder how they manage, in this situation, to produce their space, if they manage at all.

3.2.1 Arrival



Figure 4: While restoring the *Brandenburger Tor*, a curtain advertising the German Telephone Company (*Deutsche Telekom*) was draped to conceal the construction process. Standing in the background of the picture are the Eiffel Tower and the Arc de Triomphe du Carrousel. At the top, the advertisement reads, “The World is Drawing near ... DSL, ” (*“Die Welt rückt näher ... DSL”*).

Whether short-term or long-term, arriving at any new country is a process penetrating the nation’s semi-permeable borders – boundaries that first reveal themselves as applications for visas (usually at consulates at point of departure), and continue to unveil themselves in transit and upon landing. If one were to do a little research on Berlin before setting out, they would also encounter Berlin as it is presented and marketed to the rest of the world, as Berlin advertises itself as a diverse cosmopolitan world city.

One must look closely at Figure 4 to notice that this is not a photograph of the *Brandburger Tor* in Berlin. Indeed, it is the *Brandburger Tor* draped in an advertisement, during its renovation. At the time this photo was taken (ca. 2000) much of the promenade, *Unter den Linden*, many parts of *Mitte*, and most of *Prenzlauer Berg* were still under construction, and what the reconstructed Berlin would yield remained in question.³⁰ It was also a time when many other cities were turning to post-fordist models of flexible accumulation³¹ and globalising³², and it seemed the newly reunified Berlin might still be poised to do so as well³³. This optimism is shown in Figure 4, as the German Telephone Company (*Deutsche Telekom*) suggested: Parisian (i.e. international) landmarks in the background coinciding with high speed internet. One might venture and interpret that the dark charcoal covered and fragmented Berlin will be cleaned, united, and global. Presumably, for the purposes of this dissertation, like other global cities, the social milieu would reflect this new global character. The new Berlin would be a meeting point, or a place of global trajectories.

3.2.1.1 Statistics and the current situation in Berlin

In 2005, the Berliner Senate concluded the document entitled, “*Encouraging Diversity – Strengthening Cohesion*,” (Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin 2005). It was intended as a guideline for integration policy for Berlin. The ideas outlined in this document, along with some previously published statistics of Berlin and Germany, help to substantiate the image of Berlin as an open and diverse city.

³⁰ In this year, Häußermann and Kapphan (2000) came out with their book, “*Berlin: from a Divided City to a Fragmented City* (“*Berlin: von der geteilten zur gespaltenen Stadt?*”), which addressed this very question.

³¹ During the late eighties and nineties, many cities were making the transition from Fordist models of production to a flexible service economy (Mayer 1997), while at the same time entering into a new global network of exchange (Sassen 1994). The patterns and consequences of these trends were widely discussed throughout urban studies all over the world. For a glimpse into the North American situation see Keil, Wekerle and Bell (1996). For a glimpse into the European situation see Wolff, Schneider, Schmid, Klaus, Hofer, and Hitz (1997). For a glimpse into Asian transformations see Ooi (2000a/b).

³² For global city theory see Sassen (1994, 1998, 1999).

³³ Whether or not the post-industrial, post-socialist, reunified, and new German capital city of Berlin would become a booming metropolis was widely discussed in the 1990s. For a review of these debates see Berry and McGreal (1995), Frick (1991) Campbell (1999) Krätke (1992), Häußermann and Sackmann (1994), Häußermann and Strom (1994), Musterd (1994), Pepchinski (1993).

Among 24 countries reported on by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Germany had one of the highest rates – in absolute numbers – of immigration (OECD 2005a). Germany permitted entry to nearly 700,000 new arrivals in 2002, ranking it empirically second to the United States that admitted more than a million foreign-born residents that, despite tougher regulation in response to September 11th, was an increase over previous years (OECD 2005a: 23). This statistic placed Germany, however, 7th, after Luxembourg, New Zealand, Switzerland, Austria, Australia, and Canada, once these numbers were transformed into percentages of total population (OECD 2005b: 120). This data is highly irresolute, however, due to the varying admittance records among the different nations. In Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, for example, “immigrants” include permanent residents – that is, those with permission to live and work in the country (OECD 2005b: 116). Persons with student visas, work permits, or those without official permission whatsoever, may not factor in to the data at all. (ibid.). There may also be differing views on whether a person an immigrant if she is born inland or foreign-born (ibid.: 117). In contrast, German data, calculated from population registers, does include all legal residents but does not indicate what status the permitted immigrants obtained. Still, on a global scale, Germany is perceived as a receiving nation of immigrants.

OECD (2005a) also compared the rates of asylum by comparing the number of asylum applications received by each country. Between 1996 and 1999, Germany ranked first place among OECD nations, having received over 90,000 applications for asylum annually (OECD 2005: 313). In 2000, Germany was overtaken by the United Kingdom, in 2003, Germany ranked fourth behind, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, respectively (ibid.). Although it cannot be confirmed from the data, that Germany, indeed, admitted the highest number of asylum seekers, it can be interpreted that Germany is, at least, seen as either an attractive or practical country to emigrate to, or seek refuge in.

In recent years, Berlin has begun to flaunt itself as a multicultural city. In 2003, at the City’s official website,³⁴ the Senate’s chief official of Foreigner Affairs

³⁴ www.berlin.de

(*Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats* 2007a) boasted that Berlin is host to 460,000 foreign nationals. Of these, the most prominent feeder countries were Turkey, Yugoslavia, Italy, Poland (*Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats* 2007b). These numbers do not include the Russian-Germans that had settled in the Soviet Union in response to land grants offered by Catharine the Great and were permitted re-entry into Germany and given German citizenship after reunification. Numbers since January 2000 may also be smaller as many resident non-Germans became eligible for citizenship. These numbers also say nothing about the residence or citizenship status of the immigrant.

Naturalization in Berlin has gone up and down since reunification. In absolute numbers of citizenship granted, the rate has only increased between 1986 and 1999. The dramatic increase in 1995 was a result of a new law (*Ausländergesetz*) that permitted Russian-Germans (*Spätaussiedler*) access to German citizenship (Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration Flüchtlinge und Integration 2008). For five years, a naturalization process was set up to administer citizenship. This process was abandoned in 2000, and Russian Germans were granted citizenship automatically upon entry and proof of status (*ibid.*). Thus in 2000, as this group was no longer counted, the rate of naturalization dropped (*ibid.*). The rates are not so dramatic if the number of naturalised is put in proportion with the number of registered resident non-citizens. Throughout the 1990s, between 2.07 and 2.8 percent of all resident non-citizens were naturalised. From 2000 onwards the percentile sank to and oscillated around a rather steady average of 1.5%. This data is also compounded by the observations of Häußermann, Läßle and Siebel (2008: 314, 319), who noted not only the drop in the rate of naturalization despite changes in the law, but also that of the 8.5 million migrants in Germany as of 2008, only 1.2 million migrants have applied for the German passport, while 7.3 million have not.

The integration policy that was completed in 2005 (Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin 2005) was created as a guideline to deal with the issues that diverse cities face. The goal was to present Berlin as a city open and welcoming to newcomers. Integration was defined as:

“...the opposite of segregation or exclusion ... Integration means that single individuals or entire groups receive equal chances both towards the participation in societal life and the articulation of their interests, as well as protection from individual and collective exclusion. Integration is, in its core, the production of equal possibilities. Integration is in no way to be understood as assimilation into or adjustment to the existing conditions,” (Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin 2005: 6-7).³⁵

That is, very clear goals for the encouragement of diversity were outlined. Twelve essential components of the integration policy were further formulated and these included participation in the democratic society, the creation of more user-friendly public services, improved access to education and employment, improved support in kindergartens, improved welcoming structures for migrants, extra attention to problem neighbourhoods, protection of women's rights, the recognition of Islam and fight against Islamic fundamentalism, protection from discrimination and the fight against white power groups, as well as improved access for refugees (Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin 2005: 8-10).

While the statistics and statements publicised by the Berlin government might suggest an open Berlin, a recent publication on the subject suggests otherwise. In their book *Stadtpolitik*, Häußermann, Läßle and Siebel (2008: 315) stated that Germany early in integration phase, and that the difficult conditions for newcomers are easily proven. Häußermann et. Al. (ibid.) wrote that integration is reached when no systematic differences could be recognised according to distribution of social position, status, and resources (e.g. money, appearance, occupation, living standards). Integration can happen if there are openings in the labour market, education system, and housing, and if newcomers are

³⁵ My translation of, “...bildet Integration das Gegenstück zu Segregation oder Ausgrenzung [...] bedeutet Integration, dass Einzelpersonen oder ganze Gruppen gleichberechtigte Möglichkeiten der Teilhabe am gesellschaftlichen Leben und der Artikulation ihrer Interessen erhalten, und vor individueller und kollektiver Ausgrenzung geschützt werden. Integration ist im Kern Herstellung von Chancengleichheit. Integration ist keinesfalls als vollständige Anpassung oder Assimilation an bestehende Bedingungen zu verstehen.” (Der Beauftragte für Integration und Migration 2005: 6-7).

accepted by existing residents (some of these points will be revealed in detail later in this chapter).

It would seem that it is, at least, the representation of Berlin as an open and diverse city that city officials and decision-makers deem important. From outside of Germany, too, there is some evidence that Germany is also viewed as an attractive place to migrate to. Once inside the nation however, migrants seem unwilling to naturalise. Why this is the case remains unknown, and the data would seem contradictory to the efforts from above to integrate them. Inside German academic circles, some of the problems that migrants encounter come into view – a discursive arena that may sway politicians' courses of action, and the image and reality of Berlin.

3.2.1.2 Border crossing

(Häußermann et al. 2008: 313) stressed that it is increasingly inappropriate to discuss migrants as one group. Not only because many migrants have naturalised and are no longer visible, but also because within the group the migrants there are vast differences (ibid.). Still, however, all migrants must cross borders and go through the bureaucratic hoops to land. This is one common experience that all migrants share – even if it is the only experience. Within the European Union, border crossing is a rather insignificant event. Travelling by foot, bike, car, or train, from a Schengen nation, Germany, and Berlin can be entered without passport or customs checks. Individuals arriving from outside the Schengen region, may or will be subject to passport and customs controls (Bundespolizei 2006). Adult citizens of the European Union, without a criminal record, have the option of fast and convenient control, pending an iris scan (ibid.). If coming from outside the EU, Germany, and Berlin are unreachable by land as Germany is bordered exclusively by EU nations. Entry in Germany via the international air and sea ports is possible, and necessary custom controls are carried out there as well.

Entry requirements vary widely depending on travel history, nationality, planned length of stay, reason of stay. For non-EU citizens, residence permits must be applied for in person in the country of departure, except for nationals of the United States, Canada, Israel,

Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Australia, who can apply after arrival (Auswärtiges Amt 2008). Upon application the following must be submitted for review (ibid.): 1) a valid passport; 2) two original copies of filled in application forms; 3) two photographs; 4) an employment contract, a written job offer from a German employer, or letter of admission to a German university; 5) a statement demonstrating financial funds. Asylum is also possible for victims of political persecution. Temporary residency permits may be available to asylum applicants during the application process. After a residency permit is granted, an individual is able to register a home address (mandatory for all residents of Germany), open a bank account, and acquire German regulated health insurance.

In comparison to 20 years ago, Germany has opened its borders quite considerably, and its national borders have dissipated so that any EU national can arrive. Citizens of other non-EU nations may also arrive pending their ability to obtain cultural capital, i.e. work. Yet, the geography of immigration bureaucracy remains one wrought with very real and steadfast borders – in accordance with the Westphalian model of nationality (Benhabib 2004) – to those of all other nations primarily of the east and south. Like the fences that Bauman described:

“...they divide otherwise uniform space in an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ but what is ‘inside’ for those on one side of the fence is ‘outside’ for those on the other...” (Bauman 2007: 76).

Those attempting to get inside Germany are defined first as outsiders and are *de facto* illegal until proper papers are obtained. For many, this border has become naturalised. That is, most do not question it, and like Lefebvre’s (1991: 313) driver who does not question, neither the production processes nor the fragmentations that this border produces are perceived by those unaffected by it. However, those affected by it (e.g. migrants), or fragmented by this border, will indeed perceive it. Thus, the protest groups that have arisen on this issue: The Right to a Voice (*La Droit à Voi*) in France or No One is Illegal (*Kein Mensch ist illegal*) in Germany and North America.

3.2.2 Stay

Before the Berlin Wall fell, the former East German government held tight reins on immigration, and tourism was restricted to certain districts. In the eastern district of *Prenzlauer Berg*, *Husemann* Street was renovated and held as an example to tourists of an East Berlin neighbourhood. Sometimes tourists boarded a tour bus that would drive down a particular prescribed path and then back out again. These tourists would never see the square kilometres of bombed and decaying tenement housing. The well kept, painted, and polished buildings of *Husemann* Street were all that would be presented and seen. In the same way, it can be observed how longer-term residents are channelled and controlled – a process that to not prevent a newcomer from viewing the rest, but a process that inhibits full settlement and the establishment of a sense of home, of community, and of belonging.

In Berlin, as already said, there is much discourse and concern over the inclusive and exclusive aspects of Berlin as a diverse city. Häußerman, Läßle, and Siebel (2008: 316-319) argued that housing, employment and education were the three pillars of integration. Here, I will add that image production, language politics, and social spatial organization are further issues that newcomers will be faced with after sifting through the borders of landing, and settling, adjusting, carving out a life.

3.2.2.1 Image production and experience

After passing through the gates and the satisfying the government officials, a newcomer can land, move through and experience the city. By being there, one can test the representation of Berlin as a diverse city against the lived experience. To illustrate, I can draw upon my own experiences during my first visits to Berlin in 1999. First, sushi served on and chosen from a conveyor belt, then an IMAX film, then a piña colada served from a Caribbean stand at the street market, and then settling down in an audience of mainly western tourists, and closing the evening with some Kentucky Dixie music interpreted and performed by local musicians: this was experienced on a summer night at *Potsdamer Platz* – all hosted on the piece of land owned by *Daimler-Benz*. Or in *Kreuzberg* on another summer day, while shopping I found some Japanese udon noodles, Brazilian coffee, and a

salty Turkish yoghurt drink at a local supermarket. Later that night, I went out and ate at a Sri Lankan restaurant before catching the latest Inuit film, and turned down the opportunity to check out some Asian Techno. These were real experiences travelling along particular contours of particular landscapes in Berlin. Similar experiences can also frequently be obtained, simply by opening up a local entertainment magazine, *Zitty*, and choosing from a list of activities on any particular day. Berlin was fun, and one might venture that these possible everyday perceptions of space might support the representation of Berlin as open and integrative.

Another view (e.g. Klaus 2004: 262-263), however, holds that my experience demonstrates that culture is something to be consumed, and to be sure, none of these experiences can expose anything about the barriers to economic and social integration, other than that a foreigner (myself) can indeed consume what might be their products. Such a representation of Berlin – as a collection of national identities spread across a field otherwise called a city – also masks the transnational aspects of the potential migrants. It neutralizes space such that consumers may become the uncritical participants. Were the workers at the Caribbean stand indeed newcomers? Were they indeed Caribbean? What are their histories and what geography do they perceive? Does this geography transcend national borders? Is this information not essential in order to understand the depth, complexity and richness of transnational spatial geographies and trajectories? This fragmentation, as well as all the hybridities and resulting problems of classification³⁶, is hidden.

Some critics have observed that public and private actors in city development forge a certain imagery of the city as a form of urban boosterism and identity fabrication. Klaus (2004: 264), for one example, has already observed in other European cities, *a role*, and this role has its function in the creation of the multicultural image of the city. Klaus (ibid.) has showed that, in the case of Zurich, there is the rigorous promotion of a wide and varied array of cultural services inside a flexible economy. Being multicultural is trendy and cool (ibid.). Also, in telling the story of the Info Box that stood at *Potsdamer Platz*, Lehrer

³⁶ See Goonewardene's and Kipfer's (2003) analysis of Deepa Mehta's *Bollywood/Hollywood*.

(2004: 44) showed that this deceptively modest structure was an integral part of a particular marketing strategy to promote the area, and the image of Berlin. One might wonder if everyday experiences and perceptions like mine as a consumer also have a similar function. One might question my role as a consumer, the role of *Daimler-Benz* as a host, and/or the city's role for releasing the permit for the festival. Why was this festival held? Who profited? For whom was it targeted? For me, as the passive consumer, these questions were not readily in view. The space was again neutralised, and production process masked.

3.2.2.2 *The school system as regulated exclusion*

Another side of the production process that is masked by such festivals as the one at *Potsdamer Platz*, are the everyday lives of the workers at the festivals. If they were indeed newcomers to Berlin, not only would their transnational histories be relevant, but also their everyday experiences within Berlin itself as newcomers. Häußerman et. al. (2008: 313-315) have already stated that the social situation for newcomers is worse than for native-born Germans. Their analysis showed that the unemployment rate for migrants is 20%, that migrants earned less, and that they seldom held positions demanding higher qualifications (e.g. in banking, insurance, or civil service) (Häußerman et. al. 2008: 316-317). In terms of education, they also showed that newcomers are more likely to leave school without diploma, and are over represented in schools for pupils with special needs (*Sonderschule*) (Häußerman et. al. 2008: 317-318). Furthermore, only 40% of new residents achieve higher than a 10th grade certificate (*Hauptschuabschluss*) (ibid.).

This situation is exacerbated by a stream-lining school system that regulates children of both citizens and non-citizens through a minimum of 9 years and a maximum of 13 years of educational institution. The City of Berlin refers to the stream-lines as "Educational Paths" (*Bildungswege*) (*Senatsverwaltung für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung Berlin* 2008). Learning can begin at two years of age if parents choose to put their children in kindergarten where attendance is voluntary. At six years of age, elementary school (*Grundschule*) begins. After completion of the fifth grade, the children are divided across four kinds of schools in which to continue their schooling – two main schools (*Hauptschule* and *Realschule*), high school (*Gesamtschule*), and prep school

(*Gymnasium*)³⁷. The different schools and their functions have developed over many years. The *Hauptschule* and *Realschule* were once considered the main schools, or the schools in which most attended. Historically, these were schools for children of working class or farming families. Pupils expect a certificate of completion after the 10th grade (ibid.) after which graduates of *Hauptschule* have the option of continuing at a vocational college (*Berufsschule*), or at the *Realschule* whose graduates have the option of switching over to *Gymnasium* to complete another 3 years of secondary education. *Gymnasium* was the school that pupils attended if they wanted to prepare for University (ibid.). *Gymnasium* schools are the only schools that offer an education at par with international standards (Artelt et. al. 2001: 44-45).

The failure of German students to achieve even average results on the OECD Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), first published in 2001 (ibid.), was a signal that the German school system was in need of structural change³⁸. In a comparison of 32 countries, German 15-year-old pupils scored below average in each of the three broad categories of assessment, reading literacy, mathematical literacy, and scientific literacy (Artelt et. al. 2001: 13, 21, 28) – a result that sent devastating shock waves through the education and political system. The report also showed that more than half of all teenagers of non-German parents did not attend *Gymnasium* (Artelt et. al. 2001: 38). Rather, they attended *Hauptschule* – schools that by contrast were attended by only 25% of teenagers whose parents were both German born (ibid.). Furthermore, 15-year-olds attending *Hauptschule* scored lowered competency levels than those of *Gymnasium* which scored top levels of competency among other leading countries (Artelt et. al. 2001: 44-45). Essentially, the PISA results indicated an extreme process of differentiation among German pupils according to citizenship, whereby new residents were very likely to be streamlined towards a substandard education.

³⁷ In other German States, the streamlining begins after the fourth grade. It should also be noted that the English translations I have used are my “best attempts” and remain rough. Sometimes, too the categorizations are not so black and white. There are hybrid forms among the schools. Sometimes, for example, a *Gymnasium* education can be obtained at a *Gesamtschule* or *Realschule*. Still, the choice that a 10 year-old must make, is one of choosing among education streams.

³⁸ A Google search in June of 2008 for the German phrase “*PISA Deutschland Schüler*,” which means “PISA Germany Pupils” brought up over 40 pages of links to various (German) websites concerning themselves with this topic (Google 2008a).

We can view these streamlines as real and concrete trajectories that are being produced within Germany. Clearly, this is fragmenting production process. As the data from Häußerman et al. (2008: 316) has also suggested, the educational trajectories will also lead to differentiating trajectories within the labour market. The school system here, is also a site of colliding trajectories – that of migrants that may have other expectations or needs, and that of the school system as an extension of the German state – who meet at a certain point in time and cannot integrate with one another. The result is a perhaps not further fragmentation, but at the very least a preservation of the status quo whereby migrants remain at the margins during their stay, just as they did upon arrival.

3.2.2.3 Language

German is the official language of Berlin and Germany, and the language barrier is one barrier that a newcomer might encounter. German is the official language of administration and a general prerequisite for governmental and most other employment sectors³⁹. In recent years, some companies (outside of the gastronomy industry) now offer services in various languages. A German bank and postal service (*Postbank*) and the Berliner subway (*Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe*), for example, both offer vending machine services in various languages including Turkish. Museums often provide information in English as well. Lohaus and Lindemann (2003: 13), however, argued that German social policy generally targets those languages that are economically influential not those that are simply used by and among residents. Although some improvement in institutional access (institutional opening) can be witnessed in Berlin, by and large non-economically productive languages remain unsupported – this too, regardless of the languages most commonly spoken in the homes by Berliner residents. Turkish, for example, is the language spoken in the homes of families who have emigrated from Germany's most frequent feeder nation. This aspect has become a critical question in Berlin (and wider Germany) in recent years.

³⁹ This, I base on my own experience as I sift through the employment advertisements. Often knowledge of English is desired. Sometimes French, Spanish or Turkish are also called for.

The language barrier as a problem in German schools has been widely discussed in the media. It has been observed that children born of parents who are not born in Germany do not excel in the school system (Artelt et al., 2001: 38). The root cause that is usually cited is not the German school system or the greater socio-political and economic system in which the school system is embedded, rather the children and their families themselves, and it is from this starting point that policies to address the issue are constructed. In 2004, a new policy was voted in, approving mandatory German language tests for children upon entering the first grade. For children who did not demonstrate the desired level of proficiency, further German language courses are mandatory. Preparation for the test would be conducted in the kindergartens. Whether or not more spaces would be allotted in Gymnasium to accommodate and admit the resultantly better prepared students was not in discussion. In a speech to the Berliner Parliament (*Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus*) on the 15th of January 2004, Senator Klaus Böger hailed the new and greater package of school reforms – in which this language policy was a part:

"The results from the PISA test have shown that, in Germany, the social background is a greater determinant of the child's education success than the child's ability. This is not acceptable to us, and this is what we want to change,"⁴⁰ (Böger 2004: 2).

To complement, the integration policy completed in 2005 also outlined steps towards the more equal distribution of newcomers throughout the school system. Three primary measures were outlined in the English version: 1) that students should master the German language; 2) that immigrant parents should also acquire the German language; and 3) that students and parents alike need to acquire the basic information of German culture and society (Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin 2005: 8).

Turkish communities in Berlin viewed the situation another way. The Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg (2004), an umbrella organization representing the interests of

⁴⁰ My translation of, "*Die Ergebnisse von PISA haben gezeigt, dass in Deutschland die soziale Herkunft über den Bildungserfolg entscheidet und nicht die Fähigkeiten eines Kindes. Das ist für uns nicht hinnehmbar, das wollen wir ändern,*" (Böger 2004).

21 member associations in Berlin, agreed that language training for all children (including German speaking children) was a useful tool towards educational integration. The organization, however, also lobbied for (Turkish Union in Berlin Brandenburg 2004): 1) further and more intensive training of pre-school and school teachers towards the purposes of increasing their ability to support, encourage, and teach bi- or multilingual children; 2) the general addition of classes in Turkish as a second language to the school program, as well the addition of Turkish language as an *Abitur*⁴¹ relevant subject; and 3) the general transition away from the assumption that school children are a homogenous group with a German ancestry and towards, instead, an assumption of that school children are a heterogeneous group.

Again we see a discourse that promotes Berlin as a city open to diversity, as shown in the speech by Senator Klaus Böger (2004: 2). Yet, the response to the problem of fragmentation within the school system is to lay the onus on the consumers who have problems consuming the education – i.e. the migrants – and not on the elements within the production process – i.e. the school system. It is recognised that the school is a site of colliding trajectories, but instead of trying to unite and harmonise them within the school system, an attempt to erase differential trajectories at the onset is made; thus, overlooking the fragmentary character of the school system. The depth of this harmonization of difference at the onset, has also resulted in attempts to go into the homes of migrants and adjust how they speak with one another. It was exactly the assumption that consumers of the school system are homogeneous, that the Turkish Union challenged. Their position shows one of difference, one that does not challenge the various trajectories that children have travelled before entering school, but challenges the school's capabilities in managing difference.

The streamlined school system is also running the risk of creating a neutralised space. For pupils, and parents of pupils who attend *Gymnasium*, the system need not be questioned –like Lefebvre's (1991: 313) driver who does not question. Indeed, the school system was not questioned until an outside international study was conducted that damaged

⁴¹ "*Abitur*" is the name of the German high-school diploma.

the image of German schools on an international stage. But for those for whom the system works, and for those who will be set on life trajectories of power and capital, the problems of the *Hauptschule* and *Sonderschule*, indeed need not be questioned. This space is apparently natural. Furthermore, those questioning and those formulating the solutions are again those with decision-making power. The advantaged signify the disadvantaged. Turkish residents whose communities are indeed affected by the school system have different opinions on the solutions – solutions, too, that are not being transformed into policy. The signified signify themselves and are not heard.

3.2.2.4 Neutrality versus diversity



Figure 5: A governmental postcard: “German Turk” (Deutsche Türkin) (Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1999).

Another dilemma that converts itself into a barrier is the state regulation of the expression of difference on the grounds of preserving a so-called condition of neutrality.

Across the world, the story of Afghani-German Fereshta Ludin was to be read⁴². She had been forbidden to teach at a German school because she wore a *tschador* to work (Benhabib 2004: 198-200). The Stuttgart Higher School Authority forbade her appointment to the school on the grounds that her headscarf was a statement of cultural divergence and thereby not just a religious symbol but also a political symbol. It was also argued that wearing a *tschador* conflicted with parents and pupil rights to an ideology-free schooling under Article 6.2 of the constitution (ibid.).

Religious freedom is protected in the constitution under Articles 3, 4, 33.2, and 33.3. The paragraphs under Article 3 of the constitution read:

“(1) All persons are under the constitution equal. (2) Men and women are equal. The State supports the actual assertion of the equality of men and women and is active on the removal of existing disadvantages. (3) No one may be disadvantaged or advantaged on the grounds of his sex, his ancestry, his race, his language, his religious or political outlook. No one may be disadvantaged on the grounds of his disability,”⁴³ (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2008a).

In addition, articles 33.2 and 33.3 state:

“(2) Each German has, according to his aptitude, skills, and professional performance, equal access to every public office. (3) The enjoyment of civil rights, the access to public offices as well

⁴² As of June 2008, one could still call up 13 pages of links to websites discussing Fereshta Ludin, by entering her name into the Google search engine (Google 2008b).

⁴³ My translation of Article 3 of the German constitution, which reads: “(1) *Alle Menschen sind vor dem Gesetz gleich.* (2) *Männer und Frauen sind gleichberechtigt. Der Staat fördert die tatsächliche Durchsetzung der Gleichberechtigung von Frauen und Männern und wirkt auf die Beseitigung bestehender Nachteile hin.* (3) *Niemand darf wegen seines Geschlechtes, seiner Abstammung, seiner Rasse, seiner Sprache, seiner Heimat und Herkunft, seines Glaubens, seiner religiösen oder politischen Anschauungen benachteiligt oder bevorzugt werden. Niemand darf wegen seiner Behinderung benachteiligt werden,*” (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2008a).

as rights acquired to public services, are independent of religious confession,”⁴⁴ (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2008b).

Furthermore, Articles 4.1 and 4.2 state:

“(1) the freedom of belief, the conscience and the freedom of religious and philosophical confessions are inviolable. (2) The undisturbed expression of religion will be guaranteed,”⁴⁵ (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2008c).

Ludin’s case was taken to the Supreme Court where it was finally ruled that Ludin should be permitted to continue wearing her tschador (Benhabib 2004: 198). However, the court also deemed that individual German States (*Länder*) could forbid it, should they see fit (ibid.). The verdict of the High Court effectively decentralised, downloaded, and deferred the decision; thus, enabling them to take an inoffensive position while at the same time not fully protecting Ludin’s civil rights to difference.

Shortly after the verdict of the Supreme Court, the individual States began drafting amendments to their state-wide constitutions. The German States that went forward with the tschador prohibition – of which, Berlin was one (*Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit und Soziales* 2008: 5) – supported the argument that it was the teacher’s duty to remain neutral and not display religious or political leanings. Teachers were obliged to remain “neutral” (ibid.). Berlin modified Article 29 of the Constitution of Berlin (ibid.), prohibiting the display of all religious symbols not just in schools⁴⁶, but also in all public offices. Neutrality, and the codes associated with such a condition, became obligatory.

⁴⁴ My translation of Article 33 of the German constitution, which reads, “(2) Jeder Deutsche hat nach seiner Eignung, Befähigung und fachlichen Leistung gleichen Zugang zu jedem öffentlichen Amte; (3) Der Genuß bürgerlicher und staatsbürgerlicher Rechte, die Zulassung zu öffentlichen Ämtern sowie die im öffentlichen Dienste erworbenen Rechte sind unabhängig von dem religiösen Bekenntnis,” (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2008b).

⁴⁵ My translation of Article 4 of the German constitution, which reads, “(1) Die Freiheit des Glaubens, des Gewissens und die Freiheit des religiösen und weltanschaulichen Bekenntnisses sind unverletzlich. 2) Die ungestörte Religionsausübung wird gewährleistet,” (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2008c).

⁴⁶ In Germany, schools are public institutions and teachers are civil servants.

Conspicuously absent from the discussion in the courts and within the media was the notion of neutrality and its implications. The status quo attire of existing teachers defined the court's vision of neutrality – perhaps not unlike the woman in the postcard “*Deutsche Turkin*” (Figure 5) that was distributed by the government in 2000 to advertise the new immigration laws (Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1999). It the front, the postcard reads, “German Turk” (*Deutsche Türkin*). On the flipside, it reads, “Citizens with foreign passports. Speak German. Think German. Dream German.”⁴⁷ The postcard says nothing about diversity or freedom of expression. It also did not clarify what a citizen with a foreign passport is, since Germany does not permit dual citizenship to residents whose migratory history extends beyond the European Union. Nonetheless, the woman on the postcard is young, appears healthy and confident, and is above all not displaying any foreign symbols – she is not wearing a hijab or tschador, and the black and white production of this picture renders her skin colour pale. The postcard was distributed entirely independently of the Ludin case, but its message remains clear: this is what new Turkish Germans look like; new Turkish Germans will think and act in German; citizens with foreign passports will not be foreign. Was this the condition of neutrality that the German courts had in mind?

Häußermann et. al. wrote that integration is reached when:

“no systematic differences can be recognised according to distribution of social position and resources, for example, wealth, appearance, occupation, living standards,”⁴⁸ (Häußermann et. al. 2008: 315).

Whether integration is truly met under these conditions is indeed a curious question, but Häußermann et. al (ibid.) are also indicating to their readers a condition of neutrality that does *not* mean that everyone must earn, work, live, and look the same. It merely means,

⁴⁷ My translation of, “*Inländerin mit ausländischem Pass: Spricht deutsch. Denkt deutsch. Träumt deutsch,*” (Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1999).

⁴⁸ My translation of, “...keine systematischen Unterschiede hinsichtlich der Verteilung von Positionen und Ressourcen gibt, z.B. Geld, Ansehen, Beruf, oder Wohnqualität,” (Häußermann, Läßle und Siebel 2008: 315).

that the visible material characters and symbols of a person's body carry no determinable meaning. In an urban setting where this form of neutrality is the norm, Ludin's tschador would not carry any determinable meaning to the observer (see Goodewardena and Kipfer 2003: 225). The fact that the tschador did carry meaning to the schools and the courts indicates that another *a priori* norm or ideology had been challenged. When Berlin asserted the prohibition of Ludin's attire, they also placed greater value on this pre-existing, yet neither universal, natural, nor neutral norm.

With the story of Ludin, the Muslim population is seen again fighting for recognition of its difference. We also see various trajectories colliding in the work place, and the incapability or willingness of the work place to manage these differences. We also see the apathy of the government to protect this difference, in the name of protecting a so called homogeneous whole. Again instead of examining the institution (the work place), those States that prohibited the tschador attempted to harmonise the trajectories from the onset.

3.2.2.5 No-go areas?

"Do we have to go by Weekend Ticket?" Ahmed asked as he shifted his weight.

"Well, it's cheaper..." I shrugged.

"Yeah, ok... I just prefer not to travel on the milk-run trains through the New States if I can avoid it."

Later, on a regional train somewhere in Brandenburg, my darker skinned German friend and I, with my pale skin, were greeted by twenty or so drunken skinheads who at the looks of my friend, began chanting, "Ausländer raus! Ausländer raus! Ausländer raus!" Meanwhile, as we crept to our seats, I kept my foreign language mouth tightly shut.

The above is a description of a personal experience travelling from Berlin to Soest by regional trains in the summer of 2000. It was shocking to witness such hatred, and disturbing to see that some German citizens have to endure it.

Violence against visible minorities has been a growing problem in Berlin and wider Germany for some years now. On this, Neidhardt commented:

“Right wing extreme, xenophobic, and anti-semitic crimes must not be seen as isolated incidents. They are embedded in a societal climate, are based in attitudes shared by part of the population, are deliberate or at least tolerated consequences of strategies, are often committed by members of particular subcultures, scenes, or groups, and are part of wider socio-political and economic patterns,”⁴⁹ (Neidhardt 2000: 93).

Despite recognition of the seriousness of the problem, xenophobic violence rose in the following years, and in September of 2006, the citizens that either passively accept or actively support such a climate voted the *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (NPD) into the Berliner district parliaments of Lichtenberg, Marzahn- Hellersdorf, Treptow-Köpenick und *Neuköln*. The problem has led to public discussions about the existence of areas which are dangerous to anti-nationalist supporters. The creation of regions of national liberty (*National befreite Zone*) is, too, one more goal achieved by the extreme right.

The statistics of xenophobic violence and its ubiquity vary somewhat, depending on the source and the exact object of measurement. The Anti-racist Initiative Association (*Antirassistische Initiative e.V.*) in Berlin (2005: 3-345) reported the deaths of 80 refugees who have been killed by racist violence between 1993-2005. Kahane (2003: 2) reports that

49 My translation of, “*Rechtsextremistische, fremdenfeindliche und antisemitische Straftaten dürfen nicht isoliert betrachtet werden. Sie sind eingebettet in ein gesellschaftliches Klima, haben ihre Basis in Einstellungen von Teilen der Bevölkerung, sind bewußt gewollte oder zumindest in Kauf genommene Konsequenzen von Strategien, werden häufig verübt von Angehörigen bestimmter Subkulturen, Szenen oder Gruppen und sind schließlich Teil weitergehender Handlungsmuster,*” (Neidhardt 2000: 93).

members of the extreme right wing have committed over 100 murders since reunification. The victims were homeless, left leaning teenagers, refugees and persons of darker skin colour. The Berliner Senate Administration for Education, Youth and Sport (*Senatsverwaltung für Bildung, Jugend und Sport*) (2005: 3) reported 50, 36, 26, 39, and 62 racist offences within the school for the school years beginning 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, respectively. Fifteen of the 62 cases in 2004 involved physical violence. In fall of 2006, the *Tagesspiegel* (2006) reported the statistics published by the German Federal Criminal Police Office (*Bundeskriminalamt*): eight thousand racially motivated criminal offences were registered in the first 8 months of 2006 – a number 20% higher than the equivalent time frame in 2005.

The number of violent crimes against visible minorities reached a point where some were willing to publish warnings to prospective visitors. During the summer of 2006, Germany was host to the World Cup. Shortly before the opening, the Africarat (Afrikarat 2007) in Berlin circulated 10,000 flyers that warned visitors about No-Go Areas in Berlin. They also circulated warnings to several African countries (*ibid.*). The flyer identified several districts in Berlin that visitors should avoid for fear of racist violence (*ibid.*). During the World Cup, too, a hotline was set-up for victims of racism (*ibid.*). The hotline was set up with respect to the experience that previous victims have no faith in the police force (*ibid.*). With a hotline, victims could speak with someone who: a) is on their side; b) can speak their language; and c) is capable of acting as a mediator between them and the German administration (*ibid.*). The hotline received 11 reports inside 14 days (*ibid.*). The project was supported, among others, by Student's Association of the Technical University of Berlin (*Allgemeiner Studierendenausschuss TUHH*), Reach Out, Victim's Perspective (*Opferperspektive*), The Berlin Initiative for Black People in Germany (*Initiative Schwarzer Menschen in Deutschland Berlin e.V.*), CyberNomads, Plataforma, Mosquito Network (*Netzwerk Moskito*), and Refugee's Initiative Brandenburg (*Flüchtlingsinitiative Brandenburg*) (*ibid.*).

Ahmed, who lived in *Kreuzberg*, didn't want to travel through former eastern districts. Our experience showed us why. The actions of the Africarat shows that Ahmed is not alone and that there are more who fear for their bodies in some parts of Berlin. The

Afrikarat's hotline also shows distrust in the legal system to protect their bodies. What this amounts to is an accusation to the City of Berlin that Berlin is not safe for certain people. This representation of Berlin also forces those certain people into certain spatial trajectories that are dependent on their own physical being. The map of No-Go Areas is also a bottom-up representation of Berlin. The Africarat, like Ludin and the Turkish Union, is asserting its difference and re-mapping Berlin to suit their difference – this re-mapping is necessary because popular maps (or representations), such as subway, bicycle or street maps, do not reveal these danger zones.

3.2.2.6 Segregation and ghettoization?

Berlin exhibits an intensive multiculturalism in specific regions in the city. One can walk along the streets of *Kreuzberg* and *Neuköln* and observe stores and restaurants from every corner of the globe, and hear a seemingly endless number of languages being spoken. This multicultural concentration, however, has clear geographical limits within the city (see Häußermann und Kaphan 2000: 209). At the inner-neighbourhood level, Berlin exhibits an apparent lower level of segregation. At the city-wide level, however, Berlin appears the more segregating because as newcomers are apparently concentrated only inside certain neighbourhoods (ibid.). A large proportion of the resident non-German population remains concentrated in the western districts of Berlin – and not in the east (Häußermann and Kaphan 2000: 209). The uneven distribution of newcomers is reported to be a result of the different histories of the former East and West Berlins, and as a result of uneven access to the housing market (Häußermann and Kaphan 2000: 208). This situation did not change either after re-unification. With the exception of a few isolated pockets in the former East Berlin, new immigrants still tend to settle in western districts.



Figure 6: Graffiti sticker found in former eastern district of Berlin. It reads, "For Germans, the established parties are not a choice."⁵⁰

Some eastern districts are also commonly home to producers of (not always neo-) nazi thought. The sticker shown above in Figure 6 – of unknown origin but likely from a neo-fascist – was found stuck to a lamppost in the eastern district of *Prenzlauer Berg*. Evidently, there are social movements there who identify with a specific sort of Germanness, as this sticker is propagating that the existing parties are not representing the so called true German residents.

⁵⁰ My translation.

The uneven distribution of newcomers in Berlin might suggest segregation or the formation of a ghetto in Berlin, and this was indeed a concern of Häußermann and Kapphan (2000: 213) as they analysed migrant populations and their social-economic status. Wacquant (2004a: 1), however, points out that the word "ghetto" is often used very loosely in social science literature in general as its application has relied primarily its folk and layman's use. In an effort to define a useful and working definition of the term so that it may be properly compared to and put on par with other forms of oppression such as prisons, reservations, or refugee camps. To Wacquant (2004a: 2) a ghetto was characterised by four elements: stigma, constraint, spatial confinement, and institutional encasement. The ghetto is a place in which the greater society singles out a particular segment of the population and sections them either through force or through systematic institutional exclusion. The result, according to Wacquant (2004a: 3), is the growth of parallel institutionalism. According to Wacquant (2004a: 6) and his definition, the contemporary ghetto can be found in African American neighbourhoods of the United States, prisons, or refugee camps, and that these should be analysed separately from urban enclaves or slums. In another essay, Wacquant (2004b: 199) wrote that income statistics, standard of living, or other positivistic indicators, or observation of entry into the market place, are not enough to understand disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Such indicators would see no difference between such neighbourhoods as *Le Courneuve* in Paris and Woodlawn in South Chicago, for example. Hypothesizing that the differences are indeed quite substantial, he studied territorial stigmatisation, criminality and safety, institutional ecology. Reframing the analysis this way, enabled him to remark vast differences between the two urban situations. *Le Courneuve* could not be considered a ghetto in comparison to Woodlawn. By comparison, *Le Courneuve* was well attended by public institutions (such as health, transit, advocacy and security) as well as cultural services. Woodlawn lacked just about all of these amenities – even police.

Many newcomers settle in the districts of *Kreuzberg*, *Wedding*, and *Neuköln* (Häußermann and Kapphan 2000: 208). Yet, following Wacquant's (2004a: 2) definition one cannot illustrate Berlin as a city that funnels new residents into particular regions and excludes them either socially or economically. Like Paris, neighbourhoods in Berlin with an over proportional concentration of newcomers, are still well serviced and connected.

Berlin's multicultural development cannot be labelled as a ghetto, as there is no strict muster of confinement, parallel institutionalism and stigmatisation. Although new residents are found primarily in particular districts, confinement is not by physical force. The districts of *Kreuzberg*, *Wedding*, *Neuköln*, then, cannot be considered ghettos.

There is, however, a social praxis in Germany that begins to resemble Wacquant's (2004a: 2) definition of a ghetto. Newcomers who arrive applying for asylum, are subject to special laws and procedures (*Asylverfahrensgesetz*). With refugee status, newcomers may be required to live in certain designated homes and their movement may be restricted to certain districts (*Residenzpflicht*). Not adhering to the designated regulations is a criminal offence. Asylum homes have also been target of xenophobic violence. To name a few examples documented by the Antiracist Initiative Association (*Antirassistische Initiative e.V.*) (2006: 3-5, 17, 37, 51, 71-72, 166, 198, 221, 293): Malchow in 1993, Schwalm-Eder-Kreis in 1993, Mühlberg in 1993, Oebisfelde in 1993, Hohenstein-Steckenroth in 1993, Ludwigshafen in 1994, Kassel in 1995, Lübeck in 1996; Hannover in 1996, Boizenburg in 1997, Ludwigshafen in 1997, Rottstock in 2000, Neubrandenburg in 2001, Remscheid in 2002, Darmstadt in 2002, Meßkirch in 2004, Borken in 2004, Berlin in 2004. Between 1993 and 2005, the Antiracist Initiative (2006: 49, 68, 93, 125, 160, 195, 218, 249, 284, 319) documents a total of 65 deaths and 666 injured as a result of attacks on asylum-seeker's homes in Germany. The legal situation of refugees is one then that restricts movement, is reinforced by street violence and police force: this system therefore constitutes a ghetto, in Wacquant's (2004a: 2) sense. There has been, however, some positive movement towards changing this structure, as asylum applicants in *Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain* are allocated individual apartments to reduce social-spatial segregation.

3.2.3 Departure

After a few days, weeks, or months tourists pay up their hotel bills, shake hands with their tour guide, declare bought goods at customs, and leave or go home. Less transparent, however, are the return travel itineraries of newcomers or longer-term residents – if they have one at all. Indeed, all visitors – short-term and long-term – are bound by the laws of entry, as one finds them stamped their passports (Figure 7). The laws of entry, of

course, determine the laws of exit too. These regulations, which vary from nation to nation and are bound and supported by wider normative ideals of citizenship, and expectations of belonging and not belonging, invariably curtail a new resident's ability to permanently settle with a sense of longevity or tenure, and create a sense of home. The risk: newcomers may leave. The worst-case scenario: they may be deported to an undesirable destination.

3.2.3.1 Residency towards citizenship



Figure 7: Stamps to pass through the port

Residence permits are distributed initially with tight regulations concerning work, state participation, and length of stay. Permits are generally granted for the duration of a work contract and expire upon termination of employment (*Auswärtiges Amt* 2008). Students living in Germany on a student visa are limited in the number of working hours that they may take on. Figure 7 shows the contents of my passport, during my stay in Berlin on a student visa. Left it says my residency is limited. On the right, it says that employment is not permitted. The visa is also void no later than one year after completion of studies (*ibid.*).

Unless certain requirements are fulfilled, holders of residence permits cannot expect longer term stays in Germany. German citizenship may be granted after 8 years of residency if (*Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration* 2008): living expenses can be covered without the social help; proficiency in the German language can be demonstrated; no charges have been laid against the applicant; the applicant is in agreement with the German constitution; the applicant relinquishes other citizenships. Some exceptions are made to the last rule. It does not apply to European Union citizens, and if problems in renouncing the second citizenship arise, the applicant can further apply for dual nationality (*ibid.*). Citizenship is also available after three years, if the newcomer is married to a German citizen (*ibid.*).

For children born in Germany to at least one German parent, the child may retain the citizenship of each parent (ibid.). If the father is German, paternity must be proven before the child's 23rd birthday (ibid.). Citizenship according to *jus soli*, birthright, does not apply if the child is born to two non-European parents (ibid.). For such children, citizenship laws according to *jus sanguis* apply – citizenship by inheritance – and they fall into the category of the “Option Model” (*Optionsmodell*) (ibid.). Children that fall into this category are required to choose which citizenship they want at the age of 18 (ibid.). If no decision is reached before the child's 23rd birthday, the German citizenship will be revoked, and the child will subject to visa limitations (ibid.). If the second nationality cannot be renounced, an application for dual citizenship can be submitted (ibid.).

This administration process is a geography that all newcomers wishing to stay for a longer period of time are subjected to. It is an experience to in which the applicant is in total submission to the entry requirements of Germany. There is no place here for protest or the self-assertion of identity. It is a place where life trajectories slide right past one another.

3.2.3.2 Removal orders, detentions and deportation

The regulation of refugees is bound in the constitution, but specific regulation of each individual refugee is determined at the state level. Non-German residents in the City-State of Berlin who believe that they will be victims of persecution should they return to the country from which they came, have the opportunity to apply for asylum (*Landesamt für Gesundheit und Soziales Berlin* 2006). Applicants must report to the central administration of asylum seekers for the State of Berlin (*Zentrale Aufnahmeeinrichtung des Landes Berlin für Asylbewerber*), where they may receive council, and directions for further procedures, including help in returning to country of origin (ibid.). In Berlin, asylum applications are processed at the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees (*Bundesamt für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge*). By an interview, applicants will be asked to justify their grounds for application (ibid.). During the application process, applicants are required to live in a specified and ordained admissions facilities for a period of up to three months (*Aufnahmeeinrichtung*) (ibid.). If the application is rejected, the applicant has one week in which to appeal (ibid.). If the

application is referred to another European State (e.g. a border State that issued the entry Visa into Germany in the first place), the applicant will be transferred out of the country (ibid.).

Failure to depart upon termination of residency, or failure to arrive without proper papers in the first place, is an illegal offence in Germany and is liable to prosecution. Such individuals are subject to removal orders, detentions or deportations by the German State. Deportation (*Abschiebung*) legally sanctioned according to § 58 of the Residency Laws (*AufenthG §58 Abschiebung*)⁵¹ if:

“...if it cannot be assured that the individual will leave on her own free will (according to § 42 Paragraph 3 and 4), or if on grounds of order and security the departure must remain under surveillance,” (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2008d).

An asylum applicant will land in detention (*Abschiebungshaft*) if, after preliminary procedures, she has disappeared without proper consultation with the foreign office (AsylNet 2006). The German government tries to avoid this situation by heavily controlling arrival in the first place. The Federal Border Police are designated for this job. They patrol not only the border regions of Germany but also inland, at airports, seaports, and throughout the rail system. This strategy allows them to secure the borders, by the prevention the entry of unauthorised foreigners, controlling of smuggling, as well as protection against other border violating criminality such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, and document fraud (*Urkundendelikte*). (Bundesministerium des Innern 2002).

Detention (*Abschiebungshaft*) may be ordained during deportation processing if a decision on deportation cannot be immediately met and a deportation without detention is difficult or impossible (*AufenthG §62 Abschiebungshaft*) (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2008d). For this situation a preparatory detention (*Vorbereitungshaft*) is ordained, and

51 My translation of § 58 of the German Residency Laws (*AufenthG §58 Abschiebung*): “...wenn die Ausreisepflicht vollziehbar ist und die freiwillige Erfüllung der Ausreisepflicht nicht gesichert ist oder aus Gründen der öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung eine Überwachung der Ausreise erforderlich erscheint,” (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2008).

“should not last longer than six weeks” (ibid.).⁵² Security detentions (*Sicherungshaft*) may be ordained if (ibid.): 1) the affected must leave on the grounds that her arrival was illegal; 2) the deadline of departure has passed and the affected changed her address without notifying the Foreign Office; 3) the affected did not show up to an appointment for deportation; 4) the affected, for any reason, has avoided deportation; or 5) there are grounds for suspicion that the affected will avoid deportation. The deportee may not be held in security detention longer than two weeks if the departure deadline has passed, and it is certain that the deportation will be carried out (ibid.). A deportee may be sentenced to security detention for up to six months. In the case that the deportee obstructs deportation, detention may be extended to a length of one year (ibid.).

The reported experiences of deportees do not reflect the laws that govern the process. A number international and local human rights, refugee help, and anti-racism organizations (such as *ProAsyl*, *Opferperspective*, *IndyMedia.de*, *ReachOut Berlin*, *Antirassistische Initiative Berlin*, *Amnesty International*, *Anti-Diskriminierungsbüro Berlin*, *FRat Berlin*, *Internationale Liga für Menschenrechte e.V.*) report of detentions that last up to ten years, of deportees – under age and of the age of majority – who are held without legal advice or awareness of why they are there, and of inhumane living conditions or abuse within the detention centres. Further, these same organisations report of the life threatening conditions experienced by refugees crossing into Germany, or of dangers related to the deportation process itself. In a documentation of deportee cases between 1993 and 2005, the Anti-racist Initiative Association (*Antirassistische Initiative e.V.*) (2006: 49, 68, 93, 125, 160, 195, 218, 249, 284, 319) reported 49 deaths, 299 cases of abuse and 127 cases of police abuse within deportation detention centres. In addition, 162 deaths, and 439 injuries have occurred while crossing the border (ibid.) – of these, 121 deaths and 259 injuries were reported at the eastern border (ibid.). Sixty-seven deaths resulted from fires or racist attacks at refugee hostels (ibid.). In short, the reported experiences of deportees illustrates a much more violent geography of the border regions than let on by government documents.

⁵² My translation of § 62 of the Detention Law (*AufenthG §62 Abschiebungshaft*) that reads, “Die Dauer der Vorbereitungshaft soll sechs Wochen nicht überschreiten,” (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2008d).

Migreurop (2008) documented the number of deportation centres around Europe. In Germany alone there are 40 (ibid.). The detention centres are often heavily guarded buildings surrounded in barbed wire. The image of a prison perhaps comes to mind, and because of this and because of the fact that the detainees have not usually committed dangerous offences (particularly the children), but are instead mere subjects of a bureaucratic exit process, they are often referred to as deportation jails (*Abschiebeknast*) by local activists⁵³. The length of stay must depend on processing slow downs or complications. To imagine that some are held in suspension for years, is to imagine Wacquant's (2004a: 2) ghetto: forced confinement, stigmatisation, parallel institutional encasement, all play a role in the scenario of the detention centre. This is not a place of self-determination or self-assertion. Life trajectories are controlled entirely from above.

⁵³ A search in Google for the German phrase, "*Abschiebeknast*" which means, "Deportation Jail" will bring up 61 pages of links to critical discussion (in German) and reports of detention detainees (Google 2008c).

4.0 Spatialising the Stories

In Chapter Two, I summarised the theory, and discussed some of the paradigmatic commonalities and compatibilities that the theorists had. Placing them within the ancient dialogue of what space and time is, it was seen that they all worked within the same physical and metaphysical paradigm. In Chapter Three, I told some stories of social phenomena in Berlin. I told some stories that unfolded to me as a foreigner travelling across a strange land. I also reflected on these stories implementing the theory at hand. There are, then, two outstanding questions that remain, which will be addressed in this chapter. First, what does it mean when a foreigner travels across unknown territories, and observes them as they unfold before her? This dilemma unfolds when one chooses a theoretical lens through which to analyse space. In 4.1 Lefebvre's (1991: 38-39) triad and poststructural multiplicity are taken as two possible lenses. The second question is: what do such observations mean for theories of space? In 4.2, I return to the theories of Lefebvre (1991), Massey (2005), Bauman (2007), Pratt (2004), Smith (2001), and Bourdieu (1984), and discuss the ways in which these theories are compatible and which ways they are not. In 4.3, I reflect on the ramifications of this theory on conceptualisations of borders and the production of social space. Hybridisation and vertical power are taken as two dilemmas that need consideration in the organization of urban space. In 4.4, the dissertation is concluded.

4.1 Two theoretical lenses

In Chapter One, I explained that I approached this research from the standpoint of a foreigner. When I arrived at this research project I was new to Berlin. One of the great dilemmas of being new is finding an epistemology: how could I know this foreign place? In Chapter Three, I told stories of Berlin. These stories, told to the best of my ability, turned into contours (like Pratt's (2004)) of Berlin. Applying theory to them, though, brings out still new nuances. In 4.1.1, these stories are framed in Lefebvre's (1991: 38-39) triad of spatial moments of conceived, perceived, and lived spaces. It is useful because Lefebvre's theory can expose clear entries and exits as a story of centre and periphery, and above all, of power. In 4.1.2, I want to analyse the stories according to the theories of Massey (2005), Bauman (2007), Bourdieu (1984), Pratt (2004), and Smith (2001). This approach leads to yet another view: one of a city full of a never-ending complex set of trajectories.

4.1.1 The triad

By recapitulating and framing the stories told in the third chapter in terms of Lefebvre's (1991:38-39) three overlapping moments of space, one can see that: 1) particular trends emerge in the stories; 2) that the production of space is political; and 3) that theory has the power to alter one's view of space. The trends that emerge through Lefebvre's lens (the triad) show that squatters and newcomers struggle against the same *Other*. This struggle is one of a recurring struggle to secure and protect their space against forces of neutralization, festivalisation and so called legitimisation. The struggles reveal the power imbalances.

In the following paragraphs, I have separated the three moments of space. However, this division is not to imply that the spaces are detachable. On the contrary, these moments are necessarily interrelated. As Lefebvre wrote:

“... the lived, conceived and perceived realms should be interconnected, so that the ‘subject’, the individual member of a

given social group, may move from one to another without confusion,” (Lefebvre 1991: 40).

The spaces are not necessarily disconnected at all. They may, indeed, be separate spatial elements, but they may also be one and the same, existing on different levels with different meanings to different people.

Lefebvre defined conceived space as:

“... the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of artist with a scientific bent – all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived... This is the dominant space in any society (or mode of production). Conceptions of space tend [...] towards a system of verbal (and therefore intellectually worked out) signs,” (Lefebvre 1991: 38).

In other words, conceived spaces are those in which spaces are represented. They can be the space of material discourse, as language is a signifying practice (symbols that signify an object), or they can be material and physical. Lefebvre (1991: 45) defines conceived space as something for planners, urbanist, technocrats, and for people with power, in general. If, however, we take conceived spaces to mean merely those conceptions of space in which perceived and lived spaces are conflated into one representation (as he also said, above), then conceived spaces can be created by anyone – with power or not. In the stories of the previous chapter, it was told that squatters conceived their discursive space in the form of solidarity parties, educational programs, community kitchens, and events. This was the way squatters represented themselves to themselves. Their discourse was critical of social and political processes. They were explicitly anti-capitalist, anti-fascist, and against various models of city restructuring. This was how squatters (at the websites at least) represented their *Other*. To squatters, *Others* were those who supported the state and private capital. One might say that their discourse, in general, signified an alternative lifestyle, separated from and against process outside their boundaries. Their *Other*, in this discourse, also

included integrated squats, such as the *Tacheles*. The writers at Squat.net (2006), for example, separated their values from the current *Tacheles* (the “cultural tra la la”) (ibid.). Those at the *Rigaer94* were also discursively opposed to “pseudo-alternative,” (*Rigaer94* 2006) social modes.

Opposing these representations was the critical discourse over squatters from private individuals and firms – that, for example, the *Schwarzer Kanal* was conceived to lead to property devaluation. Some were so critical of squatters that they signified them as “spectre” (*CDU-Fraktion des Abgeordnetenhauses von Berlin* 2007). This particular quote came too, from a member of the Christian Democratic Party. Materially, graffiti was framed and presented as modern art. The *Tacheles*, a physical piece of property, was represented as a cultural centre. These conceptions also match the uncritical discursive representations from private institutions (e.g. *Zitty* and *Deutsche Telekom*) and consumers that Berlin: is fun; is a place of festivals with a wide and diverse gastronomic economy; and, is open and global. However, a critical discourse did emerge in academic circles – a discourse that perhaps allied itself with residents not born to German citizens.

About representational space, Lefebvre wrote that it was the:

“...space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and writers and philosophers, who describe and aspire to do no more than describe. This is the dominated – and hence passively experienced – space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate. It overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects. Thus representational spaces may be said, though again with certain exceptions, to tend towards more or less coherent systems of non-verbal symbols and signs,” (Lefebvre 1991: 39; italics as in original).

Representational spaces, or lived space, can be said to be the space of emotion, art, i.e. spaces that carry meaning. From the squatter movement graffiti represented rebellion.

Banners and music represented explicit political views. Space in Berlin was inscribed by the *Aussteigerszene* at least as far back as *Ton Steine Scherben*, who inscribed the sentiments in the lived space of song. Fights and protest represented their commitment against the *MediaSpree*, the pseudo-alternative, capitalism, and privatised development. Their fights were about holding onto specific tracts of land within Berlin, space that was also symbolic of their political and social perspective. Similarly, the lived space of some newcomers also involved struggle. The very corporeal and material existence of *Afrikarat*, *AsylNet*, No One is Illegal (*Kein Mensch ist Illegal*), and various other social initiatives represented the lived space of struggle.

Opposing these representational or lived spaces were “Free Spaces” (“*Freiräume*”) that represented uniformity, harmony, openness, or the *Tacheles* that represented access to modern art for everyone, or schools that again represented a service accessible by everyone. These spaces, produced by architects, or city officials, or private developers, signified. They were spaces created by a few for the use of a preconceived everyone. These spaces also (sometimes literally) framed the object, thus severing it too from its maker. The mystery of unknown underground culture was erased the moment the graffiti was framed. The transnational histories of newcomers were also veiled the moment the cultural festival as a product was produced. The signifier – the producer – was also masked in each situation. The power behind them existed somewhere else. Similarly, the postcard of the German Turk (*Deutsche Turkin*), or the German Telephone Company (“*Deutsche Telekom*”) veil over the *Brandburger Tor*, represented global openness, while their producer remained elusive and uncritical of its product.

On perceived space, Lefebvre wrote:

“The spatial practice of a society secretes that society’s space; it propounds and presupposes it, in a dialectical interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it. From the analytic standpoint, the spatial practice of a society is revealed through the deciphering of its space,” (Lefebvre 1991: 38).

Perceived spaces are the spaces of social practice – the channels and infrastructure that structure social life. That of the squatters was one of a continual defence of property. These territories never disappeared, however. They simply relocated if necessary, and squatters functioned inside this geography. Squatters also defended their bodies. This was particularly notable in the *Schwarzer Kanal*, which was an alternative meeting place for the production of alternative discourse about gender. This was also seen in the activist work of residents at the *Bethanien*, who occupied themselves with social issues. This defence of discourse was performed through taking space – through producing alternative public spheres. The geography of Cost Nothing Stores, solidarity parties, and community kitchens were also perceived spaces.

Newcomers also encountered social and cultural barriers that suggested certain norms in social practice which were to be conformed to. Throughout border-crossing procedures, they were also face to face with a legal barrier, where the ideals and interests of the state were backed by a judicial system and police force that protected the state. The barrier of the legal system continued to unveil itself as newcomers sought longer term residence. In some extreme cases, this led to the social practice of mere survival, as was seen in the stories of deportation centres. The perceived spaces of newcomers were not trajectories that channelled them into defence of property, but into the defence of another physical entity: their bodies. Bodies were defended in courts (defending clothing), on trains through camouflage (i.e. shutting mouth to veil foreignness), and in no-go zones (securing health and well-being). We also saw a defence of community in practice when Ludin fought for her right to go to work wearing a *tschador*.

The *Other*, from which squatters and newcomers were defending themselves, was also wrapped in a defence practice: the defence of a *whole*, such as the harmonization of pupils, culture, appearance, and language. This was the background situation that informed decisions on problems in the schools and in the work place. There was also the production of neutralised spaces, of free spaces, and border regions. These spaces were designed and produced in offices and in fields, by professional, semi-professional and low-skilled labour. The policing and legal system reinforced and protected these social practices, these perceived spaces.

4.1.2 Poststructural multiplicity

If we were to look at Berlin as purely a mass of poststructural multiplicity, there would be little left for categorization. Yet, poststructural multiplicity mirrors more accurately my experience as a researcher new to Germany. I had arrived with a set of assumptions about my object of study, which turned out to be false. I had also arrived with an ability to understand much that I could view. My naivety proved useful and encumbering at the same time. The blank slate of being new, where nothing can be taken for granted, meant that I could apply no prior knowledge and had to start at the beginning. It also meant that I had to stay open and willing to possibilities. Categorization had to be thrown to the wind, and this is a poststructuralist dream come true. What unfolded before me was an urban space of chaos.

Bauman's (2007) liquid modernity is fascinating because it could describe any city, and at the same time no city. A poststructuralist flexible everything, taken in its extreme, can lead to oblivion. People are at best travelling along a trajectory moving along and among *fields*. The stories told in Chapter Three, however, attempted to pull a thread at this endless fabric. The "refuser scene" (*Aussteigerszene*) as a whole could be viewed as a movement whose members defined themselves a certain history and a certain future. Similarly, the newcomers could be explained as travelling along an array of trajectories. All of these trajectories may fade into view for a fleeting moment, and then out again into mystery. Berlin as a centre of poststructural chaos might also be full of many coeval trajectories that never come into view at all.

A pivotal discussion is therefore invoked: one of openers and closures across borders. There is an irony here because despite Lefebvre's (1991) goal of escaping dualities, the border one back in the picture. The endless array of *fields*, endless coeval trajectories, endless discursive arenas, pose endless possibilities for the construction and deconstruction of borders. On several occasions throughout the stories told in Chapter Three, attempts to unify and categorise could be seen. It happened whenever a boundary was constructed around a group of people, who were then said to all retain the same characteristics – and who were constructed at *Other*. Physical boundaries of this sort were

squat barricades, jail fences, violence against persons of darker skin colour, police force. Squat barricades rejected the law and protected everything that belonged to the squat. Jail fences divided legal residents from illegal residents. Xenophobic violence divided endangered from unaffected. Mental borders divided investor versus punk, capitalist versus socialist, acceptable newcomers (*Deutsche Türkin*) from unacceptable newcomers (Ludin). The blockaded houses became a socially perceived space as the squat became at once a privately own building and an island of insurgents. Existence of feared eastern districts also became socially perceived as Africans were steered away. The evicted squat metamorphosed into a conceived space for condos that planned a different clientele, thus distinguishing buyer or renter from squatter. Socially lived spaces of demo chants, art, concerts, speeches, and flyers all produced a category of *Other*.

Borders in multiplicity illuminated social struggles around equality and discrimination. It is the border between the contradictions of *Self* and *Other*. It is the border between all the dualities that Lefebvre (1991) strove to avoid. It is the border between fields, the border between publics, and the border between trajectories. Borders, then, seem everywhere. There is a tendency then to worry about this state of social space – a space that endlessly divides and categorises. It would seem to work against the very aim of the project of equality. Bourdieu (1984), Fraser (1993), and Massey (2005), however, were all very adamant however, that they do exist, and even need to exist. Borders may divide, but they also illuminated. They illuminated the inscribed social differences in *habitus* that lead to varying *fields* (Bourdieu 1984), the various discourses trying to emerge (Fraser 1993), the various converging time-space trajectories (Massey 2005).

Multiplicity is layered and occurs through time, however. As was seen in the stories, borders were reproduced almost as quickly as they are destroyed. It is perhaps here that borders can be judged: to which purpose do they serve? Some social contesting around a border may have the goal of eliminating some borders and the creation of new ones – of preferable ones. This seems to have been the case with the squatters. Other borders, such as those posed to many newcomers, are not designed to be removed whatsoever. If radical opening is the project at hand, as Massey (2005: 179) argued, then borders must, too, be malleable or negotiable:

“The real socio-political question concerns less, perhaps, the *degree* of openness/closure (and the consequent question of how on earth one might even begin to measure it), than the *terms* on which that openness/closure is established. Against what are boundaries erected? What are the relations within which the attempt to deny (and admit) entry is carried out?” (Massey 2005: 179, italics as in original).

Insider-outsider dilemmas constructed around any border ignited a spiralling difficulty of belonging and not belonging that overlooks sameness across difference, neglects difference within sameness, and ignores networks and horizontal connections.

4.1.3 *Everything social is spatialised*

In 4.1.2, the stories of squatters and newcomers were discussed in terms of Lefebvre’s (1991: 38-39) triad. The triad revealed certain aspects of those stories. The stories, however, also revealed aspects of social spatial theory: namely, that the politics of space and trajectories of difference are material and spatialised. By framing of the above stories in terms of conceived, perceived, and lived spaces, it could be visualised that the trajectories and the histories of *Others* are spatialised. The stories involved spaces that were corporeal in the form of bodies, properties, material objects, places, meeting points, and infrastructures. It also shows that the spaces are inextricably linked with one another. Any one spatial element may occupy two or more meanings. Thus, Lefebvre’s (1991: 38-39) triad is a useful tool in revealing the materiality of poststructural difference, and Pratt’s (2004: 12) view, that feminist geography need not suffer from its tradition of ungrounded immaterial discourse, is supported.

The materialised representations of space (conceived space) of squatters were exemplified materially, by representations of their space as buildings, trailer-villages, meeting points, a place of residence, or a place of learning. Some discursive representations also emerged among the stories of newcomers in Berlin: the production and circulation of flyers, maps, and hotlines. Their *Other* represented them through framed works of graffiti

that hung in subway stations, or pieces of property representing cultural centres. Representational spaces (lived spaces) of squatters were materialised in the form of graffiti, music, on protest signs, and activist groups. Their *Other* supported representational spaces materialised in the form of modernised “Free Spaces” (*Freiräume*), public festivals, or exotics foods to be consumed. Spatial practices were materialised in defences of property, territories, or bodies. Cost Nothing Stores and social events were also physical places that hosted activity. Newcomers were channelled through schools, across border controls, and engaged with police or customs officials. Their *Other* produced neutralised spaces and border regions. Their spatial practices also affected school children and dress codes.

4.2 Possibilities in social spatial theory - Lefebvre versus Poststructural difference

On urbanity, Lefebvre wrote:

“To say urban space is to say centre and centrality, and it does not matter if whether these are actual or merely possible, saturated, broken up, or under fire, for we are speaking here of a dialectical centrality. It would thus be quite possible to elaborate on this form, to illuminate its structures (centre/periphery), its social functions, its relationship to labour (the various markets) and hence to production and reproduction ... One might also go into the dialectical processes bound up with this relationship between a form and its contents: the explosions, the saturation points, the challenges arising from internal contradictions, the assaults mounted by contents being pushed out towards the periphery, and so forth,” (Lefebvre 1991: 101).

His notion of the city is one of a meeting place, or a form of contact and centrality. Lefebvre’s (ibid.) conception here, however, comes very close to representing the city as a cohesive unit. Lefebvre’s (1991) centre and periphery are dialectic, and the centre might be fragmented or injured, but it suggests a one totality. As Schmuelly (2008: 214) has also

pointed out, Lefebvre was committed to a total project. Indeed, Schmuely drew a quote from Lefebvre's *Critique of Everyday Life*:

“‘without this concept,’ [of totality] ‘there can be no frame of reference, no generality, and even more, no universality.’”
(Schmuely 2008: 214)

Also, according to Schmuely, Lefebvre was:

“...vehemently opposed to the fragmentation of *knowledge* as he is to the specialization of practical and aesthetic activity. If the social division of labour is found to impose an alienating and reductive force on the individual human subject, then it is also seen to bring about similar results in the realm of thought itself,”
(Schmuely 2008: 214, italics as in original).

Even when discussing fragmentation, Lefebvre (1991) wrote of it in terms of its relationship to the whole:

“Space is whole and broken, global and fractured, at one and the same time,” (Lefebvre 1991: 355-6).

So, it would seem that Lefebvre was loath to multiplicity. This conflict with multiplicity and commitment to totality would seem to be the most difficult aspect of Lefebvre's (1991) theory of space to reconcile with poststructural difference.

In this section, one particular component and analysis of Lefebvre's hegemonic theory is useful. In his analysis of Lefebvre, Kipfer (2008) also discussed Lefebvre's hegemony, and its aspects of minimal and maximal difference. According to Kipfer (2008), Lefebvre's abstract space was hegemonic *through* difference. Urban space was particularised and its residents dispersed, parcelised, while at the same time, absorbed as minimal differences (Kipfer 2008: 201). The city's whole was perceived, conceived, and

lived as a composite and dialectic of particulars. These necessary and “induced” (Kipfer 2008: 202) particulars were Lefebvre’s minimal differences. The:

“...liberalist-pluralist diversity refers [then] to reified forms of minimal difference,” (Kipfer 2008: 204).

Lefebvre’s maximal differences could be sought out in quests for revolutionary transformation (ibid.). According to Kipfer (ibid.), groups claiming maximal difference had counter-hegemonic potential, if they can transform, and not merely assert, minimal differences (ibid.). Kipfer (ibid.) further explained that Lefebvre’s “Right to the City” was the medium through which minimal differences could transform into maximal differences and execute urban change (ibid.). Groups otherwise integrated inside a discriminatory and segregating power structure could transform into maximal claims if, like Paris Commune of 1871, they overthrew the structure and created something radically new (ibid.). In retrospect however, Kipfer concluded that this movement:

“failed to energise potentially counter hegemonic strategies with longer time horizons,” (Kipfer 2008: 205).

Schmuelly (2008) concurred, and further reminded us that the reverse process was also possible: maximal differences could be incorporated and then rendered minimal differences.

Kipfer (2008) and Schmuley (2008) were helpful in thematising minimal and maximal differences. Indeed, Lefebvre’s (1991) theory of hegemony sheds useful light on social processes in Berlin. One could speculate which differences have been integrated as minimal differences to form and serve a greater whole. Thinking about the relationships entwined among minimal and maximal differences, however, remains in the confined to the blindfolded Marxist analysis of difference that Hartmann (1979: 2) had explained. One could say that women and men alike were minimalised and incorporated into a particular pattern that serves capital production. The Marxist feminist argument is, in its essence, the same as Lefebvrian minimalisation. That women took on particular roles while men others

can be explained as induced differences within a certain whole, but the differential power imbalances within the system cannot be explained.

Poststructural difference evades such categorisations. Radical multiplicity, as Massey (2005) suggested, is incompatible with the concept of a centrality and periphery, except perhaps in its global sense, at which point – as I will explain below – all notion of centrality and urbanity is lost. Multiple trajectories would rather refer to multiple centres, multiple peripheries of respective centres, and multiple coexisting maximal differences. Smith (2001) was quite indisposed to reduce social processes within the city to purely economic realm. Furthermore, he was quite vehement that transnational histories expand the geography of so called centres, and that one strategy towards the suppression of minorities was indeed the overlooking of these networks that transcend conceived borders of urban space. The power of transnational histories and respective geographies was also confirmed by Pratt (2004). There is, however, a way beyond the impasse of poststructuralist difference and Lefebvre's (1991) hegemonic theory. They are compatible if: a) urban space can be viewed as having multiple centres and peripheries b) if centre and periphery can be implemented to conceptualise a space that subsumed to an underlying logic or metanarrative (economic forces, in particular) and c) if the levels that Lefebvre uses to analyse centre and periphery can transcend the urban. On this last point, it is then only questionable, to what extent is it remains an urban theory as opposed to a global theory. These deliberations are relevant because they can change the way we think about space and the social problems within it.

4.2.1 Multiple centres

In sections 3.1 and 3.2, it was seen that integration or acceptance of either the newcomers or squatters depended on their ability to confront their restrictions, and dissolve their boundaries. Earlier in this chapter, when analysing the stories according to Lefebvre's (1991: 38-39) three moments of space, it was seen that both groups seemed to struggle against the same *Other*, and that *Other* had substantial decision-making, and potentially violent, power. One might illustrate this phenomenon according Lefebvre's (1991: 101) centre/periphery dialectic: one dominant centre with peripheral and marginal forces

contesting it. This was, in fact, exactly how squatter movements were represented by Grell et al. (1998: 211). However, the stories can also be told in such a way to expose each movement itself as a separate centre. At the periphery of the hard core squatter movements were commodified forms of alternative lifestyles, or big city projects, or the government itself. At the periphery of some newcomers were areas that are unsafe, demand a different dress code or different language. Seen this way, these movements *are* and not merely *becoming* their own centres.

It may be interpreted that the squatters at the *Schwarzer Kanal*, the *Köpi*, the *Rigaer94*, *NewYorck59* and possibly the *Brunnenstraße 183* claimed – at least at their websites and during their blockades – maximal difference. The *Schwarzer Kanal* was an alternative public for transgender, inter- or homosexual, persons. The *Köpi* explicitly sought self-determination, and the *Rigaer94* explicitly wanted its own space where the “alternative is possible,” (Kadterschmiede 2006). This claim for maximal difference was also materialised, and perceived, conceived, and lived in the form of cabarets, exhibitions, parties, housing projects, and community kitchens.

This maximal differentiation was also found in epistemological spaces. First, the language of this discourse implied gaping differences. Used in other contexts, the word *Aussteigen* means to exit, to get off board, to escape, or to drop out. The use of this term, alone, indicated a radical refusal of some kind. On the flip side, those who were being refused, and those who tried to evict the squatters, referred to the eviction process as *Räumen*. Used in other contexts, this word means “to clean” or “to tidy up”. Police, while on assignment to “tidy up” a building, often damaged toilets and facilities (Rigaer94 2006), in order to render the premises unlivable and undesirable to squatters (ibid.). Second, there was a stark contrast in the use and application of the notion of “Free Space” (“*Freiraum*”). The concept of “Free Space” (“*Freiraum*”) played a central role in many squats and trailer villages, and its meaning could be seen in the activities that took place: how they were organised and how they were advertised. Many activities were represented as underground activities or outside the mainstream. The squatter’s concept of “Free Space” (“*Freiraum*”) endorsed a do-it-yourself approach. The fight for “Free Space”, as defined by squatters, signified a refusal of State (top-down) control, or commercially defined norms. The city’s

concept of “Free Space” (*Freiraum*), on the other hand, endorsed a space for everyone (at least in theory) to enjoy and participate in. This space was uniform and open, modern, and involved a high degree of skilled and non-skilled labour. Third, the conceived space of prejudices could not be overlooked in these scenarios. Neighbours of the *Schwarzer Kanal* along the *Spree River* perceived a devaluation of their own properties because of the squatters presence. CDU member, Wasner, was also quite open with his prejudice views. These discourses, as they arose on both sides, reinforced the notion that squatters may be maximally different.

Of the squats that remained in the central districts (the neighbourhoods of *Mitte* and *Kreuzberg*), many were accepted under cultural enrichment programs endorsed by the City of Berlin, and correspondingly they did not profess maximal difference, and indeed, it might be interpreted that these differences were incorporated and minimalised. An extreme illustration of this phenomenon of commodification would be the *Tacheles*, whose artistic products were subsidised and promoted by the City. Similarly, yet not so extreme, the *Lohmühle*⁵⁴ was not immediately threatened by eviction. They had, however, services to offer to the greater community, such as programs in environmental education or cultural exhibitions.

Discussing the minimal or maximal difference of newcomers is somewhat more complex because newcomers were not a cohesive group save for their common relationship to the State. The stories told of newcomers also did not tell of any story that can be applied to all newcomers. It cannot be said that newcomers are a single group representing themselves as maximally different, because the differentiation within the group was extreme in and of itself. However, it can be said that of these variations within the group, maximal differences can be found.

Above, I have already mentioned the festivalisation of ethnicity as a practice of minimalising and inducing difference. Another practice of minimalising difference might

⁵⁴ The *Lohmühle* is located in the district of what is now *Treptow* – a district not generally considered central. It is, however located just outside of the central neighbourhood of *Kreuzberg*, being on the eastern banks of the *Spree River*.

be seen in the common experience of newcomers throughout border crossing procedures. The ability of newcomers to stay and live in Germany was a very clear process of crossing a physical and semi-permeable border. Those that were sifted out were those that did not meet certain criteria required for the settling in the *field* of the German State. Crossing into the country and ease of entrance were determined by one's nationality (Schengen, EU, or elsewhere), criminal record, adult or age of minority, eligibility for employment, financial independence, or status of asylum. Once minimum *habitus* was proven, entry into the German *field* was granted. This was stamped in the passport, which signified permission to further *fields*, such as permission to register a home address, bank account, health insurance, permission to work, study, or simply tour. One might say that this sifting at the perimeter of German territory was a process of levelling the *field* – as all are required to demonstrate a certain *habitus* to play the *field*. One could also argue that this was a process too of minimizing differences, or of conflating multiple centres into one.

Maximal differences can exist everywhere. Individuals or groups claiming maximal differences are not necessarily on the outside to begin with. That is, they do not necessarily have cross a border. The social practices of squatters, for example, could be interpreted as maximal differences that arose inside the borders of the German Republic, and this shows that difference occurs *despite* borders. Furthermore, the newcomers discussed in Chapter Three brought with them histories, and transnational networks, which may or may not feed the production of maximal differences. As for the more specific stories of newcomers told in this chapter, maximal differences were exposed throughout struggles. It could be argued that Ludin was fighting for maximal difference, when she fought for the right to wear what she wanted to work. The Turkish Union was fighting for the inclusion of Turkish language courses in the schools – a fundamentally different strategy of social integration from that of the City which sustained that first graders and their parents should simply improve their German language skills. In both cases, the State pushed for integration through the acceptance of only minimal difference.

The stories of squatters and newcomers that were told in Chapter Three may represent coeval trajectories of maximal difference. In so doing, Hartmann's (1979: 2)

Marxist blindfold is removed, and differences are recognized coevally, and not necessarily as part of a particular system. To repeat what Bauman said:

“fences divide otherwise uniform space not an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’, but what is ‘inside’ for those on one side of the fence is ‘outside’ for those on the other,” (Bauman 2007: 76)

In other words, borders that define the outermost periphery are relative just as the centres within each bordered realm are relative. As centres collide with and diffuse away from one another, one might even conceptualise trajectories moving in, through, and out of minimal and maximal differences. The motion of *becoming* is endless.

4.2.2 Space not reduced to economic forces

In the final paragraphs of “*Production of Space*,” Lefebvre envisioned an “orientation” (Lefebvre 1991: 423) for the future. This rested on his illustrations of Chinese socialism (ibid.), in which he described an organization of society in which no political party could rise above the society itself. This was an example, in Lefebvre’s view, that:

“...the theory of space is capable of accounting for revolutionary experience world wide,” (Lefebvre 1991: 422).

The utopians, that he cited, too, were Fourier, Marx and Engels (ibid.). This heavy reliance on the socialist model as a means of emancipation is not easily bridged to poststructural multiplicity because it reduces the production of space to economic patterns.

Smith (2001: 23-46) was particularly concerned about, “time-space compression,” of urbanism, and the view that the local and global were mere containers, instead of, “mutually constitutive social processes,” (Smith 2001: 182). His primary argument was that transnational urbanism enables:

“...an approach in which the nation-state is given its due as an institutional actor implicated in the process of forming and reconstituting transnational ties. Ordinary people are viewed as creative actors involved in the social construction of transnational urbanism by social networks they form, rather than being ignored or represented as passive objects propelled by underlying economic or cultural logics,” (Smith 2001: 183).

Smith was not alone in his criticism of this reductionism. Pratt (2004: 159) was also very clear that transnational histories were not only relevant to understanding how status was formed, but also that histories provide necessary data required in order to redraw the geographies of socially processes. Smith (2001: 108) uprooted what he called the so called bottom dwelling communities. Smith argued that Harvey lacked a:

“...theory of the state and civil society and an understanding of the situated characteristic of knowledge and, hence, political agency,” (Smith 2001: 11).

By recognising that transnational networks were socially constructed, everyday people became active objects socially producing their space, and not merely helpless while located at the bottom of economic structures (ibid.). By comparing transnational networks within a city, and by comparing practices of transnational network across cities, Smith (ibid.) deconstructed the global-local opposition and argued that the local is composed of transnational:

“...networks of social practice [that were] constituted by their interrelations with and groundedness *within* localities,” (Smith 2001: 15, italics as in original).

The concept of transnational urbanism is relevant in this section because transnational ties, networks, and histories can also be viewed as trajectories. According to Smith (2001), immigrants were not merely relocating bringing ethnicity with them: they

were transnationalizing. Looking at the stories of Berlin through this lens reshapes yet again the meanings that we draw from them. The international distribution of flyers to warn against No-Go Zones in Berlin demonstrated transnational networks. Curiously, this practice did not only re-map Berlin internally, but also externally. One might examine the geographies of these ties. One might also examine the Russian-Germans (*Spätaussiedler*). According to transnational urban theory, they were not Germans appearing once again inside a homeland (*Heimat*) or fatherland (*Vaterland*), they were transnationalising and transforming the very notion of what it supposedly means to be German. One might also examine native-born Germans. How transnational were they, in fact? Particularly, how transnational, were the Germans that the right wing sticker was referring to in Figure 6? Of squatters, a transnational network is easy to find on the internet. Squat.net was a website that brought together squats from all over the world. All of these networks could be mapped out to redefine the boundaries and limits of Berlin, and as Pratt wrote:

“maps are notorious instruments of power/knowledge, which can effectively solidify existing relations of power,” (Pratt 2004: 165).

Transnational urban theory also has implications on how intra-urban networks are conceptualised. Transnational urbanism, focuses necessarily on extra regional pathways, but the same can be said for intra urban pathways: their histories are relevant, spatialised, materialised, grounded, and are part and parcel of the social transformations. The squats were explicitly in solidarity with one another in their maximal difference. These were not groups whose maximal differences came into view only in conflict with their *Other* (i.e. the City or private developers), their difference was also actively affirmed and actively produced *through* lateral pathways inside the city itself that were independent of their *Other*. Furthermore, it was precisely because of these grounded, material, rooted, and lateral pathways of community that strengthen and reify their maximal difference *despite* their *Other*, that radical squatters were not:

“...a lot of pin-prick operations that are separated from each other in time and space...[that] can be beaten off one by one,”

(Lefebvre in *Survival of Capitalism*: 116; as quoted in Schmuely 2008: 225).

Rather, subjects claiming maximal difference can move in a Foucauldian network, as described by Chanter:

“...subjects themselves can make power a resource...subjects are a nexus of various lines of force which converge and overlap at particular concentrations or nodes. Subjects can tap into these flows and eddies, thereby mobilizing energy in particular ways and creating new local and temporary centres of power, which are not orchestrated in any direct way by a centralizing, autonomous higher agency,” (Chanter 2000: 269).

Lefebvre loathed fragmentation of knowledge (Schmuely 2008: 214), but it is precisely the conception of an all encompassing totality that fragments. The centre/periphery dialectic has the effect of truncating social processes to particular locally specific processes while failing to transcend borders and recognise transnational histories or intra urban pathways. The idea that newcomers are particularities who have merely crossed a border and are now present, negates not only their transnational histories, but also their possible maximal difference. Totality confines communities within a whole (a container), and severs transnational associations. Looking at the stories in which it has been observed that maximal differences have been minimalised, induced, and legitimised, it can also be seen that the production processes get masked and severed from their histories, and transcendent stories. They are signified and defined by others than themselves. Festivals or “multi-culti” food and music, framed graffiti, polished and sanded broken-down-architecture, uniform and open free space (*Freiraum*), German Turk, are all history-less and self-signified but from an *Other*.

In general then, Massey’s (2005) theory of coeval multiplicity and Pratt (2004) and Smith’s (2001) analyses of transnationalism are not compatible with Lefebvre’s hegemonic theory because minimalisation disassociates any difference from its past and external

relations. In theories of multiplicity, horizontal relations and pathways can never be severed (except by violence) by any movement hegemonic or not. Lefebvre's (1991) hegemonic theory also demands a central signifying praxis, which is not possible in a space conceived of multiple centres of maximal difference. As Massey said:

“the margins have not arrived at the centre. This is the view of those who are already ‘in the centre,’” (Massey 2005: 88)

Transnational urbanism and coeval trajectories permit each social phenomenon to be its own centre and its own definer. So again, we see an incongruence between Lefebvre's (1991) commitment to totality and essential difference.

However, it would be a vulgar conclusion to say that Lefebvre (1991) has nothing to contribute to poststructural difference. Schmid (2008: 28) reminded readers that Lefebvre's (1991) main objective was to theorize what space is. Lefebvre's (1991) *“Production of Space”* was a continuation of an age old philosophical question that he dates back to antiquity. Moreover, according to Schmid (2008: 33) Lefebvre's dialectical triad, “has no parallel in philosophy and the history of knowledge.” In this light, Lefebvre did not insist on an economic reduction. His work was merely about defining space. Space was a process of dialectics of work and production, of centre and periphery, an Aristotelian process of *becoming*, and a Marxist view of reality in which subjects produce their own space. As such his work encourages people to own the means of production and produce space. These concepts, therefore, are not bound to a view of space that is economically reductionist. If we forgo totality, then coeval trajectories can be envisioned in this dialectic and dynamic (as discussed in Chapter Two) processes of *becoming*, and thereby producing their own space.

4.2.3 Centre and periphery that transcend the urban

At this juncture in the theory, we remain in discord with a unified centre and periphery, but not at odds with the Lefebvrian (1991) concept of space as socially produced. There is, however, a passage from Lefebvre (1991) that is worth contemplating,

despite his apparent vision of a utopia in which every being in part of a unified whole. At the end, he wrote:

“The transformation of society presupposes a collective ownership and management of space founded on the permanent participation of the ‘interested parties’, with their multiple, varied and even contradictory interests. It this also presupposes confrontation [...] it is a matter of producing the space of the human species – the collective (generic) word of the species [...] the creation of a planet-wide space as the social foundation of a transformed everyday life open to myriad possibilities...”
(Lefebvre 1991: 422).

There is room for interpretation here that does not necessitate a Marxist shift but a universal shift. Similar can be said for Massey’s (2005) multiplicity. At the planetary level, it becomes a universal concept.

At this planetary level, the social reproduction of space can be viewed as having multiple and non-hierarchical centres, that crisscross one another, and form a global web. Somebody somewhere outside of Berlin received and read the mail from the *Afrikcarat*. Somebody or some bodies somewhere informed Ludin that a tchador was appropriate. These social processes inside and outside of Berlin could represent new centres. These may also be viewed as coeval trajectories. They may be viewed as layers in Lefebvre’s (1991: 86) *mille feuille* of space, which can be expanded across the globe, and at this global level it can be seen how the theories of Lefebvre (1991) and theorists of poststructural difference can meet. Layers, contours, and trajectories, become similar in meaning. Urbanity would be, at most, a node of colliding trajectories on this global web. The outstanding question might then be, then, how much urbanity (centrality around a point) can remain under such a vision?

4.3 Grasping social spatial borders

The heart of this dissertation is a theory of social space and its borders. Again and again, throughout the stories told in Chapter Three, the borders were revealed. Again and again, squatters found themselves contesting the norms. Over and over again, it was seen that many newcomers encounter barriers against the arrival and establishment of a new home. Squatters found themselves in fights to retain territory, and in fights to justify their alternative social norms that failed to mirror the values of their *Other*. Integration of their values – that breaking of their social spatial borders – often meant the commodification of their alternative lifestyle. Many newcomers found themselves entangled in bureaucratic webs, or legal battles that revolved around the right to stay. In both cases, the borders in question were not recognised by their *Other*, but rather the borders of integration or exclusion was rationalised, legitimised, and reinforced by law and police protection.

Money and capital power seem to have been the determining factor in terms of where squatters may settle. The squatter scene of today was largely a result of reunification, as the abandoned tenement housing of the eastern districts provided ample space at affordable prices for those seeking space for utopian lifestyles. Most squats and trailer-villages shared the same social political values of communal living, environmental consciousness, co-operation, self-determination, and non-commercialism. Squats that continued to fight for these values were generally pushed to the periphery. Of the initial squats that popped up after reunification, however, most have been removed. With the exception of *Brunnenstr 183*, most remained today in *Friedrichshain* or *Treptow*, and are in current battle with developers targeting the respective areas. Most overt in their political intentions and position are the *Köpi*, the *Schwarzer Kanal* and the *Rigaer*⁹⁴. To them, their space could only be fought for. The fight would only discontinue, it seemed, if the state and institutions with capital power left them alone completely, or ceased to exist.

The border encountered by newcomers was one that the state builds and presents according to the Westphalian system of nations⁵⁵. Germany has specific borders that are etched on each map of Europe, and which indicate a legal jurisdiction or institutional structures that span over a certain territory. These borders acted as filters to newcomers wishing to enter and live within it. This entry process for many is a highly bureaucratic process -- and one obscure enough to warrant help-organisations (e.g *Pro Asyl*) for those considering an attempt to wade through it. For those who did not fulfil the requirements of residence, a more grim geography of prison cells full of even tougher barriers. For those that acquire residency or citizenship, and lives in Berlin, a city will be discovered that is on the one hand proud of its diversity, and on the other laden with various degrees of systemic racism. In *Kreuzberg* and *Neuköln* one could encounter over a hundred spoken languages and a wide array of gastronomic services. The City of Berlin advertised this. However, limits to this openness may be met in so far that multiculturalism is limited to certain areas of the city where newcomers can also expect to live, that only languages of power are recognised, and that warnings have been issued about certain areas to avoid because of the ubiquity of xenophobic violence.

The stories began with the idea that squatters were on a trajectory of *Aussteigen*, while newcomers are on the opposite trajectory of *Einsteigen*. However, this story of insiders and outsiders revealed only one border: that that lies between inclusion and exclusion, or insiders and outsiders. Yet, both poststructuralist and Lefebvrian (1991) social space theory indicate that the borders must be more numerous and complex. Below, in 4.3.1, I will discuss the implications of differentiation, hybridisation, and the problem of classification on the organization of urban space. In 4.3.2, the implications of vertical power are discussed.

⁵⁵ Although commentators on the political make-up of the Europe as a whole claim that Europe over the last 50 years has been a rejection of the Westphalian Peace Treaty of 1648, its emphasis of sovereignty of states, equality of states, and the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of another state, it is considered by some to be the birth of the modern nation (Benhabib 2006: 4).

4.3.1 Differentiation, hybridisation, and the problem of classification

The question of integration is also a question of classification: who is integrating into what, and how are these entities named? Hybridity is exactly what it suggests: the collision, morphing and/or re/production of mixed forms. Aristotle would have been the first anti-hybridist. He categorised everything⁵⁶. Descartes, also, split the mind and body neatly in two, and his models of space neatly organised space into quantifiable units⁵⁷. Lefebvre (1991: 39), indeed, tried to hybridise the physical and mental realms that had resulted from the Cartesian split. If, however, Lefebvre (1991) was also allergic to multiplicity, he would probably have a problem with Bauman's (2004) liquid modernity:

“The whole world around us is sliced into poorly coordinated fragments while our lives are cut into a succession of ill-connected episodes,” (Bauman 2004: 12).

In this fragmenting process, borders demarcate a moment in the a process of differentiation, as well as the limits of any given group. If fragmentation is endless, however, is not then its opposite, hybridity, also endless? Are borders then, not arbitrary? How can one draw borders in a world of flexible everything and liquidity? If borders can be drawn at all, what then, do they implicate?

Until the 1980s, the biological difference, the immutable and unchanging difference between men and women, was referred to as the difference between the sexes (Nicholson 2000). Feminine and masculine behaviours were relegated to the realm of the social, and were categorised as gender (ibid.). This framework proved useful to feminist thought, but gradually came under critical analysis as some⁵⁸ questioned whether the corporeal and essentialist category of sex was really as resolute as was thought. This work, argued that differences (be they minimal or maximal) as well as hybrids were social constructions.

⁵⁶ See Aristotle's 'Categories' (Barnes 1971a).

⁵⁷ See the works of Descartes (Cottingham et. al. 1985).

⁵⁸ See Butler (2004 and 2006) and Jagger and Young (2005).

Turning back to the stories of Berlin, one might search for differentiated and hybrid spaces. Starting with differentiated spaces, the squatter struggles over land use resulted in differentiation. Cabarets, community kitchens (*Volksküche*), concerts, Cost Nothing stores, Open Air cinema, solidarity parties, projects towards ecological sustainability, and exhibitions, were all different social practices that were inscribed in the real space of squats. These were the *fields* that were constitutive of further perceived, conceived, and lived spaces. In the stories told in Chapter Three, it was seen that the representations of space that were supported by capital power were those that get ultimately built: such as the *MediaSpree*, *Johannisviertel*, *Spandauer Vorstadt*, and *Rosenthaler Vorstadt*. As these plans were realised, the seeds of differentiation and contest for *fields* were sown that further entrenched the divides between the two sides of the contest. The completed *MediaSpree*, for example, would set in motion various spaces of architects, new media technology, and the international music industry. These spaces would differ drastically from those of communal and do-it-yourself living styles of the *Schwarzer Kanal*, the *Köpi*, or the *Rigaer*⁹⁴. To further entrench the difference, the *MediaSpree* was also perceived and conceived by the squatters as a top-down oppressive spatial praxis that systematically excluded those that neither had nor wanted the capital power required in order to participate. The squatter's perceptions of the development plans set in motion still another dialectic of differentiation. In this case, it could be seen that the building of physical structures created physical borders that not only protected and excluded certain forms of *habitus*, but deepened the divide. Their perceived spaces informed their conceived spaces, and all the long these processes were inscribed. The counteracting discourses entrenched themselves and differentiation was set in motion.

The most heavily differentiated spaces for newcomers would be those of the detention centres, which resemble Wacquant's (2004a: 2) ghettos. These spaces were so separated from the city, that hybridisation through habituation was all but impossible. Less extreme would be the asylum homes, a practice (albeit one that is being phased out in Berlin) that also reduced possibilities of hybridisation. Still less extreme than asylum homes might be the spaces of fear inside Berlin shared by some landed newcomers and tourists. There was also the space of the individual body. Outlawing *tshadors* in the work place, obviously did not outlaw them altogether. It was then reasonable to assume that

Ludin and others would continue to wear them in spaces where they were required, desired, or tolerated. Another prominent space of differentiation told above would be the streamlining school system. According to Artelt et al. (2001: 44-45), only the *Gymnasium* schools offered an education at par with international standards, and in comparison to *Gymnasium*, other schools – which were the schools that newcomers were likely to be enrolled in – ranked very poorly. Accordingly, pupils habituated in these schools would encounter different sets of *fields* upon graduation, than those graduating from *Gymnasium* – a clear process of differentiation.

Beginning with the squatter stories in the search for hybrid spaces, one might turn to the *Tacheles* and *Lomühle* which were squats that found ways to bridge the divide between themselves and property developers. This alone could qualify them as hybrid spaces. One might note, too, that these spaces were spaces of minimalised differences. In this process, they found new perceived, conceived, and lived spaces, and here too, new contradictions. Their counter discourses may or may not have been directed at the same opponents as once upon a time. However, their new social practices and corresponding *fields* structured new borders, and correspondingly new contests. Both the *Lomühle* and *Tacheles* had originally struggled with their respective neighbourhoods, and both found a road to legitimacy that dissolved those borders. *Lomühle* today emphasises communitarian lifestyle, subsistence economies, environmental friendliness, as their new systems of *habitus*. They also offer seminars in environmental awareness, exhibitions, concerts, and other cultural events open to the public. Similarly, many original squatters of the *Tacheles* moved away when the building was sold to the *Fundus Group*. This migration produced a new division between the “refusers” (maintainers of maximal difference) and the “accepters” (receptors of minimalised differentiation). In these cases the original borders dissolved, and the contest over property quieted down. However, the dissipation of borders – this hybridisation – has only made room for new ones. All of these new hybrid spaces, have opened up fields for new *habitaes*, new spatial practices, new discourses, new social spatial inscriptions and contradictions, and new borders and contests.

Turning to the stories about newcomers, the entry and exit avenues were clearly wrought with a number of barriers that categorised insiders from outsiders. From the

perspective of the State, there was clearly a division between those that belong and those that must ask permission to belong. Dual citizens – hybrid citizens – between non-EU and German were also not accepted, except in certain circumstances of birth right. Gilbert and Dikeç (2008), in their examination of the French condition, were recognised three major currents implicated in the literature on immigration and citizenship:

“First, immigration and citizenship directly call into question the sovereign and unitary capabilities of the nation-state, and consequently the issues of membership and its borders. Second, the notion of citizenship occupies a considerable place in the current debates revolving around globalisation and its unsettling impacts on the nation-state. While the flows of migrant labour have secured economic production, such new spatialisations are still lacking social and political recognition of citizenship. Third, the effects of immigration, and the practices of citizenship mainly unfold at the urban level,” (Gilbert and Dikeç 2008: 252).

These observations are also a testament to the inflexibility and difficulty of nation-states, in general, to recognise the hybridity of its so called outsiders as well as its insiders, and the problem that this represents for cities.

A similar phenomenon to that of the squatters was also observed amongst the newcomers. Those cultural differences that were celebrated by the City were minimal differences, and too, revealed a support for certain kinds of hybridisations. The German-Turk (Figure 5) was not a stereotypical picture of a Turkish woman recently landed in Germany carrying with her transnational history and trajectory. Rather, she was a Turkish woman who had given up orthodox Muslim practices of covering the hair and neck. This person did not speak, think, or dream Turkish (Figure 5): rather it was all performed in German. “Perform” and “Performance” were central concepts to Butler’s (2006: 72, 175, 177-178, 186, 193) social construction of sex. According to Butler, social norms and values are performed over and over again creating the discourse in which the body develops. This postcard then, in its celebration of the *performance* (how they act) of new Germans, was

also pushing for a space of discourse that encouraged hybridisation (ibid.). Similar can be said for the strategies of integration in the school system. Foreign children born to foreign-born parents were to devalue their history and their performances (speaking habits) in the home, and learn German. These (hybrid) children (of minimalised difference) were supposedly then perform better in the school system. In contrast, the story of Ludin showed that extreme differences (the *tschador*) encountered obstacles.

It might be observed here that there seemed to be an overlay between minimalisation and hybridisation. It would be inaccurate, however, to conclude that minimalisation always leads or is equal to hybridisation. This is because hybridisation, as it would be understood in terms of coeval multiplicity or transnationalism, exists all the time and everywhere, and minimalisation is a process of signifying and articulating value on and for certain forms with a particular purpose. Hybridisation and differentiation is that eternal cycle of Aristotelian *becoming*⁵⁹, to a degree such that, “‘there is no point of departure,’” (Massey 2005: 67), and borders are everywhere. All borders, histories, and trajectories are blurred, overlapped, and as soon as they appear to resolve, another cycle is spun off. Changing of codes and practices merely change the spatial structure that structures daily life which too is subject to change. Once borders are removed, new sets of boundaries and contests are produced – borders along the lines of *habitus* or *field*, or representation or lived, of ideological or real, or of discursive arenas. This was seen as the *Tacheles* and *Lomühle* reached occupancy agreements. It was also seen as newcomers finally landed. As each border is contested and overcome, the process of *einsteigen* and *aussteigen*, of differentiation and consolidation, of opening and closing continues. A mosaic melts into liquid.

This spiralling and never ending process of differentiation and hybridisation also renders categorization rather problematic. Moments cannot be captured without misrepresenting it. Examination of data sets, for example, must categorise groups along lines that are only imaginary. Fixation of borders, then, can only be arbitrary. This isn't necessarily problematic in and of itself, but it does beg an analysis of why, for whom, and

⁵⁹ See Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' (Barnes 1971b: 1552-1728).

by whom, are borders drawn. It can be seen in this chapter so far, that the production of borders produces otherness and difference. However, just as borders can be implemented as violent power from above, borders can also define the maximal difference. Poststructuralists tended to remove the centre or multiply the centre (as seen above), and they are thus loath to generalizations and rigid classifications. On the other hand, as Nicholson (1998: 296) pointed out, these generalizations have also empowered feminists into a political movement. Generalizations may have been at times so vague as to lose credibility (*ibid.*), but without it, social movements would not have happened at all.

4.3.2 Vertical power

With all this fluidity, hybridity, transnational networking, actually existing grounded maximal differences, diffusing of centrality, fragmentation of knowledge and space, and endless differentiation and hybridity, one might wonder if there is a place for a central structure at all. In the case of the Berlin stories, this line of argument, too, calls into question the role and place of that one *Other* that both squatters and newcomers seem to face: the central State. Yet, what could a central structure look like, in the face of Bauman's (2007) liquid modernity, or Massey's (2005) coeval trajectories, or Smith's (2001) transnationalism? Lefebvre (1991: 54-60, 422) called for a total project – one in which groups claim their maximal difference and overthrow the centre, producing a radically new way of life (Kipfer 2008: 208). Given multiple centres, hybridity, and coevalness of histories and trajectories, this particular project must take on a different form. These are questions of socio political theory. Benhabib (2004) and Fraser (1993) offered clues here.

For squatters, the most apparent instances of violent power from above revealed themselves when they were forcibly removed from their premises (see Chapter Three). At this moment, squatters showed their refusal of the State and the State showed its capacity to assert its position through violence. In a similar vein, newcomers encountered this barrier when they were denied entry, or were placed in detention. These were spaces dominated by physical force. When one was denied entry, one was perhaps not in direct contact with a Billy club or handcuffs, but any refusal to follow the ordained application procedures – which restricted movement and employment – would render them possible targets of

physical force. A geography of detention and deportation, and all its borders, posed a threat to those who never obtained legal entry, or to those whose legal time limit expired. These borders were actively contested by human rights groups who spoke on behalf of deportees and painted a much more gruesome representation of space than did policy-makers and law-enforcers. Perceived by government officials and bureaucrats as simple exit steps, this space was perceived as violent and dangerous by at least some deportees and asylum applicants. Asylum houses, too, ran very close to Wacquant's (2004a: 2) definition of a ghetto, because they were places of stigmatisation (signified by attacks), forced confinement (legal status), and exhibited parallel institutionalism (limited social contact). The redistribution of asylum applicants in housing throughout Berlin was slowly alleviating this latter problem. The border that was here contested showed a multi-tiered power difference between the social groups that stood on either side. There are the dialectics and dynamics between those who had rights and those that did not, of those who made decisions and those who asked the questions, of those who spoke the language and those that could not, or those who applied physical force and those who resisted it. These were measures to protect the institution of state structures, which may seem self-evident in Westphalian nations (Benhabib 2004: 41). Yet, in radical and flexible everything, any one subject would not have place to exert violent power over and above another.

Another form of power less brutal than police force – but not necessarily less violent because it affected bodies – was the process of Lefebvre's (1991) minimalisation. Festivalization of culture and framing of graffiti could be viewed as a practice of drawing borders. The histories – that go beyond national borders or so-called norms – were severed. If this process benefited some – for example, *Daimler Benz* or the City – then drawing this border could be viewed as an instrument of power. Such minimisation of difference may be seen as part and parcel of a strategic plan to reinforce power structures as Kipfer (2008: 207) described. Here, too, it was important to see that differences were not eradicated. Rather, differences were merely minimised, so that their resulting induced (Kipfer 2008: 208) differences could be instrumentalised. Yet once more, in coeval and flexible everything, any one subject would not have place to exert power over and above another.

In each of these situations, a barrier to decision-making was perceived. Those applying the force were also those making the decisions. Those that did not make the decisions, could only at best demonstrate, suggest, or ask for change. The footing was not equal. It was also another case of those exercising power were also those doing the signifying. The stories in Chapter Three told, too, of borders between two real and ideological *fields* that counteracted one another and could not exist simultaneously. It was a dynamic of state legitimised power versus counter discursive and alternative lifestyles. It was another dialectic of work and production, as the ramifications of each spatial moment rippled through each side of the discourse and the differentiation continued. The discourses of the “winner” claimed universality (e.g. free space) and space was accordingly realised with the support of legal force, while the discourses of the “loser” in the contest resorted to counterpublic arenas. The outcome, their spatial product, was yet another contradiction of product and production process, where the process was hidden.

So what could a central or centralizing structure look like in a liquid, fragmented, and flexible society? This question has been intensively examined over the past 20 years in political theory.⁶⁰ Yet, indeed, in Germany the state system has not flexibilised and horizontalised as everything else has, as Bauman (2007) described. Benhabib (2004: 216) explored new models of political membership that challenged classical Westphalian democratic sovereignty, which she defined as based on: 1) the principle that people are both author and subject of their laws; 2) the ideology of a unified *demos*; and 3) the idea of a self-enclosed, autochthonous territory governed by that same *demos*. She focussed on immigration issues as she saw migration issues as a problem still yet to be addressed as states, economies, and knowledge decentralise. In view of globalization:

“...the legitimacy of international laws to treaties among sovereign states alone, is no longer adequate to understand the legal complexities of a global civil society. Along with the obsolescence of this model, the ideal of territorial autochthony must be discarded as well,” (Benhabib 2004: 216).

⁶⁰ This subject is vast in scope. For some a glimpse into the literature see: Sassen (1998); Keil (1998); Keil, Wekerle and Bell (1996); Wolff, Schneider, Schmid and Klaus (1998); and Paloscia (2004).

In Germany (see Chapter Three), the laws that governed immigration recognised a hierarchy of political memberships that favoured Germans before Europeans, and Europeans before Non-Europeans. Germany's form of citizenship was, also, wholly territorial based. Although, Benhabib (2004: 218) did not call for the radical deconstruction of state apparatuses, she did emphasize that models of political membership must not necessarily be territorial based. For example, she argued that people could unite or link up along lines of language or ethnicity, or aggregate in institutions or under a particular common cause. She cited (2004: 105), for example, that illegal Mexican immigrants in California worked for and have voice within institutions such as hospitals, schools, and the army. Despite their illegality, they were not voiceless or useless within these spheres (ibid.). Conversely, for example, acid rain was a problem that affected Canadians and Americans alike (ibid.). Aggregation and expressing voice united around this common cause could also form a public forum of discourse that is not territorial based (ibid.). For the sake of argument and to highlight their contrast with state powers, these lateral attachments might be called horizontal power structures. Such models resemble Fraser's (1993: 8) counter publics, where counter forums are necessary in order to create counter discourse.

The *Rigaer94* was explicitly a meeting place for counter discourse. The *Schwarzer Kanal* was also a meeting place for counter discourse, and one specifically for homo-, inter- and transsexuals. Here we saw too, that Fraser's (1993) discourse analysis was spatialised into the form of a building. Fraser's (1993: 8) counterpublic spheres were necessarily spatial. A space was needed in order to contain discoursing bodies. These were also potential spaces of membership and political voice. In contrast, as a publicly funded cultural centre, the *Tacheles* did not offer much counter discourse. It was also visited by millions each year – rather open in comparison to the closed and mysterious facades the *Friedrichshain* squats. The stories of newcomers in Chapter Three did not tell much about counter spaces, as the stories did not represent them as one united group. However, the Turkish Union might be seen as one counter public sphere, since they proposed counter pedagogical models in response to the PISA studies. The detention centres might be viewed as another counter space, if they were able to mobilize counter discourse. The extent to

which these statements are true would be one for further analysis, but the potential for counter public space for newcomers would be very empowering indeed.

The stories in Chapter Three also showed once again an overlap among minimalised, hybridised, and not-so-very-counter spaces of discourse. Those of minimalised, hybridised, and/or not-so-very-counter spaces, encountered less conflict with vertical power. One might then ask to what degree are spaces of political membership or counter discourse needed for groups that claim maximal difference, or move in spaces of differentiation? For Fraser (1993: 9) multiplicity was a necessary component to democracy. Similar to an Aristotelian polity⁶¹, diversity was necessary. Otherwise constituents merely iterated the same views. Fraser (ibid.), however, brought in the notion of space and polity: space for discourse, and space for counter argumentation. Fraser's (1993) counter publics necessitated space, and a closed space too. This may at first glance appear contradictory to the possibilities that are revealed by open systems. Non-territorial memberships and counter publics, or parallel publics, are models that could fit nicely in a conception of space as radically open and composed of coeval multiplicity and transnational trajectories.

4.4 Closures and Possibilities

This dissertation was about urban space in Berlin. It was an ideational dissertation from the standpoint of someone new to Berlin and Germany, and interested in understanding social movements in a foreign place. Lefebvre's (1991) production of space, and theories of poststructural difference were chosen as theoretical directions of inquiry

⁶¹ Aristotelian social space is evident in his discussions of the state. Unlike Plato, to Aristotle, a person's ideal was attainable and therefore real and concrete. He clearly stated, "Our purpose is to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who are most able to realise their ideal of life," (Barnes 1971b: 2001, 'Politics, Book II, Line 1'). Aristotle presupposed that people, under the right circumstances, can achieve their ideal form, and that the resulting ideal state is no different from the real state. The State, too, as is an object. He wrote, "... a state is composite, like any other whole made up of many parts; these are the citizens, who compose it," (Barnes 1971b: 2024, 'Politics, Book III, Line 4'). Functional in its essence, Aristotle accordingly deepened the argument with questions pertaining to possible best practices under the ideal state. In the Aristotelian republic, people are objects of and for themselves, as well as among one another. They are dispersed through space whose form is subject to them as the resulting collective state. People may also be taught, and through education, their appropriate roles acquired. He wrote, "The citizen should be moulded to suit the form of government under which he lives," (Barnes 1971b: 2122 'Politics, Book VIII, Line 1').

that might explain the apparent opposite trajectories of entering newcomers and exiting squatters.

At the end of the Chapter Two, some compatibilities among the theories were discussed. These showed that the theories worked within the same spatial paradigm. The stories of Berlin did not change this paradigm, but this paradigm showed why space is important and why space would be important to the subjects described in the contours. In 4.1 the stories were reread within Lefebvre's triad and poststructuralist multiplicity. In 4.2 the limits and opportunities of the theories were discussed. Attempts to bridge the theories showed: that the original entry/exit contours might be inaccurate; that both phenomena can indeed be viewed at once and not as particularities subject to different disciplines; and, that a rethinking of space, in general, might prove useful.

At the end of Chapter Two, four commonalities of the theorists were discussed. The first was that social space was necessary and real and therefore not ordained by a higher or supernatural level. Space and all the corporeal agents within it were real, sensual, and knowable *a posteriori*. Lefebvre (1991: 68-168) showed that the space of human interaction was not naturally created space but socially produced. Social spaces, and therefore borders, were working social productions. This process, Lefebvre (1991: 229-291) argued, was a process of abstracting the absolute, in which abstraction was inscribed. The production of a product, a thing, a corporeal agent that occupies and demarcates space (as for example a border). Space was therefore necessary, because without space, ideas remained fantasies. It was also a political statement because humans, stripped of any chains of oppression, could manifest their reality. The inability to produce was therefore political.

Non-naturalness and non-neutrality were the second and third compatibilities that lay very close to one another in meaning. Unnatural space meant that space could not be reduced to natural phenomenon. Space was not produced by supernatural or biological predestined forces beyond the perception and grasp of humans. Embracing the real, sensory, and tangible characteristic of space, all space could therefore be assessed by whose ideal was being manifested. Spatial change is therefore political. Non-neutral space is similar. Like non-natural space, in non-neutral space, humans are viewed as agents in the

production, inscription and abstraction of space. Non-neutrality refers to the humans perception of that space, and that each space is a reflection of someone's ideals.

Of the authors presented in this dissertation, only Lefebvre (1991: 48, 85, 125, 129, 331, 333, 372, 392) discussed dialectics. I chose dynamic social space to apply to the other images of space proposed by the others. Although different in meaning, their commonality is that space is always in motion. That oppositional forces dynamically countercheck and counterbalance one another suggests too that social space must be in a continual and non-static state of unevenness. There must always be a border-contest dialectic. Every new moment of resolution or conflict sets new dialectics in motion. The produced spatial practices of haves and have-nots, upper classes and low classes, insiders and outsiders, selves and others, familiars and aliens, oppressors and oppressed, decision-makers and affected, criminals and victims, dominators and dominated, rich and poor, can never reach a permanent borderless equality.

The Berliner stories changed nothing concerning these compatibilities. These compatibilities only reminded us why space matters -- that the antique question of what space is remains relevant today's world of social unevenness, just as it did in antiquity. The Berliner stories were, however, a signal that something is perhaps amiss, and that something might ought to be done. Could there be ways of imagining space and realizing space such that inequalities are addressed?

In section 4.1 the Berliner stories were framed in Lefebvre's (1991) triad. This allowed a rereading of Berliner space, and exposed fragments and power relationships. The conceived, perceived, and lived spaces of the squatters and (some) newcomers were compared. These spaces, as viewed by the government and developers were also compared. What was found were: consistent power dynamics between signifiers and signified; material manifestations of struggle and difference; a frame of reference in which counter-hegemonic movements could transpire.

When squatters signified their own conceived spaces, they signified themselves as refusers or outsiders. They signified themselves as different. This was also found among

newcomers. When squatters signified their own lived spaces, one found protest songs, graffiti, banners, and protest. Protest and action was also the lived space of newcomers, representing themselves. The lived spaces of their opposition, revealed images of free spaces open to everyone, postcards advertising well integrated newcomers, and framed graffiti. When squatters signified their lived spaces, one found community kitchens, cabarets, exhibitions – generally an extensive network of counter-hegemonic institutions. The spatial practice (lived space) of some newcomers could be seen in public intuitions such as schools, government offices – a general network of institutions in which their bodies were to be defended. The oppositional lived spaces were a practice of harmonization (of pupils, language, appearance, language) and a general defence of the “whole”.

The signifier/signified dynamic is not irrelevant, because it is a well documented power dynamic. Godard (2003), in her review of feminism and semiotics, wrote that sex/gender system:

“...has been shown to be an important signifying practice through which relations of power are enacted. .. [and] the insights of feminism into power, difference and the signifying process of identification have contributed to the emergence of studies of racialised difference, postcolonial studies, lesbian and gay studies, and queer theory,” (Godard 2003: 1).

That is to say that entire groups have mobilises their fights by exposing the signifying practice. What Lefebvre’s (1991) triad also showed was that this power dynamic was real, material, and corporeal. It was not just discourse. There are flyers, banners, buildings, songs, people, food, paintings, cells, handcuffs, to name just a few of the material objects in Berliner space that some of the most radical squatters or most foreign and illegal residents use or come in contact with. These material manifestations, as seen in 4.1.3, could be found and read.

In 4.2, the limits of Lefebvre’s (1991) theory of space was explored. It was found that the main problem with his theory was his reliance totality. The framing of the stories

according to Lefebvre's triad, shifted the focus of the stories from one of entry and exit to one of power. At the risk of splitting the solidarity of Marxism, feminist theories of coeval trajectories (Massey (2005), radical flexibility (Bauman 2007), and transnationalism (Pratt 2004; Smith 2001), however, were needed to deconstruct reductionist metanarratives of totality. A fusion with Lefebvre (1991), however, was found if centres could be multiple, if space was not reductionist, and if cities could be viewed as nodes on an extensive net of trajectories.

Lastly, the possibility of a political structure under flexible everything. A powerful central political economic top-down structure remains in Berlin, and this was seen to be an *Other* against which both squatters and newcomers came in conflict with. I called it vertical power: that which enforces norms from above on bodies below. "Vertical power" was used to describe processes of violence or limitation on peoples who were not part of the decision-making process of those who decided to apply it. Violent power was sometimes seen in the application of police force. Other times, it was seen in less brutal forms as Lefebvre's minimalisation (as described by Kipfer 2008: 208). Minimalisation (ibid.) was violent in so far that refusing it could mean being shifted to less desirable living conditions. It seen that those who may be interpreted as minimalised and hybridised were not participants in particularly counter discourses. Those that claimed maximal difference resorted to more confrontational means of resolution. The theoretical question was, then: what forms of political organization could arise if vertical power were abandoned? It would seem that vertical power is not possible in flexible everything. Fraser (1993) and Benhabib (2004) offered clues here. Counter publics and territory-unbounded public forums shed some light onto the theoretical possibilities.

This dissertation was about rethinking space – just as the authors discussed have done as well. This dissertation discussed space in terms of looking at ways to imagine space such that social unevenness might be evened out. It is an age old problem, and western philosophers of the northern hemisphere have been rationalising difference for many centuries now.

Lefebvre (1991) showed us that social space is dialectical, produced, inscribed, and decodable. Lefebvre (1991) was valuable too because he pressed the reader to remember the masked production process, to identify not just the signified, but also the signifier. This reveals the non-neutrality of space, and the politics and power of space. His project (ibid.) was a political one too because his vision of a real and concrete social space put the responsibility and power in each person's hands. Each had the power to produce (ibid.), and by changing the codes one can change space. Massey (2005) viewed space as a mish-mash of trajectories and stories continually thrown together at junctures called the present. Homogenising these trajectories into a single time-space narrative necessarily forced an exclusion of another story. A radical opening of space, then, was in Massey view, the necessary social and political project. The theories of Bourdieu (1984), Massey (2005), Smith (2001), Pratt (2004), Benhabib (2004) and Fraser (1993) were, too, political projects towards social equality.

Otherness was a recurring theme throughout, and is essentially a problem about borders. Borders were seen throughout the stories of social processes in Berlin. That borders were everywhere, the original observation that squatters are on a course of leaving while newcomers are on a course of entering was then shown as false one-dimensional at best. Neither were simply crossing a line on map or refusing of a particular whole. Rather they were stories immersed in a sense web of trajectories, fields, and spaces hegemonic and counter that are everywhere bound by, and required for the production of further, borders. Depending on the theoretical lens, it was seen that spatial borders exist at various levels: signifier and signified, decision-makers and decision-receivers, counter and hegemonic, self and other, central and peripheral, vertical and lateral, to name a few. Borders, too, even if only temporary and ephemeral, were an integral component of these spaces. Borders were found at the points of contradiction, at the edges of *fields*, along the trajectories of *habitus* and time-space stories, and in the bounded arenas of counter discourse. All of these borders were socially produced abstractions in absolute space. All were real and concrete. All are inscribed in space. All could be perceived, conceived, and lived. All were contestable and removable. Social space was therefore, despite its borders, limitless.

Is it possible to build public spaces free of socio-economic, socio-cultural, unevenness in the midst of current forms of capitalism? To what end can each enclosed social universe be de-bordered? Could a social world with infinite possibilities be the social project that Lefebvre sought? Is it the radical opening up that Massey (2005) dreamed of? Is it possible? Is the infinite an alternative for organisation of social space? Is radical opening possible? Is it possible to conceive of networks where the “whole” never existed to begin with. Can one locate the infinite within local spaces. Are there, for example, infinite parallel societies? To say that it isn’t is to resort not only to pessimism, but to restrict oneself to rigid perceptions and conceptions of space. To say that it is possible is to throw form, structure and function to the wind and submit to the endless chaos of representational space. At what point must the border be drawn: the city, the nation, the continent, the earth, the universe? How many may a social unit include: the individual, the family, the support network, the citizenry, the earthling? Difference and contest is unavoidable.

In this dissertation, it was seen that these borders can be seen everywhere, but they are above all removable. If borders are socially produced, then no border can be assumed to be natural or permanent, and through a contest can be removed. Identifying the borders and embarking on strategies of border removal might be a pertinent further research project. Of further research interest might be to examine how contest can form, or what strategies of communication might be most fruitful. Because if borders can be perceived, conceived, and lived in its various dimensions, then stories can be addressed, and differences can be bridged.

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